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This dissertation contends that in 1940 and 1941 the makers and shapers of American 
foreign relations decided that the United States should become the world’s supreme political 
and military power, responsible for underwriting international order on a global scale. Reacting 
to the events of World War II, particularly the Nazi conquest of France, American officials and 
intellectuals concluded that henceforth armed force was essential to the maintenance of liberal 
intercourse in international society and that the United States must possess and control a 
preponderance of such force. This new axiom constituted a rupture from what came before and 
a condition of possibility of the subsequent Cold War with the Soviet Union and of U.S. world 
leadership after the Soviet collapse.  
Thus this dissertation argues against the teleological interpretations of two opposing sets 
of scholarship. The first set, an orthodox literature in history and political science, posits a 
longstanding polarity in American thinking between “internationalism” and “isolationism.” So 
conceived, internationalism favored global political-military supremacy from the first, needing 
only to vanquish isolationism in the arena of elite and popular opinion. The second, revisionist 
camp suggests the United States sought supremacy all along, driven by the dynamics of 
capitalism and the ideology of exceptionalism. By contrast, this dissertation uses methods of 
intellectual history in order to show that policy elites scarcely envisioned U.S. supremacy prior 
to 1940. Instead they widely identified with “internationalism,” understood then as the 
antithesis of power politics, not of isolationism. Prewar internationalists, in short, sought to 
replace armed force with peaceful intercourse in world affairs. 
The narrative begins, in Part I, with the decline of traditional ideas of internationalism, 
at first gradually in the 1930s and then decisively eight months into World War II in Europe. 
When the Nazis steamrolled France in May 1940, stunning the world, they swept away the old 
order and with it the assumptions of American internationalism. Now peaceful intercourse, far 
from replacing armed force, seemed paradoxically to depend upon armed force to undergird it. 
In official and especially semiofficial circles, American postwar planners scrambled to map the 
international area required to safeguard U.S. geopolitical and economic interests. They 
swapped continents in and out before concluding, by the autumn, that America’s living space 
spanned the globe. Simultaneously, the Axis powers shattered the fundaments of British 
imperial power, presenting the opportunity for the United States to take the lead. Out of the 
death of nineteenth-century internationalism and British world leadership, U.S. global 
supremacy was born. 
In 1941 policy elites conceived how to achieve world leadership, the subject of Part II. 
At first they hardly wished to set up a new world organization to replace the failed League of 
Nations. They preferred a permanent partnership with Great Britain and its white Dominions, 
a vision that President Franklin D. Roosevelt endorsed. Projecting a postwar cold war between 
the Anglosphere and a Nazi-dominated Europe, planners thought the “English-speaking 
peoples,” America chief among them, would police most of the world. Soon, however, planners 
perceived a problem. U.S. supremacy, especially in partnership with Britain, sounded 
imperialistic. If asked to play power politics, the American people might refuse to lead. 
Preoccupied with domestic public opinion, policy elites launched a campaign to 
legitimate U.S. political-military preeminence. From 1942 to 1945, as Part III recounts, they 
achieved what they conceived. They popularized a narrative that turned armed supremacy into 
the epitome of “internationalism,” redefined in opposition to their newly coined pejorative 
“isolationism.” Then they revived world organization after all, less to eliminate war or promote 
law than to cleanse U.S. power in the eyes of the American public as well as foreign states. 
Harnessing the resonance of prior efforts to end power politics in the name of internationalism, 
the United Nations Organization became an instrument to implement power politics. 
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For most of their history, Americans claimed their nation was exceptional because it did 
not covet armed supremacy over the rest of the world. Accusing European rulers of seeking 
domination, U.S. politicians, diplomats, intellectuals, and activists countered with what they 
called “internationalism,” an ethico-political discourse through which they imagined peaceful 
intercourse would transcend the Old World system of power politics. The circulation of goods, 
ideas, and people would give expression to the latent harmony among civilized nations, 
preventing disputes from arising. The mechanisms of international law, arbitration, and 
organization would peaceably resolve what disputes did arise. But unless and until these 
processes succeeded in redeeming Europe, the United States should avoid political-military 
entanglement there. In the New World, by contrast, internationalism helped to constitute and 
rationalize almost constant expansion, such that by the early twentieth century, the United 
States possessed the world’s largest economy, controlled territory spanning North America, 
acquired several colonies, and policed large swathes of Latin America and the Pacific. Yet 
internationalism circumscribed the expansion it licensed. To build a New World free of power 
politics seemed to preclude playing, let alone dominating, power politics in the Old. Only a 
rupture, a qualitative break, would change this state of affairs. Until then, global supremacy 
would sound like the kind of great-power imperialism Americans always condemned in others. 
The rupture was not achieved in 1898. True, the United States positioned itself as a 
civilizing agent akin to the great powers of Europe and seized the Philippines and Puerto Rico 
for formal occupation. But throughout the expansionist Progressive era, American leaders 
professed a posture of political-military non-entanglement toward European affairs and 
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promoted legalistic alternatives to power politics; they also found alternatives to the tactic of 
colonial conquest. Nor did the rupture occur in 1919, when advocates of world organization 
ambivalently conceived a collective security scheme in the expectation that armed force would 
never have to be used. By the late 1940s, however, policymakers were determined to maintain 
a “preponderance of power” in the control of the United States. This objective, historians have 
shown, led them to construe the Soviet Union as a threat and the Cold War as a response.1  
How did this will to lead the world come about? Historians still do not know why, or 
even when, American officials and intellectuals first decided the United States ought to lead the 
world — to become the supreme political and military power holding itself responsible for 
enforcing international law and order. Worse, historians have obscured the very question. 
Failing to imagine the United States in any role except chief arbiter of global affairs, they have 
naturalized America’s will to lead the world. Unwittingly they heed the call of publishing mogul 
Henry Luce in his “American Century” essay: “We can make a truly American internationalism 
something as natural to us in our time as the airplane or the radio.”2 Since Luce penned those 
words in 1941, historians have either cast the United States prior to World War II as a 
superpower-to-be or claimed that isolationism held America back. But the people in these 
narratives would have recognized neither portrayal; Americans did not think they were seeking 
supremacy and, until the 1930s, had not heard of “isolationism.” Rather than wonder what took 
so long for the United States to muster political will commensurate with its economic strength, 
this study asks why the transformation happened at all.  
                                                   
1 Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992). 




Two opposing constellations of scholars have equally neglected the birth of American 
global supremacy. Historians in the first group address the subject obliquely but only as the 
victory of “internationalism” in its age-old struggle against “isolationism.” That is, they structure 
their narratives around categories invented by their wartime protagonists precisely to mask the 
novelty of U.S. objectives and dismiss the views of domestic opponents. Elizabeth Borgwardt’s 
A New Deal for the World is one of the latest works to presume that world leadership was an old 
goal — that the internationalism that prevailed in 1945 shared the essential meaning of the 
internationalism that preceded it.3 Scholars debate why internationalism defeated isolationism 
                                                   
3 Much historiography continues to structure its analysis around “the traditional 
isolationist/internationalist duality in American foreign policy,” in Borgwardt’s words. It casts U.S. 
foreign relations either as isolationist before becoming internationalist or as constantly oscillating 
between the two. Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 63. Recent works that approach World War II in 
this vein — by positing a traditional “isolationism” against which they define the “internationalism” 
under study — include Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, FDR and the Creation of the U.N. (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); Inderjeet Parmar, Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, 
Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2012), ch. 3; Daniel Plesch, America, Hitler and the UN: How the Allies Won World War II and Forged a Peace 
(London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2011); David Schmitz, The Triumph of Internationalism: Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and a World in Crisis, 1933-1941 (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007); Stephen 
Schlesinger, Act of Creation: Ihe Founding of the United Nations (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2003). 
More circumspect scholars of wartime “internationalism” recognize that the label “isolationism” 
oversimplifies or distorts the opponents of their protagonists. Yet they continue to work with similar 
concepts; isolationists simply become non-internationalists. Their interventionist protagonists remain 
the internationalists, who battled for decades before emerging victorious in World War II. As Hilde 
Restad writes, “the literature still reproduces the dichotomy of isolationism/internationalism by 
substituting separateness or aloofness for isolationism — or, in other cases, authors still use the term 
isolationism.” Hilde Restad, American Exceptionalism: An Idea That Made a Nation and Remade the World 
(London: Routledge, 2015), 67-8. Notable examples from the past two decades are Andrew Johnstone, 
Against Immediate Evil: American Internationalists and the Four Freedoms on the Eve of World War II (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2014); Johnstone, Dilemmas of Internationalism: The American Association for the 
United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1941-1948 (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009); Warren Kuehl and 
Lynne Dunn, Keeping the Covenant: American Internationalists and the League of Nations, 1920-1939 (Kent, OH: 
Kent State University Press, 1997). 
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in World War II after the reverse ostensibly occurred in World War I, but the stability of the 
categories is assumed.4 Scholars have missed that self-identified internationalists before World 
War II sought to obviate the need for global supremacy by the United States or any other power, 
until the concept changed to become nearly synonymous with global supremacy. 
The resulting narratives invariably reach triumphalist conclusions, for wartime 
“internationalists” cannot but compare favorably to mythical “isolationists,” who showed little 
regard for the welfare of other nations and wished to separate America completely. Because 
supposed isolationists fought against world leadership and world organization alike, 
internationalists become the champions of both in equal measure, as if the two objectives 
contained no contradiction. Historians reproduce the erasure that their protagonists labored to 
generate — the elision of world leadership and world organization, of the projection of 
American power and the international control of power.5 Thus after her narrative shows how 
                                                   
Those recent works adopt the analytical framework established by two previous historiographical 
waves, so to speak. The first, produced in World War II or by participants afterward, made little secret 
of its effort to extol “internationalism” and discredit “isolationism.” Examples include, in addition to 
works discussed in Chapter Five: Walter Johnson, The Battle Against Isolation (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1944); William Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940 
(New York: Harper, 1952); Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, 1940-1941 (New York: Harper, 
1953). In a more analytical literature written the 1960s and 1970s, the oeuvre of Robert Divine is 
exemplary. The title of his Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America during World War II 
(New York: Atheneum, 1967) indicates how Divine reproduced the teleological narrative propagated 
by wartime anti-isolationists. See also Mark Lincoln Chadwin, The Warhawks: American Interventionists 
before Pearl Harbor (New York: Norton, 1970); Robert Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1962); Divine, The Reluctant Belligerent: American Entry into World War II (New 
York: Wiley, 1965); Harold Josephson, James T. Shotwell and the Rise of Internationalism in America 
(Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1974). 
4 Robert Divine claims the mobilization of elite activists largely made the difference; Jeffrey Legro, 
the lessons of another world war; Borgwardt, the legacy of New Deal institution building. Borgwardt, A 
New Deal for the World, 6; Divine, Second Chance, 4-5; Jeffrey Legro, “Whence American 
Internationalism,” International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 2 (April 2000), 253-89. 
5 This dissertation sometimes uses the general terms “world organization” or “international 
organization” to signify the more specific concept of an international political organization with 
universal membership, as exemplified by the League of Nations and the United Nations. Thus it 
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officials guarded American prerogatives, Borgwardt nevertheless ends up calling for a return to 
“the heady multilateralist Zeitgeist of 1945” in contradistinction to the ostensible unilateralism of 
George W. Bush.6 When they encounter wartime internationalists committed more to U.S. 
power projection than to international organization, historians have turned this fact into a defect 
and not a feature of American internationalism.7 
This dissertation aims to provide a political and intellectual history more attentive to the 
construction of categories and their generative power. For too long the original architects of 
global supremacy have been permitted to define the conceptual horizons of scholarship on U.S. 
foreign relations and international governance. Even the finest historians of “isolationism” itself 
have taken the category at face value. They use the epithet as their foundational category of 
analysis despite almost uniformly emphasizing that “isolationism” encompassed ideas and 
policies far more diverse and sophisticated than the term connotes.8 (Recently one historian, 
                                                   
sharply distinguishes “world organization” from international economic organization or exclusively 
Anglo-American political integration. The intention is twofold: to underscore how contemporaries 
understood universal international political organization to be qualitatively distinct from other forms, 
and not to burden the reader through the constant repetition of “universal international political 
organization.” 
6 Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World, 132, 250. 
7 Likewise, in a detailed examination of leading League-turned-U.N. advocates, Andrew Johnstone 
begins by defining his protagonists as apostles of a “specifically multilateral internationalism,” since he 
presumes their (never examined) detractors to be unilateralists. After his narrative reveals the limits of 
their attachment to international law and organization, he faults them for being bad multilateralists, 
who let personality clashes and a desire for government influence get in the way. But why assume them 
to be constitutively “multilateralist” in the first place? Johnstone, Dilemmas of Internationalism: The 
American Association for the United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1941-1948 (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 
2009); see also Andrew Johnstone, Against Immediate Evil: American Internationalists and the Four Freedoms on 
the Eve of World War II (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014). 
8 Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth-Century Reaction (London and New York: Abelard-
Schuman, 1957); Wayne Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932-1945 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1983); Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality; Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America, 1935-1941 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1966); Christopher McKnight Nichols, Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of 
a Global Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). Notable exceptions that refer to “anti-
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impressed with the analytical inadequacy of the category, coined “isolationist internationalism” 
to describe the prewar generation, as though it would be clarifying to yoke together terms 
understood then and now as mutually exclusive opposites, but not to examine critically the work 
those categories performed at the time.9) Having spent decades punching at the same target, 
historians appear unable to deliver the knock-out — perhaps because they take “isolationism” 
for granted, in some cases openly endorsing the term’s connotations of “narrow provincialism” 
and “national egotism,” in the respective words of Robert Divine and Manfred Jonas.10 
Consciously or not, historians have internalized the concepts of the founders of postwar 
American historiography, who, as Chapter Five describes, popularized the internationalism-
versus-isolationism narrative in order to legitimate world leadership. Indeed, it was William 
                                                   
interventionists” or “peace progressives” in place of “isolationists” are Justus Doenecke, Storm on the 
Horizon: The Challenge to American Intervention, 1939-1941 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2000); Robert David Johnson, The Peace Progressives and American Foreign Relations (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). 
In a recent article proposing to replace the interwar internationalism/isolationism dichotomy with a 
complex set of positions on neutrality, Brooke Blower briefly sketches the chronology of the 
construction of “isolationism” as a category in American political discourse. This dissertation extends 
her research on the discursive construction, and in particular it examines how “isolationism” 
functioned as a weapon of political combat and an ideological foil against which “internationalism” 
was reconceived. Brooke Blower, “From Isolationism to Neutrality: A New Framework for 
Understanding American Political Culture, 1919-1941,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 38, No. 2 (April 2014), 
345-76. An analysis of “isolationist name-calling” in political debate since the 1990s is David Dunn, 
“Isolationism Revisited: Seven Persistent Myths in the Contemporary American Foreign Policy 
Debate,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2 (April 2005), 237-61. 
9 Nichols, Promise and Peril, 8. 
10 Despite writing mostly to rehabilitate “isolationist” thought for developing thorough analyses of 
the crises in Europe and Asia, Jonas simultaneously pathologizes “isolationism” as a psychological 
deficiency: he writes that isolationism entailed an “inordinate fear of war” and is “permanently 
attractive…produc[ing] at least a nostalgic yearning for it whenever world events become too 
unpleasant to contemplate with equanimity.” Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality, 41; Jonas, Isolationism in 
America, 3, 23, 260, 275. 
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Langer, a postwar planner in the Council on Foreign Relations, who co-wrote several standard, 
and Council-funded, histories of the debate before Pearl Harbor.11 
Against the anti-isolationist historians, a second camp of scholars replies that America 
was always a superpower in the making. Did not the United States, seeking foreign markets, 
imagining itself exceptional, steadily expand until realizing its telos as a global superpower? This 
was the view of left revisionists, inaugurated by William Appleman Williams.12 It remains the 
stock-in-trade of historians critical of U.S. foreign policy, including Patrick Hearden and Neil 
Smith in their recent accounts of postwar planning.13 Revisionists did not orient their narratives 
                                                   
11 Langer and Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940 and The Undeclared War, 1940-1941. 
12 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (Cleveland: World Publishing 
Company, 1959). 
13 Hearden’s is the most comprehensive and meticulous account of postwar planning within the State 
Department. Following his Roosevelt Confronts Hitler: America’s Entry into World War II (DeKalb, IL: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 1987), Hearden argues that the overriding objective of postwar 
planners was the reconstruction a “liberal capitalist world system” that would absorb American 
surpluses, obviating the need for excessive centralized planning or deficit spending. Although the 
book’s empirical wealth often overwhelms its interpretive aims, the “architects of globalism” read as 
though they are implementing old blueprints rather than conceiving new ones. In the lone chapter set 
prior to Pearl Harbor, Hearden foregrounds the Roosevelt administration’s attempts to pressure Great 
Britain to remove postwar barriers to trade, as though this is tantamount to pursuing “globalism”; 
Hearden assumes globalism is the objective and will be the outcome. Yet at the beginning of 1940, 
globalism struck postwar planners as implausible and undesirable. Over the next two years, their 
projected postwar space within which America would live dramatically shrunk before expanding. 
Patrick Hearden, Architects of Globalism: Building a New World Order during World War II (Fayetteville: 
University of Arkansas Press, 2002), xiv.  
On his own terms Smith provides a penetrating Marxist analysis of America’s “anti-geographical 
ideology.” Nevertheless unceasing U.S. territorial and geo-economic expansion serves as the taken-for-
granted backdrop rather than the object of explanation. Smith draws a straight line across “moments 
of U.S. global ambition” from 1898 through 2001. “The period,” he writes, “is the American Century, 
which I take to have been announced in 1898, even if it was not recognized and named until decades 
later.” Neil Smith, American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003), xiii, xvii, chs. 10-4. 
Other accounts of State Department postwar planning are Aiyaz Husain, Mapping the End of Empire: 
American and British Strategic Visions in the Postwar World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2014); Christopher O’Sullivan, Sumner Welles, Postwar Planning, and the Quest for a New World Order, 1937-
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around the internationalism/isolationism dichotomy; Williams himself denied that U.S. foreign 
policy was “isolationist” in the 1920s, interpreting policymakers as “the most vigorous 
interventionists” instead.14 But much as Williams integrated the twenties into a narrative of 
relentless American expansion, so revisionist scholarship has often conjured a static American 
will to dominate. The turn to political-military supremacy becomes the culmination of 
America’s time-honored quest for the Open Door. 
Granting that American officials pursued access to foreign markets and raw materials 
since the late nineteenth century, this dissertation asks why, after May 1940, economic 
objectives suddenly seemed to require the United States to possess armed supremacy and 
assume responsibility for world leadership. At the time, officials and intellectuals acutely 
perceived the problem, viewing it as one of both conception and presentation. When State 
Department planners first convened at the start of 1940, they identified U.S. participation in an 
international economic organization to be obviously desirable and domestically palatable. On 
the other hand, they found that American interests and American opinion alike dictated scarcely 
any political or military role for the postwar United States beyond the Western Hemisphere.15 
In these areas, American thinking had a uniquely far distance to travel. It is in the perceived 
relationship between politics and economics — and not just economics but liberal intercourse 
more broadly — that U.S. diplomacy underwent a revolution in World War II. This area of 
                                                   
1943 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Benjamin Welles, Sumner Welles: FDR’s Global 
Strategist: A Biography (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997). 
14 William Appleman Williams, “The Legend of Isolationism in the 1920’s,” Science & Society, Vol. 18, 
No. 1 (Winter 1954), 3. 




innovation belies Hearden’s privileging of the desire for foreign markets in U.S. motives and 
Smith’s neglect of the extensive postwar planning devoted to political and military matters.16 
Foreign policy elites had to conceive American world leadership through a matrix of 
ideas of international society. If such ideas encompass more than the Open Door, they also 
occupy different terrain than that of the legatees of left revisionism who explain U.S. expansion 
as the product of national ideology. Scholars continue to produce a voluminous literature on 
what they now call “American exceptionalism,” roughly an ideology of superiority holding the 
United States to be destined to lead and redeem the world. Symptomatic is the oeuvre of 
Michael Hunt, who explains the twentieth-century American ascendancy as the corollary of 
“core ideas” set in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.17 Despite dismissing isolationism as 
a myth, he relies on the concept of isolationism because he simply inverts the story. Anything 
non-isolationist, which is everything, becomes a will to power. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, 
he writes, “the giant was feeling its way cautiously toward global dominance” — apparently 
without anyone thinking or saying so.18 
                                                   
16 Smith focuses on the postwar planning subcommittees pertaining to territorial issues and led by his 
biographical subject, geographer Isaiah Bowman. Those constituted around a quarter of the 
subcommittees in the State Department and the Council on Foreign Relations. A valuable left-
revisionist interpretation of Council planning — examining the Economic and Financial Group but 
ignoring the other three groups — is Laurence Shoup and William Minter, Imperial Brain Trust: The 
Council on Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), ch. 4. 
Likewise Shoup, Shaping the National Interest: The Council on Foreign Relations, the Department of State, and the 
Origins of the Postwar World, 1939-1943, PhD Dissertation, Northwestern University, 1974. 
17 Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 17. 
18 In his latest book, Hunt supplements ideology with several other causal factors, but to the same 
effect. By the turn of the twentieth century, he writes, all that remained was for the American state to 
develop the capacity to dominate the world: no ideational change required. Michael Hunt, The 
American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained and Wielded Global Dominance (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2007), 81. 
Works in this vein include John Fousek, To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural 
Roots of the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Walter L. Hixson, The 
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To the extent historians have addressed the origins of U.S. world leadership, then, they 
have offered teleological accounts, whether emphasizing the relentless expansion of U.S. power 
or assuming that only isolationism stood in the way. They have done the same since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. The endurance of America’s will to lead the world, following the 
disappearance of its Cold War adversary, might seem puzzling.19 Befitting the domestic political 
consensus in favor of American world leadership, however, “postrevisionists” John Lewis 
Gaddis, Michael Hogan, and Melvyn Leffler continued to center debate on origins of the Cold 
War in the late 1940s, leaving the Good War less examined.20 Only John A. Thompson and 
                                                   
Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2008); Emily S. Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–
1945 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982). 
A more sophisticated account, by Anders Stephanson, treats “manifest destiny” ideology as a 
conceptual frame indeterminate with regard to foreign policy: it accommodates either exemplary 
separation or regenerative intervention. This dissertation argues that internationalism is another 
conceptual frame that is foundational in the discourse of American foreign relations. Internationalism 
is not reducible to exceptionalism but rather combines with it, such that the United States always 
pitches itself as at once superior and equal, above the law and within the law. Anders Stephanson, 
Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995). 
19 Indeed political scientists have struggled to predict and explain the continuation of American 
global supremacy since the 1990s. See Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou, “Waltz, Mearsheimer and the 
Post-Cold War World: The Rise of America and the Fall of Structural Realism,” International Politics, 
Vol. 51 (2014), 295-315. 
20 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during 
the Cold War, 2nd ed. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Gaddis, We Now Know: 
Rethinking Cold War History (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Michael J. Hogan, 
A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State (Cambridge, UK, and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Leffler, A Preponderance of Power. The overwhelming focus on 
the Cold War suggests that scholars have naturalized U.S. global supremacy, but it might also suggest 
that they conflate the origins of global supremacy with the origins of the Cold War. As political 
scientist Barry Posen, who advocates scaling down America’s contemporary role in world politics, says: 
“I don’t think the United States quite set out to achieve this level of dominance. I think we were just 
trying to defend ourselves and our friends against the Soviet Union.” Scott Beauchamp, “America 





Anders Stephanson, in provocative articles, have outlined the transformations in concepts of 
national security and cold war articulated in public discourse from 1939 to 1941.21 In the last 
two decades, moreover, the field has reoriented itself around how non-American actors have 
related to American power. Quietly this “international turn” has turned historians away from 
inquiring into the domestic sources of and desire for that power.22 Barbara Keys, Samuel Moyn, 
                                                   
21 This dissertation extends their research and analysis in several ways. It examines a range of 
officials and intellectuals who devoted themselves to thinking and planning the postwar world prior to 
Pearl Harbor. It shows that these actors conceived political-military world leadership in addition to 
cold war ideology and globalist definitions of “national security.” It also foregrounds ideas of 
internationalism as an explanatory context and a source of legitimation. Anders Stephanson, “Liberty 
or Death: The Cold War as US Ideology,” in Odd Arne Westad, ed., Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, 
Interpretations, Theory (London: Frank Cass, 2000), ch. 4; Anders Stephanson, “Fourteen Notes on the 
Very Concept of the Cold War,” in Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby, eds., Rethinking Geopolitics 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 62-85; John A. Thompson, “Another Look at the Downfall 
of ‘Fortress America,’” Journal of American Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3 (December 1992), 393-408; 
Thompson, “Conceptions of National Security and American Entry into World War II,” Diplomacy and 
Statecraft, Vol. 16, No. 4 (December 2005), 671-97. Also see Thompson’s forthcoming A Sense of Power: 
The Roots of America’s Global Role (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015).  
In addition, Frank Ninkovich and Jeffrey Legro offer perceptive chapters on transformations before 
Pearl Harbor. Using typically idiosyncratic (and anachronistic) terminology, Ninkovich argues that 
“globalization,” dating from the late nineteenth century, compelled the United States to join 
international society and become its preserver. The result amounts to neo-orthodoxy. In his chapter set 
before Pearl Harbor, he writes that the debate pitted “internationalists” against “isolationists,” that is 
“those who believed that international society was a vital interest” against “those who believed that the 
nation could do without it.” For his part, Legro, a political scientist, perceptively presents the pre-Pearl 
Harbor years as a case study of great-power “ideational transformation” although he assumes the 
conceptual stability of “internationalism” from World War I to World War II. Frank Ninkovich, The 
Global Republic: America’s Inadvertent Rise to World Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 
153-4; Legro, Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2005), 2, 49-83. 
The “great debate” of 1940 and 1941 figures as a turning point in two wide-ranging explorations of 
the militarization of American political life and the creation of the national security state, respectively: 
Michael Sherry, In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1995); Douglas Stuart, Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law That Transformed 
America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
22 Prominent examples include Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the 
International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); 
Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). The turn away, so to speak, was prefigured as early as 1969, from 
within left revisionism. Thomas J. McCormick, William Appleman Williams’s student and successor at 
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and Mary Dudziak have recently written partial counterexamples that explore how discourses 
of “human rights” and “wartime” served to legitimate U.S. interventions abroad. But they 
presuppose U.S. power itself, neglecting to explain why officials and activists apparently favored 
its extension axiomatically.23 The unwitting implication is that American supremacy is obvious 
and immutable and that nothing within the United States militates against it. 
 
In order to reveal the contingency of America’s embrace of world leadership, this 
dissertation uses the methods of intellectual history to show how ideas of global supremacy 
emerged out of discourses of international society — specifically from the perceived failure of 
“internationalism” to provide a basis for world order. As a second-rank power in the early 
twentieth century, the United States was a leading advocate of internationalist reforms, and 
many Americans in foundations and universities participated in the League of Nations and 
related institutions despite the nation’s abstention from formal membership. One does not need 
to speculate, as Borgwardt does, that the American architects of international institutions in 
World War II projected “New Deal-style multilateral institutions onto the wider world stage.”24 
                                                   
the University of Wisconsin-Madison, called for diplomatic historians to “get beyond historiographical 
squabbling over the motivations of America’s economic expansion to some realistic assessment of its 
consequences.” Thomas J. McCormick, “The State of American Diplomatic History,” in Herbert J. 
Bass, ed., The State of American History (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970), 139.  
The international turn has, however, generated extensive research on the mutual constitution of 
expert knowledge and U.S. foreign policy. A survey is David Engerman, “American Knowledge and 
Global Power,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 31, No. 4 (September 2007), 599-622. 
23 Mary Dudziak, War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012); Barbara Keys, Reclaiming American Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2014); Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
24 Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World, 6. 
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Ideas of international society, a major area of American intellectual production by the middle 
of the twentieth century, provided direct influence. U.S. planners modeled the United Nations 
Organization on the British Commonwealth of Nations and the Concert of Europe more than 
on any domestic institution.25 
Rather than reducing international history to American history, this dissertation 
conceives international society and U.S. foreign policy as two distinct subjects of inquiry and 
puts each into conversation with the other. It integrates the United States — and its political 
and military power — into a new historiography of international society that often sidelines 
America’s rise to global supremacy, a profound development in world history.26 This literature 
                                                   
25 Indeed historians of Britain and Anglo-American relations have done the most to illuminate the 
wartime transition from British to American initiative, chiefly vis-à-vis the bilateral alliance and the 
prosecution of the war. This dissertation touches on the Anglo-American handoff but argues that U.S. 
world leadership was conceived as an alternative to peaceful intercourse as much as to British world 
leadership. Before seeking world leadership for the United States, policy elites had to decide that the 
world needed political-military leadership at all. See especially John Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise 
and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), ch. 
11; William Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 
1941-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); Brian McKercher, Transition of Power: Britain’s 
Loss of Global Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930-1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); 
David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-41: A Study in Competitive Co-operation 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982); Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor: 
Roosevelt’s America and the Origins of the Second World War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001); Christopher 
Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War Against Japan (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1978). 
26 On the whole, American actors are hardly underrepresented in international histories, especially 
for the period after 1945. They are, however, less frequently integrated into histories of international 
society, understood as an arena structured by norms, laws, and institutions. In particular, the prewar 
United States rarely figures as participating in international society, rather than either isolating from it 
or attempting to run it. For example, in his seminal history of international law, Martti Koskenniemi 
ignores the international legal profession in the United States until the 1940s, when Hans Morgenthau 
brings his deformalized version of law to America. The United States becomes an empty vessel filled 
only by German émigrés. Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of 
International Law, 1870-1960 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001); on the rise of 
international law in America, see Benjamin Coates, Legalist Empire: International Law, Civilization, and U.S. 
Foreign Relations in the Early Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). The 
historiographical divide may be traced in part to the English School of International Relations, which 
pioneered the study of “international society” and gained popularity in Greater Britain but not the 
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sometimes fetishizes the international or transnational as an inherently emancipatory space, 
counterposed to power and egoism.27 Accordingly, in a number of recent works, historians and 
political scientists treat the United Nations as a dramatic, linear advance for international law 
and organization and credit the wartime United States for accepting binding constraints on its 
conduct.28 Such a view becomes difficult to sustain, however, when one reads history forward. 
                                                   
United States. See Timothy Dunne, Inventing International Society: A History of the English School 
(Basingstoke and New York: Macmillan Press, 1998). 
27 Akira Iriye’s agenda-setting Global Community, for instance, narrates the growth of international and 
nongovernmental organizations as though they stood united against all manner of parochialism and 
conflict. It defines NGOs to exclude religious, military, and profit-seeking organizations because they 
smack of the egoism and particularism more easily obscured in other bodies. Akira Iriye, Global 
Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2002); and his “The Making of a Transnational World,” in Akira Iriye, 
ed., Global Interdependence: The World After 1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 679-847. 
Other examples include Thomas Bender, A Nation Among Nations: America’s Place in World History (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 2006); Mark Philip Bradley, “Decolonization, the Global South, and the Cold 
War, 1919-1962,” in Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War: 
Origins, 1945-1962, Vol. 1 (Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 464-
85. 
28 Borgwardt claims the wartime United States “chose to bind itself to multilateral institutions that 
would manifestly limit its historic obsession with unfettered freedom of action.” For political scientist 
G. John Ikenberry, the creation of the United Nations exemplifies a general truth: “When all is said 
and done, Americans are less interested in ruling the world than they are in a world of rules.” Likewise, 
political scientist and policymaker Anne-Marie Slaughter symptomatically positions Woodrow Wilson 
as the fundament of the American liberal internationalist telos, despite evincing some ambivalence 
about the United Nations: “Wilson would look today at the expanded European Union and see his 
own vision of self-determination and democracy…He would look at the United Nations and perhaps 
see an improvement on the League. He would look at the responsibility to protect and see an effort to 
update his principles to changing circumstances.” Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World, 10; G. John 
Ikenberry, “Power and Liberal Order: America’s Postwar World Order in Transition,” International 
Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 5, No. 2 (August 2005), 150; Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Wilsonianism in 
the Twenty-First Century,” in G. John Ikenberry, Thomas Knock, Annie-Marie Slaughter, and Tony 
Smith, eds., The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-First Century (Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009), 115. 
Other works that present the United Nations Organization as an elaboration of and advance on the 
League of Nations include G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding 
of Order after Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Paul Kennedy, The Parliament of 
Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations (New York: Random House, 2006); Schlesinger, Act 
of Creation. A notable exception, covering the later years of the war, is Robert Hildebrand, Dumbarton 
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This dissertation situates the creation of the United Nations in the context of previous ideas of 
American internationalism and finds that the U.N. was conceived against prior proposals. To its 
American architects, the organization possessed largely instrumental value as a vehicle for the 
projection of U.S. power.29 In this way, this study makes a fresh contribution to the international 
turn, not by bringing far-flung actors into the same frame but rather by conceiving a non-
teleological narrative of the construction of international institutions and recovering the self-
conscious body of international thought that existed in the prewar United States. 
Finally, this dissertation locates agency in the American foreign policy elite, understood 
as encompassing official policymakers as well as experts in foundations, academia, and 
journalism. Although the inclusion of semiofficial and unofficial actors expands the state-centric 
field of traditional diplomatic histories, the Americans who thought seriously about foreign 
affairs were, relative to the public at large, few in number and homogenous in all manner of 
composition.30 The United States, then, amply exhibited Michael Mann’s concept of 
                                                   
Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1990). 
29 Presenting international institutions as vehicles for hegemonic power, as opposed to lawful and 
accountable governance, are Matthew Connelly, Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World 
Population (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008); Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The 
History of an Idea (New York: Penguin, 2012); Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the 
Ideological Origins of the United Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
30 For the classic account of the social structure and formation of the “power elite,” conceived as the 
circle of leaders of economic, political, and military institutions who make decisions insulated from 
popular pressure, see C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956). 
Recent adaptations and reconsiderations of Mills include G. William Domhoff, “Mills’s The Power 
Elite 50 Years Later,” Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 35, No. 6 (November 2006), 547-50; Domhoff, The 
Power Elite and the State: How Policy Is Made in America (New York: A. De Gruyter, 1990); Daniel Geary, 
Radical Ambition: C. Wright Mills, the Left, and American Social Thought (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2009). 
Although reading post-1940 anti-isolationism back to the early twentieth century, a portrait of an 
“establishment” specific to foreign policy is Godfrey Hodgson, “The Foreign Policy Establishment,” in 
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“geopolitical privacy,” but with a few particularities.31 For one, political and economic elites 
had their dominant interests anchored within the United States itself; despite enlarging after 
World War I, internationally oriented sectors of the economy were highly concentrated.32 
Second, the federal government apparatus was small, remaining so even after the dramatic 
expansion effected by the New Deal, as James Sparrow contends.33 Both of these particularities 
opened space for non-official experts and public intellectuals to redefine the terms of America’s 
engagement in the world. Historians are increasingly highlighting the role of unofficial elites in 
foreign relations across the twentieth century, but in the early years of World War II, their 
import was singular.34 During this unique period in the history of American state formation vis-
                                                   
Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds., Ruling America: A History of Wealth and Power in a Democracy 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 215-49. 
31 Michael Mann, States, War, and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1988), 32. 
32 See Jeffrey Frieden, “Sectoral Conflict and U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 1914-1940,” in G. John 
Ikenberry, David A. Lake, and Michael Mastanduno, eds., The State and American Foreign Economic Policy 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 59-90. 
33 James T. Sparrow, Warfare State: World War II Americans and the Age of Big Government (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), esp. 5-6. 
34 On the production of expert knowledge after the 1930s, see, among many others, Nick Cullather, 
The Hungry World: America’s Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2010); Cullather, “The Foreign Policy of the Calorie,” American Historical Review, Vol. 112, No. 2 
(April 2007), 337-364; David Engerman, Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall of America’s Soviet Experts 
(Oxford University Press, 2011); Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War 
America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); Nicholas Guilhot, ed., The Invention of 
International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2011); Parmar, Foundations of the American Century; David Price, Anthropological 
Intelligence: The Deployment and Neglect of American Anthropology in the Second World War (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2009); Joy Rohde, Armed with Expertise: The Militarization of American Social Research 
During the Cold War (Cornell University Press, 2013); Bradley Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian 
Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008). 
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à-vis foreign policy, the small bureaucracy relied on the large pool of private expertise — a 
proto-national security state built up over the preceding two decades.35  
Within two weeks of the Nazi invasion of Poland, State Department leaders found 
themselves consumed by the war crisis and delegated the task of postwar planning to the Council 
on Foreign Relations (CFR) in New York. Established in 1921, the Council was the main organ 
of the three arms of the foreign policy elite: officials, intellectuals, and professionals, especially 
leading businessmen, financiers, and lawyers.36 Even after Pearl Harbor, when the State 
Department took postwar planning in-house, it installed CFR planners atop several 
subcommittees, as described in Chapter Four. Arguably, despite the Cold War collaboration 
between the state and the industrial-military-academic complex, the foreign policy bureaucracy 
would never again be so dependent on outside expertise in the formulation of basic objectives.37 
                                                   
35 On the construction of the foreign policy elite before World War II, see, in addition to works cited 
elsewhere, Tomoko Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific: The United States, Japan and the Institute of Pacific 
Relations in War and Peace, 1919-1945 (New York: Routledge, 2002); Coates, Legalist Empire; Paulo 
Ramos, The Role of the Yale Institute for International Studies in the Construction of United States National Security 
Ideology, 1935-1951, PhD Dissertation, University of Manchester, 2003; Katharina Rietzler, American 
Foundations and the ‘Scientific Study’ of International Relations in Europe, 1910-1940, PhD Dissertation, 
University College London, 2009; Rietzler, “Experts for Peace: Structures and Motivations of 
Philanthropic Internationalism in the Interwar Years,” in Daniel Laqua, ed., Internationalism 
Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements Between the Wars (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011), 45-66; 
Robert Vitalis, White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2015). 
36 Peter Grose, Continuing the Inquiry: The Council on Foreign Relations from 1921 to 1996 (New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), 1-22. On the CFR, see also Carlo Santoro, Diffidence and Ambition: 
The Intellectual Sources of U.S. Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991); Robert D. Schulzinger, The 
Wise Men of Foreign Affairs: The History of the Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1984); Whitney H. Shepardson, Early History of the Council on Foreign Relations (Stamford, CT: 
Overbrook Press, 1960); Michael Wala, Winning the Peace: The Council on Foreign Relations and American 
Foreign Policy in the Early Cold War (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1994). 
37 Beginning with the war mobilization in 1942, the government strengthened its capacity to set 
current and future objectives. The process culminated in 1947, when the Truman administration 
established the Policy Planning Staff within the State Department and Congress passed the National 
Security Act. The latter integrated the armed forces into the new Department of Defense and set up 
the National Security Agency and Central Intelligence Agency. See Wilson Miscamble, George F. 
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Unofficial planning turned out to be self-liquidating: ten years hence, after the state had 
assumed the global responsibilities that outside actors urged of it, it developed the infrastructure 
to make its own plans and forecasts. 
But foreign policy elites wielded power beyond their immediate impact on policy. 
Although anchored in the CFR-State nexus, this dissertation also examines individuals and 
organizations with no formal connection to the state because they too exerted influence in 
establishing the plausibility of new arguments and constructing a political consensus around 
world leadership. Beginning in 1940 and 1941, scores of groups sprung up to partake in a mania 
for planning the future. They saw the opportunity to shape elite and public discourse by 
presenting two faces to the world. To the educated public, they spoke with the authority of 
independent experts, unsullied by politics. To government officials, they stood in for the public, 
claiming a privileged position for divining which courses of action would command popular 
legitimacy. They therefore possessed power distinct from that of public officials, and in some 
respects greater. Appearing as the organic expression of civil society, the site of liberal freedom, 
they were uniquely positioned to forge an enduring political consensus.  
If the particular influence of one or another postwar planner is impossible to specify, 
clearer is the importance of the Northeast-based policy elite at large. Uncertain and fractured 
before the fall of France, it reconstituted itself in the 18 months thereafter and turned a long-
range program of global supremacy into the obvious response to the contested events of war. 
This dissertation does not comprehensively trace the ideas and activities of a few individuals or 
groups, nor does it elucidate the many differences of opinion within the frame of U.S. world 
                                                   
Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 
ch. 1; Sparrow, Warfare State; Stuart, Creating the National Security State. 
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leadership. Rather, it offers a genealogy of the innovation and evolution of a shared argument 
— that the United States should take leadership of world politics, under the rubric of anti-
isolationist internationalism. 
In examining the birth of “world leadership,” this dissertation refers to a specific 
conceptualization of America’s role in international politics.38 By 1945 world leadership 
constituted something more fundamental than a policy, doctrine, or even grand strategy: it 
became an axiomatic formulation of the basic international requirements and responsibilities of 
the United States.39 It held that America possessed an overriding interest in and duty to set the 
terms of international society and underwrite world order, by force if necessary. To these ends 
the United States could collaborate with others but would exercise the determining influence. 
In the imagination of foreign policy elites, that is, world order would be ensured by the United 
States and no longer by the British Empire (an alternative world leader) or civilized intercourse 
(an alternative to world leadership). As a concept, world leadership was capacious, befitting an 
                                                   
38 This dissertation uses “world leadership” interchangeably with such other terms as global 
supremacy, preeminence, and primacy. World leadership, an actor’s category, usefully conveys a sense 
of national mission, but global supremacy perhaps better connotes the essential political-military 
aspect, since Americans had long pictured themselves as leading the world in non-political-military 
ways. Despite its recent popularity, “empire” seems inadequate for present purposes. Typically defined 
by the relationship between center and periphery, empire does not imply global supremacy. Further, 
the United States already possessed a formal colonial empire when World War II began. As historian 
Carl Becker wrote in 1944: “Since the United States has acquired Alaska, Puerto Rico, the Hawaiian 
Islands and the Philippines…it has, by every common test, the right to be recognized as an empire, as 
one of the great imperial powers.” Nevertheless empire connotes power and leadership on a grand 
scale, and Chapter Three shows how Americans modified imperial terminology in order to 
characterize their hoped-for postwar supremacy. Carl Becker, How New Will the Better World Be? A 
Discussion of Post-War Reconstruction (New York: Knopf, 1944), 88.  
39 Announcing further European colonization of the Western Hemisphere to be inimical to the peace 
and safety of the United States, the Monroe Doctrine is narrow by comparison, at least in its original 
form. On axioms in foreign policy, see Ernest R. May, “The Nature of Foreign Policy: The Calculated 
and the Axiomatic,” Daedalus, Vol. 91, No. 4 (Fall 1962), 653-67. 
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actor’s category that not only prescribed objectives for policy but also expressed a national 
identity. Still, the axiom implied three novel international objectives. First, the United States 
had to acquire and retain political and military superiority over any other nation. Second, it 
had to control, or be able to mobilize, a preponderance of political and military power on a 
global scale.40 Unlike before World War II, policy elites now held that U.S. security depended 
on the balance of power in Europe and Asia.41 Third, the United States had to undertake the 
routine armed policing of aggressors, who were expected to arise. 
 
In Part I, this dissertation shows how global supremacy first became imaginable and 
desirable as traditional ideas of internationalism declined. The first chapter surveys American 
internationalism from the founding era through the 1930s, after which advocates of U.S. 
supremacy dismissed the era as isolationist, effacing its internationalist character. It describes 
how U.S. diplomats, lawyers, and activists led efforts to reform international society, especially 
from the late nineteenth century through the 1920s. To them “internationalism” meant 
pursuing the elimination of war and power politics, often by promoting international law and 
organization. Even after the United States declined to join the League of Nations after World 
War I, self-described internationalists believed their cause was alive and well, at home and 
abroad. 
                                                   
40 According to Leffler, a preponderance of power “meant establishing a configuration of power and 
a military posture so that if war erupted, the United States would prevail.” Leffler, A Preponderance of 
Power, 19. 
41 On the absence of such an assumption prior to World War II, see Robert Osgood, Ideals and Self-
Interest in America’s Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1953); John A. Thompson, “The Geopolitical Vision: The Myth of an Outmatched 
USA,” in Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell, eds., Uncertain Empire: American History and the Idea of the Cold War 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 91-114. 
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The chapter then sketches the decline of internationalist ideas in the 1930s. Confronted 
by “totalitarianism,” internationalists doubted the existence of a latent world harmony whose 
expression could bring about perpetual peace. They pioneered concepts like “collective 
security” and “world order” to convey a new sense that armed enforcement was required in 
order to preserve a modicum of intercourse and stability. They also began to characterize anti-
interventionists as “isolationists” who would cordon off the United States from foreign relations 
in toto. Yet if conceptual underpinnings were shifting, policy implications remained elusive. With 
the American public opposed to participation in the war ongoing in Asia and looming in 
Europe, no solutions arose to resolve the newly conceptualized problems. 
The chapter’s second half centers on little-known efforts in the State Department and 
CFR to plan for peace during the first eight months of World War II in Europe, from September 
1939 through April 1940. It argues that however much internationalist tenets seemed to have 
failed, U.S. planners saw no choice but to reprise a “peace without victory,” the formula of 
President Woodrow Wilson from the last war. They even hoped to mediate a settlement by 
bringing Mussolini to the side of the democracies, for which President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
dispatched Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles to Rome, Berlin, Paris, and London. In 
public discourse and private discussions alike, U.S. world leadership was scarcely contemplated: 
any assumption of political and military commitments beyond the Western Hemisphere 
remained anathema so long as the fighting resembled the stalemate of World War I. Likewise, 
international political organization reached the nadir of its popularity in the United States. Its 
foremost champions, like historian James Shotwell and political scientist Quincy Wright, 
considered splitting the League into several regional organizations, with the United States 
confined within Pan-American boundaries. 
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But when the Nazis steamrolled France in May 1940, stunning the world, they swept 
away the old order and with it the detritus of old internationalism. Chapter Two spans the fast-
moving six months that followed. It argues the German conquest of France convinced U.S. 
foreign policy elites not only to enter the war, as historians have shown, but also to supplant 
Great Britain as the premier world power afterward. Suddenly Hitler was master of Europe and 
the Nazi war machine seemed likely to seize the British Isles and threaten the British Empire. 
At first, in June and July, planners expected the postwar United States to inhabit no more than 
a “quarter-sphere” extending from North America down to the so-called bulge of Brazil. In 
narrow material terms, such an outcome did not look altogether disastrous: CFR economists 
found the largely self-contained U.S. economy would perform adequately if future trade were 
confined to the quarter-sphere alone. By the autumn, however, Britain withstood the Nazi 
onslaught and planners determined that the United States should defend essentially the whole 
world except a projected Nazi-dominated Europe. This living space, dubbed the Grand Area, 
became the basis for postwar planning through most of 1941. 
Why did the fall of France trigger the recalculation of America’s world role given that 
North America appeared safe from attack even if Germany were to defeat Britain? Hitler’s 
victory seemed to exhibit the danger of old internationalist assumptions and demonstrate the 
reverse to be true: rather than progressively replacing power politics, peaceful intercourse 
paradoxically required military force to back it. Whichever nation possessed armed supremacy 
would impose its concept of world order in the epoch to come. Simultaneously, the Axis powers 
shattered the fundaments of British imperial power such that observers on both sides of the 
Atlantic called on the United States to take the lead in policing the postwar world. Out of the 
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death of nineteenth-century internationalism and British world leadership, U.S. global 
supremacy was born. 
Having glimpsed the possibility of American supremacy, foreign policy elites conceived 
how to achieve this objective in the pivotal year of 1941. In Part II, consisting of the third 
chapter, they proceeded along several tracks at once: they began to build domestic political 
support for postwar world leadership and consider the international institutional basis through 
which the United States would operate. The chapter reveals, first, that anticipations of the 
American Century were not confined to a few personages, like FDR or Henry Luce, on whom 
historians have lavished attention. As Congress passed Lend-Lease legislation in the beginning 
of 1941, a panoply of U.S. officials and intellectuals publicly articulated a new goal: the 
acquisition of global political and military supremacy by the United States, without a wider 
international organization. Despite the variety of proposals that circulated, their common 
denominator was that whatever shape the postwar world order took, the United States should 
be the one to define it. Well before a new world organization generated any serious discussion, 
the American political system rejected “isolationism” and embraced world leadership. 
Indeed policy elites scarcely wished to set up another universal political body to replace 
the failed League. Instead they preferred a permanent partnership with Great Britain, including 
the white Dominions of the British Commonwealth. The “English-speaking peoples,” bound by 
race, led by America, would police most of the postwar world and keep Nazi Germany confined 
to Europe. The chapter recovers postwar planners’ extensive blueprints for building jointly run 
military bases and for extending near-citizenship to Anglo-Saxons the world over. American 
interest in a British partnership culminated in the Atlantic Charter, which historians have often 
interpreted as favoring world organization and challenging colonial empire. Yet FDR vetoed 
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Winston Churchill’s proposal to endorse a new world organization, insisting that only the 
United States and Great Britain could keep order in the postwar world. 
Soon, however, planners perceived a problem. The Atlantic Charter, they observed, 
“fell like a dead duck” upon Congress and the public.42 American global supremacy sounded 
imperialistic, especially in combination with Britain. As the Soviet Union entered the war and 
the United States mobilized its economy and military, secret planners and public intellectuals 
put one concern above the rest: if asked to play power politics, America’s supposedly isolationist 
public might refuse to lead. Foreign policy elites fixated on the problem of “public opinion,” a 
concern animated as much by elites’ own anxieties as by actual public expressions. In response, 
they launched a campaign to legitimate American political-military preeminence. From 1942 
to 1945, as Part III recounts, they achieved what they had conceived. 
Chapter Four reinterprets the American origins of the United Nations Organization, 
homing in on the State Department’s postwar planning committee formed after Pearl Harbor 
with the participation of non-governmental experts, military and Treasury officials, and 
members of Congress. Whereas existing scholarship on the creation of the U.N. focuses on 
great-power diplomacy in the later years of the war, this chapter asks why the United States 
wished to create an international political organization in the first place, given policy elites’ 
dismissal of the League and universalist solutions in general. It argues that in 1942 and 1943 
postwar planners revived world organization less to eliminate war or promote law than to 
cleanse U.S. power in the eyes of the American public as well as foreign states. As they designed 
what became the United Nations, they jettisoned League-era proposals for the common control 
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of international decisions. Led by Welles, they grafted U.N. universalism atop an American-
British, and increasingly just American, power base, the true enforcer of world order. 
Harnessing the resonance of prior efforts to end power politics in the name of internationalism, 
the United Nations Organization became an instrument to implement power politics. 
The fifth and final chapter analyzes the public campaign nominally intended to ratify 
the U.N. Charter. It argues that the campaign rallied the country first and foremost around the 
postwar projection of American power. By 1945 the United States was simultaneously at the 
start and the height of its supremacy. It possessed globe-spanning military bases and an 
economy as productive as the whole rest of the world’s. American foreign policy elites hardly 
wished to subordinate this unprecedented power to multilateral control. To the contrary, by 
evoking multilateral control they sought to legitimate American power, creating a bulwark of 
public support.  
Because the United Nations possessed mostly symbolic value, no alternative models of 
international organization garnered widespread interest, in contrast to the multiplicity of 
proposals that circulated in World War I. In an outpouring of books, speeches, pamphlets, and 
film, proponents of the United Nations framed discussion around whether to accept world 
leadership and world organization (“internationalism”) or retreat from the world altogether 
(“isolationism”), a stark binary that obscured alternatives within internationalism and prevented 
Americans from considering how to participate in governing the world. This internationalist-
isolationist narrative expelled anti-interventionists from the sphere of legitimate discourse: 
anyone seeking a hemispheric restriction on American political-military power became an 
“isolationist,” a self-regarding, anti-modern provincial who had brought on the Second World 
War by preventing the United States from exerting leadership after the First. The chapter ends 
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by recovering criticisms of the Charter expressed by Wilsonians and anti-interventionists, who 
nevertheless lacked a positive program that commanded political support. Six years after U.S. 
world leadership seemed all but inconceivable, it was now impossible to conceive an alternative. 
Framed around the changing deployment of “internationalism” in political discourse, 
this dissertation suggests that exceptionalism is not the only concept through which the United 
States has legitimated its unequal power. It was internationalism, as much as exceptionalism, 
that legitimated U.S. global supremacy at its birth. In professing internationalism, Americans 
conveyed not that they were intrinsically superior but that they respected the equality of others. 
As first among equals, the United States would honor the rule of law and serve the welfare of 
all. 
In fact, U.S. elites sought a simulacrum of equality, touting common participation while 
retreating from ideals of common control. The dissertation concludes on the creation of the 
United Nations because it was the new world organization that made U.S. global supremacy 
unanswerable in domestic politics. The United Nations embodied the ideal template for 
American leadership: the United States would act together with others and the others would 
follow America’s script. The Cold War, by contrast, was always conceived as an aberration. It 
was one epoch of American world leadership, which would outlast the Soviet challenge as well 
as the Soviet collapse.
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Chapter 1: Internationalism before “Isolationism,” 1815-1940 
 
In 1911 a young Edwin Borchard proposed a way to end war. He wanted the world’s 
civilized states to agree to settle disputes between them in a court of arbitration, where 
“enlightened public opinion” — acting through discerning lawyers like himself — would compel 
governments to choose peace and, in time, disarm.1 Two world wars later, the renowned Yale 
professor of international law assailed the new United Nations Organization. It amounted, 
Borchard wrote, to a “thinly disguised military alliance of the three largest Powers,” the United 
States above all. Its oxymoronic quest to “enforce peace” actually made peace impossible, 
authorizing the strongest powers to wage war on anyone they claimed to be an aggressor.2 To 
Borchard, the emergent postwar world order harked back to the nineteenth-century Holy 
Alliance, whose monarchs imposed their version of international cooperation on popular 
revolutionaries throughout Europe. 
If Borchard was an internationalist par excellence before the First World War, then he 
possessed an equal claim to be considered an internationalist after the Second as well. His 
criticism of the United Nations demonstrated his consistent aspiration to tame power politics 
through the pacific settlement of disputes and the disarmament of nations. In addition to 
denouncing the U.N. Charter, he proposed to rescue it by, among other measures, elevating 
the universal General Assembly to the status of the big-power Security Council and replacing 
armed sanctions with peaceful conciliation. By 1945, however, the conceptual horizons of 
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American foreign policy had changed more than Borchard had. “As force grows in importance, 
the law recedes,” he still insisted, but most Americans who called themselves internationalists 
had come to the opposite conclusion: law was nothing if not backed by force, that of the United 
States in particular.3  
The new internationalists did not merely defeat Borchard’s prescriptions for American 
foreign policy and international society. They also expelled him from membership in 
“internationalism” and thus the sphere of legitimate discourse. In their eyes, Borchard now 
embodied “isolationism” for opposing U.S. intervention in World War II and U.S. global 
supremacy thereafter. Borchard had indeed been one of the most influential such opponents 
before the attack on Pearl Harbor, writing books, delivering testimony, and advising Senator 
Hiram Johnson to the effect that the United States should confine its political and military 
commitments to its own hemisphere and uphold the traditional laws of neutrality, premised on 
equality among nations and a sharp separation between war and peace.4 But Borchard felt that 
his activities were nothing if not internationalist and that his detractors perverted the term by 
redefining it in in opposition to their novel epithet “isolationism.” He complained two months 
before Pearl Harbor about “the idea that those who oppose entering the most risky of wars are 
‘isolationists’ or malefactors of some kind.” Such denigration, Borchard continued, “is 
abhorrent and does the country no good.”5 
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American policy elites might have continued to conceive Borchard as an internationalist 
and frame their proposals as alternatives within internationalism. Instead they claimed 
internationalism all for themselves as advocates of U.S. global supremacy. This semantic shift 
deserves sustained scrutiny. It represented more than the rhetorical one-upmanship common 
to political debate. It was a necessity if the United States was to assume political and military 
leadership of world affairs. In order for U.S. global supremacy to become conceivable and 
appear legitimate, Americans had to erase what they had hitherto known as “internationalism” 
and invest the term with new meaning. 
The task was formidable enough to give Borchard confidence that his country would 
slough off interventionist fantasies and steer clear of Old War political-military entanglement. 
For a very long time, he was right. One world war did not convince the country to join its 
president’s league for peace, let alone to vie for paramountcy in Europe and Asia; not even 
ardent interventionists of the day sought the latter. The approach of a second world war 
hollowed out aspirations for international harmony, but throughout the 1930s and into 1940, 
interventionists-to-be attempted to broker a settlement in Europe that they envisioned the 
United States doing nothing to enforce after the fighting ceased. Once again, while American 
intercourse would traverse the globe, American arms would stay largely within the hemisphere. 
Internationalism still guided U.S. foreign policy, if only by default. 
 
Power Politics Versus Public Opinion, “The Queen of the World” 
 
Before the 1930s, James Shotwell did not fear isolationism. Born in Canada to American 
Quakers, Shotwell was a leading intellectual and networker in the burgeoning interwar realm 
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of American semiofficialdom — a historian at Columbia University, a director of the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace and the Social Science Research Council, and the president 
of the League of Nations Association.6 In 1930 he assessed the condition of world politics and, 
despite America’s refusal to join the League of Nations, saw internationalism everywhere on the 
ascent and mentioned isolationism not once. Judged against a decade of progress on limiting 
armaments, illegalizing aggressive warfare, and reviving world trade, the U.S. Senate’s 
reluctance to pledge armed force behind the League seemed a minor matter. Besides, as 
Shotwell wrote, the resort to police power “declines in proportion as all the members of a 
community begin to be aware of the common interest.”7 Perhaps a growing fellow-feeling was 
replacing even the lawful resort of force, superseding the controversies of 1919. 
Although buoyed by recent events, Shotwell spoke the language of internationalism 
descended from the Enlightenment and articulated as such transnationally in the nineteenth 
century. Internationalists in America, as elsewhere, did not necessarily seek to strengthen U.S. 
political and military power — often the opposite — and did not see “isolationism” as their 
adversary. What united them, rather, was their aspiration-cum-assumption that nations would 
progressively express the harmony that was immanent in the world, in contradistinction to the 
self-aggrandizement exhibited first by ruling princes and then by narrow nationalists.8 “There 
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is no very great difference in the fundamental desires of all the civilized nations,” as Shotwell 
wrote — and so uncivilized nations should become civilized and civilized nations organized.9 
In these efforts, Americans like Shotwell, and Borchard, took a leading role. Far from standing 
aloof from internationalism before World War II, Americans ranked among its foremost 
advocates.10  
To sketch the contours of internationalism before World War II requires an act of 
recovery, since wartime interventionists, Shotwell included, found this history too subversive to 
preserve. As described in Chapter Five, they promulgated a narrative in which the United States 
was born isolationist, its original sin, and remained in thrall to isolationism until World War II. 
This traditionalist account contains the grain of truth that U.S. diplomacy strove to avoid open 
political and military entanglement in the system of power politics. Yet it is more accurate and 
encompassing to view non-entanglement as an aspect of American internationalism, whose 
ideal was often the transcendence in addition to the avoidance of power politics. This section 
therefore outlines a new narrative of ideas of internationalism and the activities organized under 
its sign. In the process, it also complicates revisionist narratives of linear U.S. expansion 
culminating in the achievement of global supremacy. In fact, the United States undertook 
aggrandizement prior to 1940 in the name of ending power politics, an ideological commitment 
that imposed limits on actual policy and required a rupture before global supremacy could be 
embraced.  
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The United States was born of exceptionalist nationalism, imagining itself providentially 
chosen to occupy the vanguard of world history.11 It was also born internationalist, promising 
and incarnating a world governed by reason and rules, not force and whim. These foundational 
concepts contradicted one another: exceptionalism cast the United States as a nation above 
others, internationalism as a nation among others. But being foundational they could not be 
abandoned; they had to be configured in such a way as to push the contradiction out of view. 
For the first century and a half, successive generations achieved this feat by positioning 
Americanism and internationalism alike in opposition to the system of power politics centered 
in Europe. Abstaining from the system politically, the United States could transcend it 
peaceably. Without seeking global supremacy, Americans could imagine themselves leading the 
world to better things. 
Thus, on the one hand, George Washington famously used his Farewell Address to urge 
his successors to “steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world,” lest 
American peace and prosperity become entangled in the separate and retrograde political 
system of Europe.12 Even that most realpolitik of founders, Alexander Hamilton, asserted that the 
United States should aim to be “an ascendant in the system of American affairs” only, before 
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complaining of the domination that Europe arrogantly extended over the rest of mankind.13 
Rejecting power politics, the founders offered an alternative embodied by the United States 
itself, whose Constitution attempted to keep peace between the states through exchange and 
law more than compulsion by the not-quite-superior federal government.14 A few breaths after 
Washington forbade permanent alliances, he advocated “liberal intercourse with all nations,” 
along with “rules of intercourse” that the young republic should join with like-minded nations 
to establish.15 Here was a vision of order potentially universal in scope but premised on the 
power of intercourse to replace politics. Washington’s precepts, although associated with 
“isolationism” since that term’s coinage in the 1930s, better resembled a version of 
internationalism, conceived as anti-power politics. 
In the nineteenth century, internationalism established itself as a conceptual and 
eventually discursive frame for both national policy and transnational activism, each 
counterposed to the European diplomatic system. To strengthen its anti-political “empire of 
liberty,” the United States brutally extended its territorial dominion across North America.16 In 
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the Monroe Doctrine, it designated the entire Western Hemisphere as a U.S.-protected refuge 
from further European colonization and war.17 Internationalism licensed and circumscribed 
expansion by the same stroke. Instead of simply asserting a U.S. interest in the hemispheric 
political system, Monroe reciprocally foreswore a U.S. interest in the “eminently and 
conspicuously different” European political system. The United States could vastly enlarge the 
area over which it claimed political responsibility, but that area had to be conceived as exempt 
from power politics, whether in the form of balance-of-power rivalry or exploitative domination. 
Accordingly, the Monroe Doctrine proclaimed a U.S. interest over the fate of the hemisphere 
without suggesting that the United States must police the hemisphere or challenge the British 
Navy for pride of place. It articulated a philosophy of history and society in which public opinion 
and consensual intercourse would replace politics and war. Americans, north and south, needed 
only to be “left to themselves” and they would reject the European system of their own accord.18 
As the United States pursued conquest and hegemony in the New World, the American 
peace movement launched a wholly compatible crusade to redeem the Old. The first self-
described internationalists formed peace societies in the United States and Britain in order to 
contest the great-power settlement of the Napoleonic wars.19 Together with Cobdenite free 
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traders and Mazzinian nationalists, they reposed faith in what they termed “public opinion” 
against its armed suppression by the Concert of Europe.20 By mid-century these laissez faire 
internationalists offered a comprehensive program for peaceful relations among states, or at 
least the elite club of civilized states. Through the “people-diplomacy” of free trade, open 
congresses, and national autonomy, states would express their true, harmonious interests and 
prevent disputes from arising.21 Through disarmament and arbitration, states would resolve 
what disputes did arise by discussion rather than war. 
Until the end of the nineteenth century, these formulae remained distant from prevailing 
diplomatic practice. Internationalists were dissenters in international society. They glorified a 
“public opinion” impossible to reconcile with the existing order of monarchical and aristocratic 
states and their loose organization in the Concert of Europe. In short, public opinion and world 
organization were poles apart — and American internationalists chose the former. Any 
practicable world organization would have the European great powers at its core and small 
states, including the United States, at its mercy. It would be a vehicle for power politics.22 
Nevertheless a New Hampshire sea captain sketched how public opinion and world 
organization might come together. In 1840 William Ladd, the first president of the American 
Peace Society, devised a plan for an international congress and court to which all states could 
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voluntarily bring disputes. Ladd’s proposal involved no contractual obligations, much less 
economic or military sanctions. He was, he wrote, “leaving the functions of the executive with 
public opinion, ‘the queen of the world.’”23 In embryo Ladd suggested how world organization 
might amplify public opinion and thereby become an instrument against power politics. 
If peace men like Ladd commanded respectability in the nineteenth century — John 
Quincy Adams expected Ladd’s plan to be realized within 20 years — they faced denunciation 
by a new species of militant imperialist at the turn of the twentieth.24 One might assume that 
the United States openly cast off its hostility to power politics then. After all, it joined the club 
of the great powers by building a world-class navy and acquiring fully fledged colonies in the 
Caribbean basin and the South Pacific.25 Its political and intellectual leaders increasingly 
associated United States with Europe in a shared industrial civilization.26 No president accorded 
the European diplomatic system more respect than Theodore Roosevelt, who studied the 
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balance of power and held up the British Empire as a model for the American.27 
On the whole, however, American diplomacy stayed politically and militarily apart from 
European alliances while seeking the transcendence of power politics through intercourse. The 
tactic of formal colonial rule was tried out far from the centers of European rivalry, and to 
Roosevelt’s chagrin, it quickly proved unpopular.28 The Progressive Era presidents henceforth 
preferred to discipline Latin Americans through so-called dollar diplomacy, pitched in 
American and internationalist terms as substituting “dollars for bullets.”29 Indeed, successive 
administrations from the 1880s onward strengthened the hemispheric orientation of U.S. policy 
and the internationalist credentials of U.S. hegemony in the hemisphere. They helped to build 
a specifically “American international society” featuring Pan-American law and conferences, 
where “all shall meet together on terms of absolute equality,” as Secretary of State James G. 
Blaine declared on convening the first International American Conference, naturally in 
Washington, D.C.30  
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More remarkable were the endeavors of even the rough-riding Roosevelt to promote 
something like Ladd’s plan for ending war throughout the civilized world. As European 
monarchies yielded to the principles of nationality and representative government, the reformist 
ethos of newly professionalized international lawyers displaced the revolutionary and 
evangelical fervor of mid-century internationalists.31 Soon lawyers walked the corridors of 
power; led by Secretary Elihu Root, they dominated the turn-of-the-century State Department. 
The United States became a foremost sponsor of transatlantic efforts to codify legal code and 
settle disputes between states in arbitral and judicial courts.32 At the instigation of Roosevelt and 
the Russian Tsar, this movement of legalist internationalism produced two Hague conferences, 
where dozens of governments set up the Permanent Court of Arbitration and endorsed the idea 
of forming a general pact to obligate the arbitration of disputes.33 It was this voluntarist formula 
that attracted Borchard, who occupied the internationalist vanguard before World War I but 
stayed put while others moved on. 
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As ever, national assertion and international idealism went hand in hand. The surge of 
the former, formidable but delimited, necessitated no new concept of the latter. 
“Internationalism” retained its anti-power-political moorings. The term did not yet appear as 
the negation of (not yet coined) “isolationism.” Most internationalists opposed their creed, 
rather, to “nationalism,” occasionally to suggest that internationalism should supplant 
nationalism, more often that the two should come into balance. “Sound Nationalism and Sound 
Internationalism” was how Theodore Roosevelt put his principles.34 What nationalism had 
achieved for individuals, enlarging their community and outlawing war between them, 
internationalism would extend to nations.35  
The term therefore connoted the restraint, perhaps control, of national policy — its 
regulation by “the international mind,” in the 1912 phrase of Nicholas Murray Butler, president 
of Columbia University and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.36 Before the 
First World War, the idea of public opinion remained enthroned as the enforcer of international 
law and underwriter of world peace. Although more and more suspicious of the masses, and 
willing to insert their own judgment as the content of “public opinion,” professional 
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internationalists aimed to end armed conflict without themselves resorting to forcible 
sanctions.37 The international society they envisioned would not require or benefit from routine 
military policing by a globe-spanning United States. Nor would one great war change this 
judgment. 
 
Europe’s descent into violence in 1914 could not but compel U.S. policymakers and 
intellectuals to reexamine their assumptions about international society and America’s role 
within it. After the belligerents defied international law and stifled transatlantic intercourse, 
driving the United States to defend its neutral rights by suspending its neutral status, American 
elites and activists turned to international organization as a prescription for the newly named 
condition of “international anarchy.”38 Parting with prewar pacifists and legalists, many 
proposed to endow a world body with economic and even military sanctions. Now that civilized 
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Germany flouted its clear legal obligations, the challenge was “not so much to make treaties 
which define rights as to prevent the treaties from being violated,” as Root put it.39 The 
introduction of physical sanctions marked a significant step away from pacifistic formulas and 
toward military intervention on a global scale — or it would have, had the United States joined 
the League of Nations. 
Yet even if the Senate had approved the League unanimously, the United States still 
would not have embarked on anything like the project of world leadership that it adopted twenty 
years later. League advocates in World War I maintained the internationalist premise that 
liberal intercourse would undermine the causes of war. Their innovation was to yoke the goal 
of transcending power politics to the instrument of world organization, thus attempting to 
reconcile what seemed irreconcilable a century ago. The result was a vision shot through with 
hesitations and contradictions. But it was not a vision of U.S. global supremacy, except insofar 
as its formulas might have inadvertently undermined its purposes. 
Most interventionist internationalists of World War II did not seek to join or dominate 
the global balance of power because they hoped to end it instead. Like Shotwell, who helped to 
plan the peace in the U.S. government’s wartime “inquiry,” President Woodrow Wilson 
assumed that the true interests of peoples were harmonious.40 He cast the League as a means of 
expressing those interests, of removing the blockages and distortions that had plagued 
European-dominated international society. In Wilson’s words, the League would transform the 
balance of power into a “community of power,” wherein “all unite to act in the same sense and 
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with the same purpose, all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under 
a common protection.”41 Wilson’s utopian notion of a community of power described how 
American policy elites had long seen the Western Hemisphere. But rather than separate from 
Europe politically, Wilson now proposed to Americanize Europe. Hence his answer to 
accusations that he would entangle the United States in European power politics: the League 
was rather a “disentangling alliance.”42 It would forever end the capacity of European alliances 
to entangle the United States. Whatever the plausibility of Wilson’s ideas, doubted by many of 
his contemporaries, he argued for the United States not to counterbalance or dominate any 
rival but instead to render counterbalancing and domination obsolete. 
So did other advocates of world organization quite different from Wilson. In 1915, two 
years before the United States became a belligerent, peace activists and international lawyers 
formed the League to Enforce Peace (LEP) and launched transatlantic discussions of a postwar 
settlement. The LEP, led by former President William Howard Taft, immediately issued a 
specific four-point platform in which all states would agree to settle their legal disputes in an 
international court and use force collectively against any violator.43 Building on the prewar 
legalist movement, the LEP made judges the protagonist of its hoped-for international society. 
Wilson, by contrast, worried that legal machinery stifled the organic growth of international-
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mindedness.44 He gave pride of place to politicians in the League’s parliamentary Council and 
Assembly. 
From the standpoint of the next generation, however, legalists and Wilsonians looked 
more similar than different: diplomat George Kennan lumped them together in a single 
“legalistic-moralistic approach.”45 Both species of pro-league internationalist conceived a world 
organization that would produce peace by unleashing public opinion, as they called it. They 
divided over which sort of white male of European extract — the jurist or the statesman — 
should “interpret” public opinion, namely by exercising enlightened introspection. Thus both 
versions sought to end war altogether, mostly by preventing violence and partly by redefining 
violence as either the criminal violation or the community policing of law. In this sense, as Root 
explicitly theorized, international society would become just like domestic society, ordering 
sovereign states as each state ordered individual citizens.46 But because hardly anyone envisaged 
an overarching world government to compel compliance, league advocates relied on the idea 
that a natural harmony underlay international society. As Wilson said on unveiling the League 
Covenant in the United States, “We are depending primarily and chiefly upon one great force, 
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and this is the moral force of the public opinion of the world — the pleasing and clarifying and 
compelling influences of publicity.”47 
Envisaging the transcendence of power politics, American planners did not expect the 
League to wield armed force against constant acts of aggression. They never resolved whether 
the League should rid the world of violence or organize violence against wrongdoers. Instead 
they hoped that after pledging to use armed force, states would rarely have to deliver.48 Wilson 
told the Senate that Article 10, the League’s controversial guarantee of political independence 
and territorial integrity, constituted “a moral, not a legal obligation,” “binding in conscience 
only” and leaving Congress free to decide whether to act.49 Likewise, while insisting on the 
importance of forcible sanctions, LEP leaders claimed that the resort to arms “may never 
become necessary,” as Taft assured the LEP’s pacifistic wing — and himself, for if military 
enforcement transpired too frequently, it would defeat the purpose of a league for peace.50 
Perhaps no one expressed the ambivalence better than Quincy Wright, the outstanding 
international lawyer and political scientist of his day. Piling qualification upon qualification, 
Wright wrote a colleague in 1932 that “one should make use to the utmost of moral sanctions 
although I believe that certain physical sanctions should be organized in a rather general way 
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in the background.”51 By then, however, world events were exposing the contradiction in 
Wright’s position, forcing internationalists to choose between non-intervention and collective 
security. 
Finally, insofar as pro-league internationalists promoted a kind of armed global 
supremacy, it was not to be possessed mainly by the United States. One looks in vain for wartime 
blueprints of a postwar world spanned by U.S. military bases. Interventionists did not propose 
to convert America’s economic and financial preeminence into political and military 
preeminence in Europe or Asia. They recognized that Great Britain would remain the leading 
Old World power for the foreseeable future, although Wilson pursued naval parity with 
Britain.52 Instead, to the limited extent armed superiority was supposed to deter aggression, it 
would be possessed collectively, by League members in combination, and would be triggered 
automatically, by rule. The architects of the League lodged authority for international peace 
and security in the universal Assembly as well as the great-power-dominated Council. In Articles 
10 through 16, they strove to detail the circumstances that would elicit sanctions so as to deter 
would-be aggressors. Such multilateralism, so to speak, amounted to more than a preference. It 
was how American League advocates expected things to work, and they did not deem the 
United States responsible for underwriting world order by force if collective action failed.  
In World War I, in sum, the most interventionist of internationalists did not advocate 
U.S. global supremacy as the World War II generation conceived it. They articulated no long-
term U.S. commitment to participate in the balance of power or acquire a preponderance of 
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power, objectives they wished to render obsolete. Despite adding forcible sanctions to 
nineteenth-century peace schemes, they foresaw a world of deterrence and disarmament more 
than of policing. And they did not adopt the acquisition of political-military primacy as an aim 
of the United States, much less position such supremacy as the quintessence of America’s 
exceptional role in world history. So long as they expected and sought the transcendence of 
power politics, American foreign policy elites would find U.S. global supremacy to be 
unnecessary at best and imperialistic at worst.  
The United States, of course, declined to join the League, an outcome that historians 
since World War II have attributed to the strength of traditional isolationism and the 
unwillingness of League supporters to set aside their squabbles in the service of anti-
isolationism.53 This interpretation, however, reveals more about the conceptual horizons of the 
American political class in 1945 than in 1919, when “isolationism” was anachronistic. In 1919, 
at the height of the League debate, the term “isolationist” appeared in the New York Times once, 
and “isolationism” not at all.54 Contemporaries understood and presented themselves as 
advancing the kind of internationalism they preferred, not as making common cause against 
isolationism. League advocates did not even deploy that term as an epithet against their 
opponents, though they did renounce an international posture of “isolation.” They remained 
within the century-old concept of internationalism as anti-power politics. 
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Moreover, advocates of intervention and world organization did not claim 
internationalism as their exclusive preserve. Rather than denoting the project of one side in a 
political debate, “internationalism” served as a discursive frame, a terrain for contestation 
among alternative programs linked only by their aversion to imagined European-style power 
politics. If anyone’s internationalist credentials were open to question, it was those of League 
supporters, who introduced armed sanctions, however ambivalently, into plans for peace. 
Critics argued precisely that the League disguised an old-fashioned alliance with the victorious 
great powers, the British Empire in particular. Hiram Johnson, the progressive California 
Senator, castigated the League as a new “Holy Alliance” — the bête noir of nineteenth-century 
internationalists — because it froze territorial borders by threatening to punish their alteration 
with force, and bolstered European empires by authorizing the absorption of ex-German and 
ex-Ottoman territories as Mandates.55 So-called irreconcilables like Johnson condemned the 
Covenant on thoroughly internationalist grounds. 
Not so much the weakness as the strength of internationalism kept the United States out 
of the League of Nations. Internationalism commanded such legitimacy, and embraced such a 
diverse array of peace plans, that its supporters felt little pressure to put aside their differences. 
Whether to have internationalism was a given; they oriented debate around how. 
“Internationalism has come, and we must choose what form the internationalism shall take,” 
Senator Gilbert Hitchcock declared on Wilson’s return from the Paris Peace Conference.56 
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Wilson’s League competed with alternative blueprints devised by legalists, divided amongst 
themselves over whether and how to put armed sanctions behind international law.57 American 
citizens staked out nuanced positions on which provisions of the Covenant to retain and which 
to amend; surveys showed that only 7 percent desired outright rejection.58 In the end, as anti-
isolationist historians argued, the United States would have joined the League if full supporters 
and mild reservationists in the Senate had compromised or if Wilson had not forbade 
amendments to the Covenant. But at the time the details seemed to matter. They might make 
the difference between ending the system of war and getting embroiled in it. Perceiving no 
isolationist enemy, advocates of world organization had no reason to fetishize world 
organization. They would rather formulate the right terms than join on any terms. 
Challenged from within internationalism, Wilson faced a challenge from exceptionalism 
as well. Although he argued that the League would Americanize Europe, extending the Monroe 
Doctrine to the world, many of his contemporaries thought the League would more likely 
Europeanize America. Even if the United States withheld its army from Europe, the 
irreconcilable Senator William Borah feared the League would destroy the Monroe Doctrine, 
licensing European intervention in the Americas.59 “We are asked to become not an integral 
sovereignty but a vulgar fraction of a League,” complained the North American Review.60 This 
objection would remain so long as the United States stayed a second-ranking political and 
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military power in Europe and Asia. By the same token, it should become less salient as America 
became more powerful. The sheer acquisition of power could solve one-half of the Wilsonian 
dilemma, allowing the United States to dictate to an international organization and keep an 
international organization from dictating to it. Yet solving the exceptionalist problem would 
exacerbate the internationalist problem. If the United States were to master the game of power 
politics, how could it seem to destroy it at the same time? 
 
In the 1920s, American foreign policy elites had no need to confront this question. By 
eschewing formal membership in the League, the Senate stabilized internationalism rather than 
repudiating it, let alone adopting isolationism. Unburdened from having to square the goal of 
peace with the methods of force, American internationalists more actively than ever promoted 
universal intercourse as a substitute for politics and war. They pursued disarmament, organizing 
the Washington Naval Conference of 1921.61 They orchestrated private loans to Germany so 
that capital could underwrite the European peace.62 They participated, unofficially, in the 
Permanent Court of International Justice and the so-called technical or non-political sections of 
the League — on intellectual cooperation, on hygiene, on economics and finance.63 They 
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championed the pacific settlement of international disputes, achieving the outlawry of war in 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, originally suggested to French Foreign Minister Aristide 
Briand by James Shotwell.64 
In all these endeavors, American diplomacy placed a renewed faith in the concept of 
public opinion. On accepting the Nobel Peace Prize for his namesake antiwar pact, Secretary 
of State Frank Kellogg affirmed that the abolition of war would come not through the force of 
arms, placed behind a tribunal, but rather “through the force of public opinion, which controls 
nations and peoples — that public opinion which shapes our destinies and guides the progress 
of human affairs.”65 This message attracted the once irreconcilable Borah. He passionately 
supported Kellogg-Briand, showing how the reversion to internationalist normalcy healed the 
wounds of the League debate.66 Borah also led a bloc of anti-imperialists in criticizing U.S. 
military interventions in the Americas, laying the foundations of the Good Neighbor Policy of 
the 1930s.67 In this climate, ambitious young intellectuals like Raymond Leslie Buell extended 
critiques of European colonial empire, catalyzed by the League’s Mandates system, to what 
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Buell dubbed “American imperialism.”68 Buell, a lecturer at Harvard and the research director 
of the newly formed Foreign Policy Association, urged the United States to accept some form 
of international oversight over its interventions in Latin America. “The question,” Buell wrote, 
in classic internationalist terms, “is whether we are willing to submit our acts to the conscience 
of the world.”69 
Buell’s anti-imperialism illustrates that before World War II unimpeachable 
internationalists had the capacity to conceive the United States as a potential aggressor 
requiring restraint. Capacity, not necessity: heads of state and their advisers were not so critical 
of American power. Most agreed with Theodore Roosevelt that “the sound nationalism is the 
only type of really helpful internationalism.”70 Yet even for them, internationalism did not 
necessarily favor the accumulation and projection of American power in the world. By 1930 
Shotwell, the professional internationalist, could view the future with optimism. 
Notwithstanding America’s official abstention, he wrote, “the League has already brought into 
operation a revolution in diplomacy.”71 Internationalism seemed alive and well, not least 
because it did not require the United States to stand at the center of a world making progress. 
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Internationalism from Death to Reconception 
 
In 1938 Nicholas Murray Butler summed up one proposition on which divided 
American foreign policy elites could agree: “International law, like international morality, has 
disappeared in a fog.”72 Only in the late thirties did Butler lose his international mind. In World 
War I, internationalists like him ultimately affirmed their confidence in public opinion and 
peaceful intercourse. They slotted their German adversary into the preexisting internationalist 
imaginary of power-seeking rulers, in this case the Kaiser and the Prussian aristocracy, 
suppressing the peaceful people.73 If defeated, Germany could be recast on proper self-
determining lines and reintegrated into international society; even if victorious, Germany did 
not seem to incarnate a new social order irreconcilable with existing norms and laws. The events 
of the 1930s, by contrast, threw the premises of internationalism into question. In the face of a 
new “totalitarian” rival, internationalists began to doubt that a harmonious public opinion was 
immanent in the world, or whether, if only shrouded in fog, it could overthrow the reign of 
armed force. 
Fascist and communist powers confronted American internationalists with more than 
law-breaking. They embodied political, economic, and social orders that seemed so 
irreconcilable with the liberal principles that the category of “totalitarian” emerged to 
characterize them despite their obvious diversity.74 Offering effective and modern responses to 
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the Great Depression, the totalitarian powers shook Americans’ faith in the progressive 
direction of world history; they seemed to represent the “wave of the future” as liberal capitalism 
and parliamentary democracy reeled.75 Simply by virtue of taking root in Germany, Italy, 
Japan, and the Soviet Union, they challenged several valences at once of the constitutive 
internationalist belief in public opinion.  
To American observers, totalitarian regimes appeared either to enjoy the genuine 
enthusiasm of their people or to control their people so completely that the difference was 
negligible: so much for public opinion literally conceived. In 1933 Wright convened a group of 
scholars to assess “public opinion and world politics,” and the ensuing discussion focused on the 
susceptibility of the masses to state propaganda.76 Moreover, the Nazi regime in particular 
discredited less literal notions of public opinion as immanent harmony, civilized conscience or 
consciousness, and universal intercourse. When the totalitarian state looked upon “war rather 
than peace as the normal law of life,” American political scientists and international lawyers 
struggled to see how totalitarian concepts of the international could be made commensurable 
with those of the liberal democracies.77 
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As they defied the League of Nations and the Versailles order, the revisionist powers 
invalidated “international public opinion,” finally, as a non-forcible sanction among states. The 
Manchuria and Abyssinia crises compelled liberal internationalists to make a decisive choice 
between moral and physical sanctions.78 This was the very dilemma they had papered over in 
1919, hoping never to face. Now, for the first time, they called the League an instrument for 
“collective security,” as if it had been so all along.79 From Geneva, Arthur Sweetser knew better. 
“The League has entered into a wholly new field,” reported Sweetser, a well-connected 
American journalist serving on the League’s Secretariat and Information Section, as the 
Council scrambled to apply economic sanctions against Italy.80 Once the conquest of Ethiopia, 
a member state of the League, was complete, the lesson seemed undeniable: “conciliation 
without force is ineffective,” Sweetser wrote.81 
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It was a small step to condemn confidence in public opinion as a dangerous conceit, as 
Shotwell told listeners of CBS radio in April 1940. “Reliance upon the public opinion of 
mankind to ensure peace,” Shotwell declared, “serves only to entice the law breaker to go ahead 
with his plans in the confidence that peace-loving nations will not interfere.”82 But it was a large 
step, even after World War II began in Europe, to specify the implications for the foreign 
relations of the United States. Would-be interventionists mostly advocated non-interference 
with sanctions that the League was failing to provide. As a concept, internationalism was 
changing. As a foundation for policy, the new internationalism offered no clear replacement for 
the old. 
 
“Practically all the Leaguers stand for intervention,” Borchard noted in September 1939 
as the Nazi invasion of Poland began the Second World War in Europe.83 In fact, very few 
wanted the United States to become a belligerent quite yet. Over the 1930s, Borchard 
nevertheless came to regard the logical conclusion of pro-League agitation to be a policy of 
universal intervention. Universal, because under the League Covenant and Kellogg-Briand 
Pact every armed conflict would henceforth feature a law-breaker.84 Intervention, because 
military force now appeared the only sure method of punishment. Borchard might have added 
that Leaguers decreasingly kept faith with the League. In 1938 FDR was one of many former 
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enthusiasts who asked whether the League should withdraw from overt politics, retaining only 
its sections of technical experts.85 Shotwell and Wright now hoped that armed sanctions would 
be meted out on a regional basis while the League provided moral sanctions alone.86 Their 
concept of internationalism was becoming unmoored from the aim of ending power politics 
through peaceful intercourse, and fixed to a new anchor: the creation of “world order,” in the 
last instance through force of arms.87 
But they were not about to call themselves interventionists. For one, they hoped to keep 
the United States out of war by supporting, or at least not obstructing, the European 
democracies as they shouldered the heaviest burdens of collective security. In any case, the 
American public wanted no part of a future war. From 1935 to 1937, the peace movement 
reached the height of its popularity, rallying an estimated 12 million adherents in cities, 
churches, and campuses.88 This time, unlike in World War I, the United States proved willing 
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to sacrifice certain traditional neutral rights so as to avoid defending them by force. Starting in 
1935, Congress passed a series of Neutrality Acts that automatically embargoed shipments of 
arms and loans to all parties at war, even those seeming to defend themselves from aggression. 
By treating belligerents impartially, the initial acts repudiated the discriminatory theory of 
neutrality intrinsic to collective security.89  
For the rest of the decade, advocates of collective security, FDR included, countered 
with discriminatory neutrality acts. These would grant the president discretion to designate 
which belligerent was an aggressor and should be embargoed. In this way U.S. diplomacy could 
coordinate with collective sanctions without seeming to validate critics’ fears of “compelling us 
to police the world,” in the words of Kansas Senator Arthur Capper.90 In 1937, after an 
impartial embargo benefitted the fascist rebels in the Spanish Civil War, American neutrality 
acts began to allow the President to discriminate between aggressors and victims. Still, 
accusations like Capper’s stung. They suggested that the Wilsonian quest to end war had 
morphed into its opposite. In a world bereft of harmonious interests and value systems, collective 
security became a recipe for perpetual armed conflict. 
What could be less internationalist than that? As it happened, would-be interventionists 
formulated an answer: “isolationism.” In the mid-1930s, they invented this category as an 
antonym of “internationalism,” using it to characterize their opponents as antithetical to 
intercourse among nations and therefore to internationalism itself. Despite drawing on a 
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longstanding discourse of “isolation,” the -ism, connoting an identity and worldview, was new.91 
“Isolationism” debuted in magazines and journals only in the 1920s, arriving in the New York 
Times, for example, in 1925.92 Its appearances were sporadic and its meanings unstable until the 
mid-1930s, when “isolationism” (slightly preceded by “isolationist”) ascended in earnest. On 
May 21, 1935, Maryland Senator Millard Tydings became the first member of Congress to 
utter “isolationism” in a floor speech; in July 1938 “isolationism” entered the pages of the 
American Historical Review in reference to the United States; “isolationism” arrived in Walter 
Lippmann’s regular column on March 23, 1939. By then Lippmann took it to be the nation’s 
default foreign policy, stretching “all through American history.”93 
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Isolationism was more than just a new epithet deployed in political combat. Through it 
advocates of collective security refashioned the basic options for America’s role in international 
society. They branded as “isolationist” all those opposed to the armed policing (with U.S. 
cooperation) of Europe and Asia — many of whom regarded themselves as internationalists and 
were previously recognized as such. Then they claimed exclusive ownership of 
“internationalism,” a term they appropriated and redefined as the negation of isolationism. 
Interventionists became the internationalists. 
Far from offering a neutral analytic, the new discursive formation delegitimized anti-
interventionists and legitimized interventionists, as the former immediately perceived. “Isolation 
and isolationism, a new invention, have been used as cusswords,” Borchard objected.94 If they 
were cusswords, they functioned through a specific semantic manipulation that drew on prior 
notions of internationalism but made one crucial elision. Interventionists applied the 
“isolationist” label to anyone against the armed enforcement of world order, yet “isolationism” 
connoted something much more expansive: a desire to “keep us out of everything,” as the 
interventionist playwright and FDR speechwriter Robert Sherwood put it, or more precisely “a 
policy of walled separation from all contacts with other peoples,” in the words of the anti-
interventionist Chicago Daily Tribune, which noted that no one sought such a policy.95 For favoring 
peaceful intercourse without force, “isolationists” qualified as such, whereupon, for being 
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isolationists, they appeared hostile to all forms of peaceful intercourse. “Isolationism” thus 
wholly destroyed peaceful intercourse as a conceptual possibility. It implied that peaceful 
intercourse required force to back it. 
The discourse of isolationism delegitimized anti-interventionists through a second 
connotation. As the Chicago Daily Tribune detected early on, the label conveyed a “morally 
deplorable disregard of the welfare of mankind.”96 The phrase “selfish isolation” recurred in 
interventionist literature in the 1930s and 1940s.97 Devotees of isolationism became, in short, 
narrow-minded, self-regarding provincials, akin to the isolated traditional peoples imagined by 
ideologies of development and modernization.98 Again interventionists took a quintessentially 
internationalist ideal — of enlightening particular outlooks so as to harmonize with the good of 
mankind — and denied it to “isolationists” simply for opposing armed commitments. 
Embracing force became the prerequisite for pursuing harmony among nations. 
In the same stroke as they created their isolationist enemy, the new internationalists 
constituted themselves in opposition to that enemy. Negating isolationism, they appeared to be 
for intercourse, for peace, for the good of man, just like the internationalists of old. Rendered 
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invisible in this discourse was the actual novelty of their politics: the acceptance of forcible 
sanctions as the sine qua non of world order. Force reappeared only to those who contested the 
very concept of isolationism. “To talk of isolation,” opined the Chicago Daily Tribune, “is dust 
throwing in an attempt to give greater emphasis of sentiment to the demand for political 
alliance.”99 Borchard likewise insisted that “there is no such thing as ‘isolation.’ This is merely 
a denunciatory word employed by the interventionists who want to line us up with other Powers 
for war or hostile action.”100 While dismissing the analytical utility of “isolationism,” the people 
it designated acknowledged its productive power. Here was a vocabulary through which the 
United States could engage in the fullest power politics in the name of ending power politics.  
In response, opponents of power politics sought to change language as well as laws. 
Denouncing the “false name — isolationism,” historian Charles Beard attempted to 
characterize his preferred policy as “continentalism”; lawyer Jerome Frank championed 
“integrated America” against “disintegrated Europe.”101 Yet by the late 1930s anti-isolationists 
were widely identified as “internationalists.” In a book chapter titled “The Policy of 
Internationalism,” Beard presented advocates of collective security as the genealogical 
successors of the nineteenth-century peace movement, rather than one successor among 
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others.102 In 1938 the Chicago Daily Tribune’s news writers first used internationalism and 
isolationism as descriptors even as the paper’s editorialists lambasted every step toward war.103 
On the eve of the Second World War in Europe, American advocates of collective 
security had turned isolationism into an established category of thought, positioned to become 
ubiquitous if political circumstances changed. They had conceived, in embryo, both a program 
of collective global policing and a lexicon for presenting it. But they found it easier to develop 
the presentation than the program. Having accepted armed force as the guarantor of world 
order, they could not say which entity would send in the troops. The League so dramatically 
failed to execute collective security that by the Munich conference of September 1938 European 
diplomacy had reverted to great-power deal-making reminiscent of the post-Napoleonic 
concert.104 Abstract, almost hypothetical, anti-isolationism remained a program in search of an 
agent to carry it out. 
And what of America? According to polls in the final months of 1939, only 17 percent 
of the public wanted the United States to enter the war at some stage. Still fewer wished to enter 
immediately. Strong majorities favored a policy of impartial neutrality in which the Nazis could 
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purchase American exports.105 Public sentiment aside, few interventionists-to-be even imagined 
that the United States could or should emerge anytime soon as the world’s supreme power 
projecting its military across the globe. True, in June 1939 Lippmann penned an essay called 
“The American Destiny” that envisaged the United States exercising the “controlling power in 
western civilization” if only Americans would shed their nerves about asserting their influence. 
“What Rome was to the ancient world, what Great Britain has been to the modern world, 
America is to be to the world of tomorrow,” Lippmann announced.106 Yet calls to greatness 
were as concrete as Lippmann got; he said nothing of how — or where — the United States 
would exercise its “controlling power.” For every Lippmann, furthermore, there were many 
more Sumner Welles, FDR’s Under Secretary of State, close adviser, and future head of postwar 
planning. While supporting collective security, Welles declared the main fault of the League to 
be its denial of equality to the powers defeated in the last war.107 If the next world order required 
stronger provisions for subduing aggressors, more important still was a mechanism for “peaceful 
change” to satisfy have-not nations without violence.108 
At any rate, the world already had a leader in Great Britain. Despite nursing a decades-
long hope of bringing the United States to their side in global politics, British officials found 
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their entreaties rebuffed with prejudice as the war neared. At the beginning of 1939, Lord 
Lothian, soon to be ambassador to the United States, visited the White House to tell the 
president that “Anglo-Saxon civilization” needed a new guardian. As Roosevelt dismissively 
recounted thereafter, Lothian, an apostle of worldwide Anglophone unity, proclaimed “that the 
scepter of the sword or something like that had dropped from their palsied fingers — that the 
U.S.A. must snatch it up — that F.D.R. alone could save the world — etc., etc.” Roosevelt was 
not in a world-saving mood. “I got mad clear through,” he recalled, and denounced British 
despair. Unless it regained the will to lead the world, “Britain would not be worth saving 
anyway,” FDR concluded. “What the British need today is a good stiff grog, inducing not only 
the desire to save civilization but the continued belief that they can do it.”109 The President of 
the United States preferred British world leadership to a Pax Americana: let them bear the brunt. 
What Great Britain had been to the modern world, Great Britain would still be to the world of 
tomorrow. 
Most American foreign policy elites agreed with FDR. As long as Europe and Asia 
remained divided and Britain supreme, they perceived little U.S. interest in joining the 
upcoming war and pursuing supremacy in the postwar. Fascists and militarists may have 
promised new orders for their regions, but word was not deed, especially when the superior 
Anglo-French alliance stood in the way. Before the Wehrmacht marched into Poland, American 
policy elites believed they could have universal intercourse without universal force. They 
continued to think so for some time after. 
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Great Britain and Nazi Germany had been at war for one week, but Hamilton Fish 
Armstrong was thinking ahead. On September 10, 1939, Armstrong, a founder of the Council 
on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the editor of its prominent journal Foreign Affairs, telephoned a 
fellow Council member in Washington. Armstrong told Assistant Secretary of State George 
Messersmith that the United States had been ill prepared for the last peace conference: it came 
late to planning and poorly coordinated private experts with official policymakers, as Armstrong 
observed then as Princeton’s delegate to the League to Enforce Peace.110 Two days later, 
Armstrong and Council director Walter Mallory arrived at the State Department with a 
proposition. The war, they predicted, would strengthen America’s global standing and intensify 
the department’s need for expertise. It might even present a “grand opportunity” for the United 
States to become “the premier power in the world,” for which eventuality the foreign policy 
bureaucracy was scarcely prepared.111 Perhaps the Council should plan for peace while the 
government contended with war? 
Messersmith and the meeting’s other attendees, Sumner Welles and economist Leo 
Pasvolsky, knew how to accept a good deal. They recognized the truth of Armstrong’s 
suggestion that their short-staffed diplomatic corps could not undertake long-range planning. 
Already day-to-day issues absorbed the State Department, whose entire professional and clerical 
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staff numbered 900 people.112 The department’s leadership also feared that postwar planning, 
if carried out internally, might become public knowledge and raise suspicion that the Roosevelt 
administration was preparing for war. Better to delegate the task to the Council men, so long as 
they could ensure strict confidentiality. This they promptly agreed to do.113 
Armstrong’s proposal won same-day approval because it redressed a significant 
vulnerability. Insulation from the present war, indeed from the historical balance of power, 
endowed the United States with paradoxical potentialities for the postwar world. Geographical 
fortune bestowed the luxury, unique among the great powers, to plan the future while the 
belligerents exhausted themselves elsewhere. By the same token, it had given Americans 
insufficient motivation to develop the official capacity to seize the occasion. And if it meant 
America would stay neutral throughout World War II, the United States might not receive a 
seat at the peace conference. Recognizing the latter problem, the State Department formed a 
small, short-lived advisory committee that sought to organize the neutral powers to mediate in 
the war and shape the peace. But more consequential was its collaboration with the burgeoning 
field of American semiofficials, the CFR in particular. Over the next six years of war, especially 
the first two, these experts acted as a proto-national security state, furnishing officialdom with 
knowledge and personnel. 
The CFR had little trouble gathering money and talent for its new inquiry, titled 
“Studies of American Interests in the War and Peace,” or War and Peace Studies. The project 
ultimately sent 682 memoranda to policymakers at a cost of $300,000, supplied by the 
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Rockefeller Foundation.114 On its inception, it could draw on three decades of efforts to 
construct a U.S. foreign policy elite, able to advise officials, educate the public, and, not least, 
replicate itself.115 The project’s roster read like a cross-section of the elite’s upper echelons; many 
of the almost 100 participants, spread over four groups, stood at the forefront of their fields and 
professions. Heading the Economic and Financial Group were both the “American Keynes,” 
Harvard economist Alvin Hansen, and the leading neoclassical economist of the day, Jacob 
Viner, of the University of Chicago. The Political Group was chaired by international 
businessman Whitney Shepardson; the Territorial Group by prominent geographer Isaiah 
Bowman, the president of Johns Hopkins University; and the Armaments Group by corporate 
lawyer Allen Dulles and New York Times military analyst Hanson Baldwin.116 Finally, CFR 
president Norman H. Davis, a close advisor to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, led the entire 
project and along with Armstrong, the vice-chair, coordinated with the State Department to 
make sure the studies addressed current needs.117 The State Department, in turn, would make 
Council planners the backbone of the official postwar planning committee it set up after Pearl 
Harbor. 
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The trajectory of unofficial internationalists into the corridors of power had led some 
historians to narrate this history along almost conspiratorial lines. After the victory of popular 
“isolationism” following World War I, they suggest, elites organized outside the state in order 
to hasten the day when they could realize the interests of private capital in American world 
leadership.118 Such a reading, however, credits elite institution-builders with more prescience 
than they possessed. In the 1920s, they created institutions as much to forge connections abroad, 
in the North Atlantic and the Far East, as to influence policy formation at home. The two largest 
philanthropic organizations, the Carnegie Endowment and the Rockefeller Foundation, sent 
millions of dollars to Geneva, funding the League’s work on health, economics and finance, and 
intellectual cooperation.119 Carnegie and Rockefeller money also supported the creation of the 
three largest foreign-relations institutes in the United States: Armstrong’s CFR, Buell’s Foreign 
Policy Association, and the Institute of Pacific Relations, part of an international federation in 
the Far East.120 Internationalist but yet not anti-isolationist, these groups aimed to foster peace 
by cultivating public opinion at elite and popular levels. As Butler characterized the Carnegie 
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Endowment’s guiding assumption: “The real obstacle still to be overcome is that which prevents 
public opinion from controlling the policy of governments. When that can be accomplished, 
peace will be secured.”121 
From the beginning, the CFR was the institute most oriented toward shaping state 
policy, and the crisis of the thirties convinced others to follow its lead. After spending the 1920s 
as a critic of European and American imperialism in the Middle East, historian Edward Mead 
Earle set up the nation’s first “grand strategy” seminar at the Institute for Advanced Studies in 
Princeton. In New Haven, too, a cadre of young scholars established what they called the 
“power school,” officially the Yale Institute for International Affairs. Together the Ivy League 
institutes trained dozens of policy intellectuals who became influential after World War II. They 
reoriented American scholarship away from international law and organization and toward 
geopolitics and military conflict.122 It would be Earle’s 1943 volume Makers of Modern Strategy that 
turned George Kennan, the draftsman of Cold War containment, into a practitioner of grand 
strategy.123  
Yet the institutes hardly envisioned U.S. global supremacy before 1940. If anything, 
they sought to circumscribe America’s world role more sharply than ever. Members of the Yale 
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institute generally argued for hemispheric boundaries on U.S. political and military power; 
living in “the safest country on the face of the earth,” the American people had no place 
pursuing “power politics in distant parts of the world.”124 Earle reached comparable grand-
strategic conclusions. As late as 1939, he affirmed that the United States, shielded by the oceans, 
could abstain from the global balance of power centered in Europe. “For the moment,” Earle 
wrote,” a balance-of-power policy seems to be outside the realm of practical possibility, even if 
it were otherwise desirable.” And it was decidedly not desirable. Invoking the nineteenth-
century British internationalist Richard Cobden, Earle detected “something intrinsically 
abhorrent in the balance of power as such.”125 Despite repudiating the utopian assumptions of 
internationalism, the new admirers of power politics arrived at familiar prescriptions for United 
States foreign policy. 
So too during the eight-month “phoney war” that began World War II: the State and 
CFR postwar committees found themselves following nineteenth-century formulae by default, 
however slim the chances seemed that Hitler would welcome peaceful mediation, general 
disarmament, and universal commerce. Those formulae suited Americans’ traditional 
unwillingness to commit political-military power in Europe and Asia, and despite all the 
uncertainties of war, the one prognostication on which planners felt they could depend was that 
the United States would remain similarly apart in the future. “Military and political tie-ups are 
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taboo” was how the CFR’s Political Group summarized its study of American public opinion.126 
Top State Department officials made the same assumption at the end of 1939 when they 
assembled the 15-person Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations, chaired by 
Welles until its dissolution in the summer of 1940.127 At the first meeting, everyone agreed: 
“participation of the United States in a political unity such as the League of Nations is probably 
impossible,” as Assistant Secretary Adolf Berle put it.128 Membership in a world political 
organization was rejected even by Assistant Secretary Breckinridge Long, the one planner who 
professed disagreement with a “policy of aloofness from European political problems.”129 
In part, this restriction was imposed on the planners by public opinion. But they did not 
necessarily disagree themselves, notwithstanding Armstrong’s initial suggestion that the war 
could leave the United States as the premier world power. Despite abhorring Nazism, they 
judged the U.S. stake in the war and the peace on traditional lines harking back to the 
Napoleonic Wars: let Europe quarrel to America’s profit. Prior to May 1940, none of the State-
CFR planners dwelled on the possibility that Germany might conquer Europe and threaten the 
British Empire. The events of the phoney war hardly disproved the lesson of World War I that 
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defense tended to trump offense. In any case, the Anglo-French alliance seemed clearly to boast 
superior military strength and political solidity to the German-Soviet team of enemies effected 
by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939.130 Italy and Japan, for their part, remained 
neutral vis-à-vis Germany, not yet constituting the unified Triple Axis.  
To some planners, in fact, the real danger lay in too hasty and complete a victory by 
Britain and France. The CFR’s Economic and Financial Group worried that the Allies could 
parlay wartime trading arrangements into a postwar bloc that would discriminate against the 
United States.131 In his diary, Berle condemned a potential Anglo-French trade bloc as “really 
nothing different from the German Grossraumswirtschaft [sic].”132 Although others did not go so 
far, Berle’s equivalence underscored the difficulty of glimpsing even the faintest outlines of the 
postwar world and of America’s interests in it. A frustrated Hugh Wilson, the vice-chair of the 
advisory committee, admitted: “The future is so uncertain, the course of the war so 
problematical, and the atmosphere in which peace negotiations may take place so unknown.”133 
Uncertainties did not prevent Berle from having a nightmare that the Russo-German 
combination would win the war and force the United States to defend the Americas for the rest 
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of his lifetime — but the reverse scenario, of U.S. global supremacy, was apparently too 
farfetched for Berle’s dreams.134 
In the first half of 1940, therefore, the Roosevelt administration planned for peace with 
Hitler. It reprised the Wilsonian formula of “peace without victory,” seeking a mediated 
settlement in Europe that would secure for the United States a maximum of peaceful intercourse 
at a minimum of political commitment. On January 11, the State Department planners 
convened and pursued FDR’s desire to “intervene as a kind of umpire” in the European 
conflict.135 This became the committee’s reason for being: to gather a conference of neutrals — 
including fascist Italy — that would set forth principles of a new world order and bring the 
belligerents to the negotiating table.136 In February the committee sent messages to 45 neutral 
nations in order to ascertain their interest in a scheme for international economic cooperation 
and worldwide arms reduction. (Messages were prepared for the Soviet Union and Japan but 
not sent.)137 Later that month, Roosevelt dispatched Welles to Europe, where the under 
secretary met with leaders in Rome, Berlin, London, and Paris.138 Although FDR publicly 
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downplayed expectations for the “fact-finding” mission, the Baltimore Sun came closer to the 
mark, reporting that Welles was assessing prospects for a “peace without victory.”139 
While in Europe, Welles floated postwar proposals that his planners were developing, 
proposals with a long internationalist pedigree. Optimistically the State Department committee 
wanted to reestablish trade worldwide through some kind of international economic 
organization. The objective of economic universalism was uncontroversial among the planners 
and, they expected, would be welcomed by the public.140 But they planned to join economic 
universalism with political regionalism and military disarmament. Politically the United States 
would stay within the “natural unit” of its pan-American sphere.141 European states, by contrast, 
were to stop fighting, disarm, and join a rump, regional League for collective security. State 
Department planners proposed to realize this fantastic vision through the still more fantastic 
devise of a supranationally constituted “International Force” for Europe, enforcing 
disarmament from the air.142 Even though the proposal elicited snickers in European capitals, 
Welles continued to host discussions on airborne police until May, perhaps because 
supranational enforcement was the only way to have collective security and national 
disarmament at once.143 Those goals seemed unimpeachable, no matter how infeasible, so long 
as the United States left the politics of Europe to the Europeans.  
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Most of the Council planners also reverted to Wilsonian and pre-Wilsonian defaults in 
the face of geopolitical uncertainty. The military experts in Allen Dulles’s Armaments Group, 
including General George V. Strong from the Army’s War Plans Division, got to work by 
wringing its hands over all the conceivable outcomes the wars in Europe and Asia might bring. 
In their first memorandum, they paused to wonder whether the United States could expect the 
“mounting expansion of our military establishments, no matter what the outcomes of the 
present wars may be?”144 Yet they decided to suppose for planning purposes that the postwar 
world would embark on general disarmament, despite admitting that this was only one possible 
outcome, no more likely than others. As the Nazis marched into Denmark and Norway, they 
proceeded to catalogue disarmament proposals spanning from the ancient Greek prohibition 
on poisoning wells to Churchill’s 1913 suggestion of a one-year naval-building holiday.145 
Indeed, more than pioneering new internationalist policies, postwar planners were 
reverting to pre-twentieth century patterns, in which the United States promoted universal 
trade, disarmament, and arbitration while Europe policed itself. Two decades into the League 
experiment, world political organization was discredited and planners hardly considered its 
revival. Nor did the foremost League supporters outside the government. After the war began, 
Shotwell ended his four-year tenure as president of the League of Nations Association in order 
                                                   
144 Armaments Group, “Possible Outcomes of the European War in Relation to the Armaments 
Problem,” Memorandum, No. A-B1, April 5, 1940, CFRWPS. 
145 Armaments Group, “A Survey of Significant Disarmament Proposals Prior to the World War,” 
Memorandum, No. A-B2, May 1, 1940. Similarly, Shepardson’s Political Group spent the phoney war 
studying the experience of the League and related bodies like the world court. Political Group, 
Memorandum of Discussions, No. P-A1, February 26, 1940, CFRWPS; Political Group, “Relations 
with the Neutral States at the Peace Conference of Paris,” Memorandum, No. P-B1, March 29, 1940, 
CFRWPS; Walter Langsam, Political Group, “History of the Campaign to Bring About American 
Entry into the World Court, as a Possible Object Lesson in Procedure,” Memorandum, No. P-B3, 
February 22, 1940, CFRWPS. 
 
 76 
to form and chair the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace (CSOP).146 Shotwell’s 
became the most prominent postwar group that publicized its efforts, and in the spring of 1941, 
its dozens of mostly academic members attempted to draft blueprints for a postwar world order. 
The effort, however, only revealed the muddle in which these nominal Wilsonians found 
themselves. Having lost faith in public opinion as the basis of international order, they faced an 
unwelcome choice: get the League out of politics, reducing it to social and economic activities, 
or espouse coercive sanctions, shorn of past illusions that force might never have to be used.  
To some CSOP members, like the corporate lawyer and future Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles, a “merely consultative” League represented the most that could be achieved and 
the one scheme America might join.147 In April Shotwell himself suggested CSOP might 
advocate a League devoted solely to economic and social work.148 The suggestion did not satisfy 
Quincy Wright, who headed CSOP’s internal effort to develop a program and, throughout the 
war, went further than anyone to maintain a Wilsonian faith in the transcendence of power 
politics through world organization and public opinion. “We must get at the crux of the matter 
and deal with the problem of security,” Wright wrote. He criticized “the welfare people” for 
repeating the mistaken assumption of the 1920s that cooperation in nonpolitical areas would 
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trickle up.149 Yet the problem of security had no answer, as Wright came close to admitting later 
in 1940. “In the present state of public opinion,” effective international organization required 
“overwhelming force,” but it was impossible to say from where the force would come, much 
less how the force could be regulated.150 
Unable to draft satisfactory blueprints, CSOP mustered only the vaguest public 
pronouncements until 1941. A sense of failure and resignation crowded out the creativity of 
interwar League supporters. Harvard historian William Langer, a CFR planner, reflected on 
the prevailing mood in early April. “I think most of us who experienced the last war,” when 
Langer served in the Army, “are still rather in the position of not being able to grasp this new 
catastrophe.” Their response was not to insist on the same solutions but to take stock and 
rethink: “Those who hoped for the ultimate success of international organization cannot help 
but despair somewhat of human nature.”151  
The semi-Wilsonianism of the State Department, most Council planners, and CSOP 
did produce one dissenter: the CFR’s Economic and Financial Group. Like the others, the 
economic experts perceived a trend toward a “world of blocs” combining customs unions and 
currency areas. Unlike the others, they regarded the eventuality as a more-or-less-inevitable and 
not-so-bad thing. An economic bloc, they agreed, featured a “common cohesive interest,” be it 
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“common culture, emotional ties, close economic relationship, or contiguity.”152 It provided a 
solid basis for order. Instead of associating with a grouping of disparate neutrals, the United 
States ought to orient itself economically as well as politically within the Pan-American system.  
Such a limitation — which would look like “isolationism” by year’s end — was not 
optimal, Viner conceded. A world of blocs could not permit all the economic specialization of 
a unified world. But Viner thought blocs might well improve prospects for peace.153 Calling 
blocs “a form of world organization,” he envisioned a Pan-American bloc coexisting with an 
Anglo-French bloc (incorporating the empires and the sterling area) and a German-Italian bloc 
(including the Danubian area and possibly Scandinavia, Turkey, and even Russia).154 This 
vision of blocks remained highly speculative. It ignored Asia except by way of the British and 
French empires. It was conceived in disregard of its domestic political palatability. Its exponents 
did, however, articulate a clear alternative to neo-Wilsonian planning: a roughly autarkic 
principle for military defense, political affiliation, and economic integration. For the moment, 
this principle threatened to reorient all dimensions of U.S. foreign relations to the Western 
Hemisphere, but its logic dictated that if America’s trading area were to expand, its political-
military area would as well. 
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On the Eve of the Invasion of France 
 
By early May, as Hitler prepared to order his forces westward, American observers were 
primed to interpret events through a new matrix of concepts. The destruction of international 
society, rapidly achieved over the past five years, challenged their assumption that power politics 
could be transcended and their aspiration that it would be. As yet, the apparent intellectual 
error nevertheless inflicted small costs on the United States. Even interventionist-minded 
officials and intellectuals did not translate their changed assumptions into a positive program 
for orienting U.S. foreign policy and realizing world order. As long as they saw no advantage 
in extending political commitments to Europe and Asia, the formulas of nineteenth-century 
internationalism would serve American interests well. The United States would pursue peaceful 
intercourse on the cheap while encouraging the other great powers to settle their differences 
and reduce their armaments. Anti-isolationist internationalism would remain a concept in 
search of an agenda. 
For the many anti-isolationists already envisioning the postwar world, the search 
produced little more than a “talk-fest,” as one State Department official characterized a 
Saturday morning meeting.155 American foreign-policy elites concluded that any effective 
system of security required force behind its word. But what if one of the enforcers were Nazi 
Germany? What anyway was neutral America’s leverage for shaping the peace? Too many 
circles needed squaring, Hugh Wilson confessed: “I have made several attempts to get onto 
paper my conceptions of world order and have destroyed the results since I found they tended 
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to be too specific.”156 The State Department’s advisory committee disbanded after May, when 
the conference of neutrals for which it planned went from improbable to absurd. 
As one historian writes, the proposals of the short-lived official planning operation were 
“extraordinary and fantastic” — and struck its participants as such.157 It is notable then that 
U.S. global supremacy was not among the extraordinary, fantastic options that planners 
entertained. They came the closest in agreeing that if the Allies faced defeat, the United States 
would probably need to send its navy and air force to Europe. Here they contemplated a limited 
intervention in the war and nothing about the postwar, and Welles feared that “when the 
American people might be ready to act it might be too late to save the Allies.”158 The 
improbable scenario of Allied calamity, Welles implied, could unsettle the political consensus in 
the United States, but how and to what effect were difficult to say. Langer offered a similar 
assessment. He reported to his British colleague that Americans wholly sympathized with the 
Allies but equally resolved to stay out of war. “What may happen if you meet with disaster,” 
Langer wrote, “no one can tell.”159  
At the time, observers like Welles and Langer perceived the contingency of how the 
United States would respond to Nazi victories. Their perception deserves to be taken seriously. 
No one could tell. Harry Elmer Barnes, however, had an idea. To Barnes, a prolific historian 
and public intellectual, “internationalists” revealed their militaristic potential when they 
represented Barnes and his associates as “isolationists.” When CSOP formed, Barnes noticed 
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that the commission excluded anti-interventionist peace organizations as it undertook its 
supposedly objective studies. Despite spurning many Americans hitherto widely regarded as 
internationalists, its members were attempting “with unlimited funds to set themselves up as the 
sole guardians of peace.” “In the end,” he wrote, “the interventionist approach to peace will 
seem the only way.”160 
Although Barnes did not foresee the interventionist approach entailing the global 
supremacy of the United States, he was prescient. Already in place, as the phoney war ended, 
was a novel conceptual and discursive structure for discrediting America’s traditional 
commitment to non-entanglement, if not yet for making global supremacy the privileged 
alternative. This structure grouped, under the black flag of isolationism, all opponents of the 
armed enforcement of world order. It made an isolationist out of critics of great-power 
dominance like the journalist Frank Simonds, who condemned the League of Nations as a Holy 
Alliance through which the strong maintained “their pleasant but precarious possession of the 
fruits of past conflicts.”161 It made an isolationist out of advocates of non-forcible schemes for 
world peace like Borchard, who devised plans to eliminate the causes of war through arbitration 
and international control of the distribution of raw materials; like Theodore Burton, who as 
president of the American Peace Society, founded by Ladd, introduced the first neutrality 
legislation in Congress; and like Indiana Representative Louis Ludlow, who proposed a 
Constitutional amendment that in 1938 gained nearly 50 percent support in the House of 
Representatives and would have required a popular vote on declarations of war, except in cases 
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of armed invasion, because if other countries did the same, “I believe wars would be brought to 
an end.”162 These internationalists, considered by prewar standards, possessed the intellectual 
resources to resist intervention in the world war and supremacy in the postwar world. For so 
long, the makers and shapers of American foreign policy at large had possessed those resources 
too. 
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Chapter 2: World War for World Order, May-December 1940 
 
Six days after German tanks and planes began to sweep across the Low Countries and 
around the vaunted Maginot line, Franklin Roosevelt lay awake confronting what he described 
as a “crashing truth.” France was lost to Hitler. Surely Britain would follow, perhaps along with 
its fleet. Before long, “we would have nothing between us and some pretty hostile Germans 
except the deep Atlantic,” FDR mused to his assistant secretary of state, Adolf Berle. “It was 
interesting to see what came into your mind at a time like this.”1 Berle, no great Anglophile, 
nevertheless equally perceived enormous implications in the precarious position of the British 
Empire — implications the American people had to face. “I suppose it comes hard to realize 
that the foundations of the order of things as you know it may have ceased to exist,” he reflected 
in his diary.2 
But popular outcry was not long in coming. Five days later, Berle observed a “steady 
wave of hysteria” developing across the country, unmatched, he thought, in over a century.3 By 
the end of June, Congress approved a multi-year military buildup of vast proportions. The U.S. 
Navy, stationed in the Pacific, would now span two oceans, becoming the world’s largest. More 
drastic still was the institution of the first-ever peacetime draft, which promised to transform the 
U.S. Army, then ranked nineteenth globally, smaller than the Dutch.4 These measures arguably 
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constituted the most sweeping military expansion in U.S. history outside of wartime. And they 
“could not even have been contemplated two months before,” as the British Foreign Research 
and Press Service, charged with monitoring U.S. opinion, reported back to the Foreign Office.5 
In both the historiography and the popular memory of World War II, the German 
invasion of France in May and June of 1940 pales in significance beside the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor 18 months later. The latter readily assimilated into the national mythology as a 
sneak attack on “Americans” (more precisely, military installations in U.S. territories) that 
brought the United States formally into the war. Contemporaries, however, experienced at least 
as great a shock from the five-week implosion of the world’s strongest army. Until then, 
Americans had regarded the defeat of Britain and France as an “abstract problem and one that 
probably would never actually confront us,” Yale University’s suddenly interventionist 
president, Charles Seymour, recalled in June.6 Suddenly, on the heels of Germany’s invasion of 
Scandinavia in April, Hitler seemed to achieve what no one since Napoleon had gone far in 
attempting: mastery of Europe. If Britain fell next, “totalitarian” powers would control the 
Eastern Hemisphere. 
In the State Department, officials abandoned all hope of brokering a negotiated peace 
and installing a liberal international order of trade, disarmament, and regional political 
organization. The department disbanded its postwar planning committee at the end of May. 
The future was too uncertain to be planned, with one exception: the United States possessed 
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neither the military power nor the public opinion to permit the “perpetual assumption of 
protection for spots in remote parts of the world, in other words, a replacement by the United 
States of the British Empire,” the planners agreed at their final meeting.7 The best that could 
be imagined, through the summer, was to preserve a U.S.-led hemispheric order against the 
Nazi New Order in Europe. 
While the highest government officials scrambled to guard the hemisphere, however, 
foreign policy elites largely outside the government systematically considered the president’s 
intuition that Hitler had shattered the premises of U.S. foreign relations. The Nazi bid for 
Lebensraum, they recognized, posed an unprecedented question: what exactly was America’s 
living space? Until now, the expansion of American influence seemed not only imperative but 
forthcoming, appearing in the guise of either “manifest destiny,” for territorial acquisition across 
North America, or the “open door,” for economic penetration everywhere else. Americans had 
never before considered the prospect of a solely hemispheric existence, walled off, in every 
respect, from the rest of the earth. 
How they would react was anything but obvious, for traditional ideas of internationalism 
offered contradictory guidance. On the one hand, internationalism enjoined the United States 
from “entanglement” in the system of power politics centered in Europe. Had not the Monroe 
Doctrine, in claiming the Americas for the Americans, left Europe to the Europeans? On the 
other hand, internationalists had foresworn foreign entanglement in the expectation that the 
processes of peaceful intercourse — commerce, discussion, travel, law — would operate beneath 
the machinations of realpolitik and progressively undermine them. But the fall of France seemed 
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to prove, once and for all, that pacific forms of engagement, indeed “civilization” itself, would 
extend only as far as military force permitted. Choices had to be made, not just whether to 
intervene in the present war but also what kind of peace to seek: effectively hemispheric or 
global. Over the next year and a half, foreign policy elites undertook a thoroughgoing rethinking 
of America’s world role, ultimately concluding that the United States had to take responsibility 
for underwriting world order by securing its own political and military supremacy. The attack 
on Pearl Harbor would not initiate but culminate the process by which Americans acquired a 
will to lead the world. 
This chapter shows how policy elites first glimpsed postwar American supremacy during 
the second half of 1940. It primarily challenges an orthodox historiography according to which 
a slumbering, isolationist United States finally awoke to the threat of Nazi Germany and 
prepared, in the run-up to Pearl Harbor, to defend itself and its anti-fascist Allies.8 Such 
orthodoxy, although strongest in the 1940s and 1950s, endures in weaker form in the prevailing 
tendency to reify the vocabulary of interventionists, who redefined “internationalism” against 
their recent coinage, “isolationism,” said to have scuttled U.S. participation in the League of 
Nations and brought on the Second World War. But this chapter also challenges revisionist 
interpretations that have suggested, though not foregrounded, the emergence of America’s will 
to lead the world in 1940 and 1941. Two students of William Appleman Williams, Patrick 
Hearden and Thomas J. McCormick, attribute the transformation principally to economic 
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imperatives, real or imagined: faced with the nightmare of a world closed to trade, policy elites 
resolved to force the world open.9 In fact, the desire to preserve and extend liberal capitalism 
constituted only part of their concerns, articulated in terms of “world order.” Understanding 
their broad and tellingly vague rationale begins by taking seriously a concrete prospect: that of 
living in a world led by Hitler. 
 
Learning from Hitler, Summer 1940 
 
“Adolf Hitler is not aiming solely nor even chiefly to win for Germany a conqueror’s 
glory,” declared a Kansas newspaper man. “He represents a new world order.”10 Better than 
subsequent historians, William Allen White articulated the stakes of the fall of France as the 
U.S. foreign policy elite perceived them. They were hardly limited to stopping Nazi Germany 
in the present war, even though that was the most proximate purpose of White’s organization, 
the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (CDA), formed as the Nazis neared 
Paris. Constitutive of “interventionism” like White’s was what its proponents called 
“internationalism” — interventionism and internationalism being semantically joined by their 
common goal of U.S. “participation” in world politics and their common opposition to an 
imagined “isolationism.”11 Indeed, the CDA immediately declared itself to be constituted “for 
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the duration of this world war and for the peace that shall follow the war.”12 The League 
advocates in the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace (CSOP) lent the CDA their 
mailing lists and personnel; Clark Eichelberger, longtime director of the League of Nations 
Association, served as the CDA’s number two and eventual chairman; and pro-League scholar-
networkers Quincy Wright and James Shotwell sat on its national policy board. As Wright 
wrote, the CDA sought the “immediate objectives,” CSOP the “ultimate objectives.”13 
Born of the panic of the summer of 1940, the CDA quickly became the most popular 
group urging aid to Britain. By the beginning of August, before anti-interventionists had set up 
their America First Committee, it amassed 600 chapters nationwide.14 Experts throughout U.S. 
policymaking circles, in fact — officials in the State Department and military, planners in the 
Council on Foreign Relations, and academics in the Yale Institute for International Studies and 
Princeton’s military strategy seminar — reoriented their work in response to Hitler’s conquests. 
But why was the fall of France cause for such frenetic mobilization? Historians have scarcely 
probed the interventionist-internationalist imaginary for an answer, as if Americans reacted 
straightforwardly to external threats. At the time, though, the threat did not seem 
straightforward. Hardly anyone regarded an attack on North America as more than a distant 
prospect, even if Britain fell.15 “We shall not be invaded,” columnist Walter Lippmann stated 
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flatly.16 The advent of air power fortified the defense of coastlines more than it aided an invasion 
from the seas: down to Pearl Harbor, this was one of anti-interventionist spokesman Colonel 
Charles Lindberg’s central arguments. His opponents largely conceded it.17 
Confident in the immediate safety of the continental United States, U.S. foreign policy 
elites experienced Hitler’s conquests instead as a crisis of “world order.” The totalitarian powers 
had already revised and discredited the Versailles settlement, but until May 1940 the world’s 
most powerful empires, the British and the French, remained as the pillar of the interwar system. 
Now, in a stroke, Hitler swept the old order away. If he seized Britain, he would hold the reins 
of world leadership. The Nazis were “interested in domination and in supplanting both Britain 
and America as [the] Number One power in the world,” Raymond Leslie Buell, the interwar 
research director of the Foreign Policy Association, wrote to his colleagues in the new “Postwar 
Department” of the Time/Life/Fortune publications owned by Henry Luce.18 Or as FDR 
repeatedly underscored, Hitler sought “world domination,” first in Europe and then everywhere 
else.19 
It was the specter of a Nazi-led world order, a fear for the nature of international society, 
that animated interventionist-internationalists, even as they also painted vivid but highly 
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speculative scenarios by which Germany might attack the United States, often by way of 
economic subversion in Latin America.20 In public declarations and private discussions, U.S. 
foreign policy elites determined that the United States could not tolerate a world led by the 
Nazis. They proffered two distinct reasons — one foregrounding internationalism, the other 
exceptionalism — each leading to the conclusion that the United States would end up “isolated” 
in a hostile world unless it stopped Germany now and attained global supremacy thereafter. In 
this way the intellectual foundations of U.S. world leadership were laid in the summer of 1940, 
although Germany’s unstoppable war machine, and America’s conspicuous military weakness, 




The first problem with a world order led by Germany and totalitarian powers was that 
it might be closed to U.S. trade and other forms of intercourse. Previous generations of 
American internationalists had often taken for granted the ability to practice “free intercourse” 
— to send people, ideas, and goods across borders — without needing to undertake 
corresponding political entanglements. Indeed this was the sine qua non of internationalism. In 
the words of Thomas Jefferson, the United States sought “peace, commerce, and honest 
friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.”21 But in a Hitler-led world, was it 
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possible to have intercourse without entanglement? Interventionist-internationalists thought 
not. They worried that the United States would lack sufficient space for intercourse unless it 
prevented a German victory in the war and upheld the international political order thereafter. 
No aspect of the world’s enclosure was more disturbing than the economic. Despite the 
overwhelmingly domestic orientation of the U.S. economy, the potential loss of trade outside 
the Western Hemisphere troubled policy elites from the President on down. Lippmann penned 
one of the most immediate and influential expressions of these concerns. In “The Economic 
Consequences of a German Victory,” appearing in the July issue of Life, he helped to convince 
the head of the Army, General George Marshall, to rethink the hemispheric orientation of the 
military’s war plans.22 If Hitler defeated Britain, Lippmann argued, totalitarian states would 
control all the industrial “workshops of the world” — Western Europe, Russia, and Japan — 
except North America. To do business in such circumstances would be like “naked soldiers 
trying to stop a charge of tanks”; individual manufacturers, farmers, and labors could not trade 
fairly with “gigantic government monopolies managed by dictators and backed by enormous 
armed force.” The result would be a paltry economic living space: “we shall be left with Canada 
and the small republics around the Caribbean as the only region in which we can still do 
business on equal terms and under something like normal conditions.” Under such 
circumstances, Lippmann acknowledged, the American people could, in theory, improve their 
bargaining power by accepting the governmental organization of trade so as to meet the 
German monopoly with an American one. But Lippmann dismissed this option out of hand. If 
Germany held Europe, the United States would lack the bargaining power to trade fairly; and 
                                                   




if the United States gained bargaining power by regimenting the economy of its hemisphere, it 
would compromise free-market capitalism. Lippmann’s worry, then, was not that Germany 
would completely close off American trade with Europe but rather that it would render the 
United States less competitive (or less capitalist). His imagery nevertheless opposed American 
openness to German closure. The United States, he wrote, would end up “isolated in a 
totalitarian world.”23 
Anti-interventionists vigorously countered arguments like Lippmann’s. Many disputed 
the assumption that the “totalitarian” powers were or could become united. They contended 
that the bargaining position of postwar Germany, dependent on U.S. imports, would actually 
be weak. In a world divided into economic blocs, the United States, as the most integrated, self-
sufficient continent, should fare well.24 But the depiction of a German-led world as “closed…to 
normal intercourse” became a structural feature of internationalist-interventionist discourse.25 
“We are either internationalists or isolationists, and I can see nothing in the future of the United 
States except absolute ruin of our industrial structure if we become isolationists,” wrote Thomas 
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J. Watson, the CEO of International Business Machines who worked with the Carnegie 
Endowment of International Peace to develop plans for postwar economic reconstruction.26  
Over the next 12 months, this specter would lose no resonance, perhaps the opposite, 
as its realization become less likely owing to Britain’s defense of its home isles, Hitler’s invasion 
of the Soviet Union, and European resistance to Nazi rule. The fall of France seemed to reveal 
the true nature of international society, valid beyond the present war. By 1941 both presidential 
candidates from the previous autumn justified U.S. aid to Britain in terms of global economic 
openness and closure. Wendell Willkie, the Republican industrialist, insisted that the United 
States must build an “open world” in opposition to the “closed world” of the Axis. FDR declared 
that “freedom to trade is essential to our economic life.”27 The United States could not tolerate 
a “Nazi wall to keep us in.”28 
Behind closed doors, too, the fall of France forced FDR’s planners to determine the 
minimum world area that U.S. economic interests required. As the State Department wound 
down its postwar planning committee and the Army and Navy prepared new war plans confined 
to hemispheric boundaries, writing off U.S. positions in the Far East, it fell to postwar planners 
in the CFR to formulate an “adequate statement of the policy and interests of the United 
States.”29 By the end of July, the four different CFR groups, often joined by Hull’s advisor Hugh 
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Wilson and several representatives of the military, hesitantly converged on a spatial concept to 
frame the future of American foreign policy. According to this idea of the “quarter sphere,” the 
United States would economically support, and militarily defend, the area extending from 
Canada down to northern South America, around the “bulge” of Brazil that jutted toward West 
Africa.30 
Despite its limited scale, the quarter-sphere concept satisfied the Economic and 
Financial Group’s criterion of requiring a “minimum of trade dislocation” relative to the whole 
hemisphere, whose southernmost states exported large surpluses to Europe.31 Alvin Hansen, the 
Keynesian economist from Harvard and rapporteur of the Economic and Financial Group, 
went so far as to praise the quarter-sphere as an “excellent economic unit for the essential 
defense of the United States,” even if Germany were to seize southern South America, Japan, 
and the Dutch East Indies.32 To defend the whole hemisphere simply would exceed the military 
capacity of the United States, the planners judged.  
Yet the planners, Hansen included, never regarded the quarter-sphere to be desirable 
from an economic standpoint. The quarter-sphere seemed likely to provide “too small an area 
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for a satisfactory American standard of life.”33 Expanding even to the whole hemisphere, 
comprehended by the planners as “hemispherical isolation,” would still result in the loss of 
almost two-thirds of U.S. foreign trade.34 In late July, they began to study a larger area 
incorporating remnants of the British Empire and the Far East. But the stumbling block was 
clear and, so far, insurmountable: it was “the question of our naval power to secure this area for 
ourselves.”35 In a world led by totalitarian powers, liberal economic exchange would extend 
only as far as armed force would back it. 
For interventionist-internationalists, then, the fall of France gave entirely new urgency 
to the lesson of the 1930s that force was essential to the preservation of order, lest totalitarian 
aggressors conquer new lands and close them off to the rest of the world. Isaiah Bowman, 
America’s most famous geographer and head of the CFR’s Territorial Group, issued new 
“guiding principles” for the postwar planning on May 20. “We cannot relive 1919,” wrote 
Bowman, who had advised Wilson at Paris. “Only force will make and keep a good peace.”36 
But from where would the needed force come? Through the summer, with Great Britain 
struggling to survive and the United States to arm, any answer was too farfetched to propose. 
One, however, could be ruled out. Hitler’s conquests drove the nail into the coffin of world 
organization, still associated with the search for pacific alternatives to the use of force. As 
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Bowman’s guiding principles declared: “The League? Without force it would again become a 
mere debating society so far as political power is concerned.”37 Belief in public opinion as the 
solvent of world order, appearing as a false hope since the mid-1930s, now looked like a 
dangerous illusion. 
The most ardent League advocates, in CSOP, scarcely disagreed. Determining in June 
that a new world organization required such “overwhelming force” as to render its defeat 
“practically impossible,” they perceived, earlier than others, that world organization might be 
yoked to armed policing. But they could not devise a method that satisfied them, and they kept 
their blueprints private.38 Most Americans gave the subject little mind. In June three League 
supporters approached Berle for funds to save the League’s non-political sections by 
transplanting them from Geneva to Princeton. The Assistant Secretary saw their bid as an 
attempt to stave off the end of world organization, not as the beginning of a new dawn. “A sort 
of minor revolution,” Berle reflected, recalling the League’s formation in 1919. “To see the 
fragments wafted our way on the wings of a storm is not the happiest picture in the world.”39 
Despite Berle’s chagrin, the League advocates left empty-handed, though they would make their 
way to the Rockefeller Foundation and find all the funds they needed.40 
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If the first objection to a German-led world expressed a fear of “isolation” in the 
primarily internationalist terms of economics and exchange, the second objection framed 
“isolation” in the primarily exceptionalist terms of security and destiny. After the Depression 
raised the question of whether the future belonged to liberal democracy or totalitarian 
dictatorship, Hitler’s conquests threatened to deliver a decisive answer. Should Germany win, 
interventionist-internationalists repeated, the United States would be “alone in a contemptuous 
world” — receiving world history rather than making it.41 “If Britain falls, we become isolated 
in a world totally ruled by dictators,” as one CDA speaker said.42 Stung by Mussolini’s decision 
to ally with Hitler, FDR delivered a fiery speech on June 10 that assailed “isolationists.” They 
wished the United States would become “a lone island, a lone island in a world dominated by 
the philosophy of force,” Roosevelt charged. Such a fate constituted “the nightmare of a people 
lodged in prison, handcuffed, hungry, and fed through the bars from day to day by the 
contemptuous, unpitying masters of other continents.”43 In FDR’s telling, the United States — 
despite currently possessing the world’s largest economy and unquestioned leadership of its 
hemisphere — would become a passive, suffering recipient of world history defined by the 
Nazis. 
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If the weakness of “public opinion” pointed to the need to wield force to create order, 
policy elites’ concerns over the direction of world history made it imperative that the United 
States supply that force — by aiding Britain, entering the war if necessary, and policing the 
world. Without U.S. intervention, Buell foresaw one hundred years of “a turbulent sea of 
transitory political units floating and then sinking — a search for a new balance of power 
between nations or groups of nations breaking into small bits on the one hand or fusing into 
larger units on the other.” Whereas many interventionists feared world domination by a united 
totalitarian front, Buell, perceiving German-Soviet antagonism, predicted world anarchy. But 
the implications were the same: to uphold order, there was “no price too great for the U.S. to 
pay.”44 By the end of June, Buell was convinced of the inadequacy of proposals, advanced at an 
Institute of Pacific Relations conference, for U.S. leadership of an “American-Pacific 
Commonwealth” that would join the Western Hemisphere to all of Britain’s dominions and 
colonies in the Far East in case Germany conquered the British Isles. Instead the United States 
had to assist Britain so as to destroy Nazi Germany, or, if this proved impossible, form a bloc 
with Britain and its empire to counterbalance a German-dominated Europe.45 
Again Lippmann provided one of the most rapid and vivid articulations of the 
interventionist-internationalist position. On the day after Germany invaded France, he warned 
that an Allied defeat would leave America “isolated in a world dominated on both sides of our 
oceans by the most formidable alliance of victorious conquerors that was ever formed in the 
whole history of man.” True, there was “no doubt we should still be able to protect the forty-
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eight states from direct invasion.” But “that is all we can be reasonably sure of doing.”46 In early 
June, Lippmann made explicit the interventionist-internationalist premise that the United 
States had to preserve its self-image as the engine of world history. What was “shaken to its very 
foundations” was not North America’s safety but rather “the power to preserve the order of the 
world in which the American nations were born and have flourished.” Lippmann lamented that 
anti-interventionists fixated on the Founders’ injunctions against foreign entanglement. “Our 
generation does not understand the place of America in the great scheme of things,” he wrote. 
However American was the non-entanglement position, so too, Lippmann implied, was the 
aspiration to give law and order to the world. Both expressed an internationalist opposition to 
power politics and an exceptionalist exemption from the norm; now Americans had to choose 
between them. 
What was to be done, for the moment, was to establish “a citadel so strong in its defenses 
that by our own example the world can eventually be redeemed and pacified and made whole 
again. This,” Lippmann concluded, “is the American destiny.”47 America had first and foremost 
to defend the hemisphere, a position Lippmann maintained throughout 1940 and 1941. Yet he 
embedded hemispheric defense in the globalist aspiration to preserve world order and make the 
world “whole again” — as did Under Secretary Welles in declaring that “the duty to hold 
western civilization in trust” now devolved upon the Americas.48 And Lippmann claimed, 
almost in passing, that hemispheric defense required naval control of the Atlantic and the 
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Pacific, which in turn required both sides of the oceans to be “ruled by friendly or by weak 
powers.”49 Tentatively in the summer of 1940, and boisterously later, Lippmann established the 
fate of Western Europe as a vital U.S. interest. 
The CFR planners were starting to feel similarly. Even as they contemplated a quarter-
sphere living space in case Germany defeated Britain, the Anglophilic Political Group upended 
the ideological basis of the Monroe Doctrine’s hemispherism. The group contended that the 
United States enjoyed greater intimacy with the British Commonwealth than with Latin 
America. “Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and even Germany have closer racial ties with the 
United States than does Latin America,” the group reported to the State Department. No 
surprise that war “nearly always” occurred somewhere in Latin America, whereas Anglophone 
countries were uniquely peaceful and peace-loving — their imperial wars against indigenous 
peoples going unmentioned.50  
Francis P. Miller doubled as the CFR’s organizational director and a Political Group 
planner and did more than anyone to organize the Century Club, a group of interventionists 
who played a critical role in brokering the destroyers-for-bases deal in September.51 After 
fighting in World War I, Miller had studied international relations and theology at Oxford on 
a Rhodes scholarship.52 Now he made explicit the inversion of the Monroe Doctrine’s 
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constitutive polarity of the warring Old World versus the pacific New World. “Technical 
advances,” he told the planners, “had made obsolete the ‘separate universe’ idea of the Monroe 
Doctrine.” But Miller emphasized race more than technology. He told the planners to put a 
premium on “folk-thinking, namely, a sense of kinship with Canadians, Australians, and New 
Zealanders.”53 For the moment, “folk-thinking” justified narrowing, not widening, U.S. 
responsibilities, by excluding southern South America from the sphere of U.S. defense and 
trade. It would do the opposite, however, once Britain seemed likely to survive the Nazi 
onslaught. 
As Miller’s phraseology suggests, Hitler often earned the sneaking admiration of 
American observers in the summer of 1940. As Nazis explained Nazism to their youth, CDA 
officials wrote, so “we must tell the proper story to our youth.”54 In particular, interventionist-
internationalists portrayed the German leader as a uniquely clever and prescient master of 
statecraft. While America and Britain slept, they repeated, Hitler meticulously planned his 
conquests. His seeming foresight strengthened fears from the 1930s that parliamentary 
democracies could not act decisively.55 In his columns, Lippmann reiterated that Hitler fixed 
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on the future while publics reacted. Americans had to show that “a democracy can and will arm 
itself effectively while it is still at peace.”56  
Hitler also modeled for Americans the “tremendous advantage of the offense over the 
defense,” as General George V. Strong, Chief of the Army’s War Plans Division, told his fellow 
CFR planners.57 Suddenly, the stalemates of the Great War, which had dominated military 
planning ever since, counted for nothing. “Everything preceding the 10th of May last is ancient 
history,” announced Army intelligence chief General Sherman A. Miles. Planners concluded 
that offensive power had to be controlled at its inception, before an act of aggression took place. 
Miles thus deemed “useless” the internationalist methods of pursuing peace by submitting 
disputes to bodies of inquiry and then acting collectively against any wrongdoer.58 Such 
judgments did not go uncontested: over the coming months, anti-interventionists cited British 
resistance against a cross-channel invasion as evidence that coastlines could still be successfully 
defended. But the superiority of offense became a staple of policy elites’ thinking and implied 
that the United States itself must develop the capability to wage war offensively.59 
In the wake of the fall of France, U.S. foreign policy elites pieced together a new 
argument out of the tatters of traditional American internationalism. In order to prevent the 
spectacular negation of certain international ideals Americans had always held dear — an open 
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world and an American world — they began to perceive the need to reverse the doctrine of 
non-participation in extra-hemispheric wars. World order could not be trusted to the natural 
progress of history; no longer given, it had to be made, in the last instance by military power. 
Anything less meant “isolation.” Raising the specter of being confined and alone in a hostile 
world, “isolation” was the master signifier expressing interventionist-internationalists’ fears. It 
also associated anti-interventionists, as “isolationists,” with the kind of world the Nazis sought. 
To interventionist-internationalists, the alternatives were becoming as stark as could be: 
America could be either isolated or supreme. 
 
Glimpsing World Leadership, August-December 1940 
 
While U.S. foreign policy elites rejected an “isolationist” future for the United States, 
they could not yet conceive a satisfying and practicable alternative. On the surface, historian 
Charles Beard seemed likely be vindicated in his prediction from early in 1940 that the United 
States would return to tried-and-true hemispherism.60 Guarding the Western Hemisphere was 
the issue of the summer, more prominent in public debate and private planning than the matter 
of whether to aid Britain.61 In newspapers and magazines, the main question was how much of 
the Americas could the United States salvage: either North America including the Caribbean, 
the quarter-sphere down to the Brazilian bulge, or the entire hemisphere?  
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Beard and Senator Gerald Nye, the anti-interventionist North Dakota Republican 
instrumental in the passage of the Neutrality Acts, cheered the Roosevelt administration’s plans 
to create a Pan-American cartel in order to purchase South American surplus commodities and 
sell them to a Nazi Europe. By strengthening the bargaining power of Western Hemisphere 
countries, the cartel idea suggested that “isolation” might not be so dire: if Germany won the 
war, the Americas could exchange goods with Europe and still keep Germany from acquiring 
political influence in South America by dictating the terms of trade.62 The administration’s 
efforts to organize hemisphere defense culminated in the Havana Conference at the end of July. 
There Latin American states authorized the United States to seize colonies threatened by a 
German takeover and rule them through a collectively overseen mandate.63 FDR’s diplomats 
left Havana triumphant, having united Americans north and south against the Nazi threat. 
Hemisphere defense had never appeared so vital. 
Then the hemisphere idea fell away. British observers scarcely believed their good 
fortune. “The talk was all of Anglo-American co-operation, rather than of Hemisphere 
defense,” the British monitors of U.S. opinion marveled in October. “The remarkable fact 
is…that so little attention was paid to the Hemisphere idea, even in relation to defense.”64 This 
shift preceded the milestones focused on presidential decision-making typically cited by 
historians: FDR’s election to a third term in November and his announcement over the new 
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year of Lend-Lease, the “arsenal of democracy,” and the “four freedoms.”65 As the next section 
discusses, the transcendence of hemispherism owed less to the actions of the president than to 
the way Britain’s performance in the war changed the possibilities perceived by foreign policy 
elites. Even Roosevelt’s destroyer deal, in early September, did not clearly depart from 
traditional hemisphere defense: anti-interventionists delighted to find that the United States 
received 99-year leases on British bases in the Western Hemisphere, in exchange for sending 50 
old destroyers to Britain.66  
British resilience, first evident in August, proved that Germany might not attain 
dominance in Europe and Asia. If so, the United States could act on the lessons of the fall of 
France. First in private and then in public, foreign policy experts began to take anti-isolationism 
to its logical conclusion. Of the two aspects of “isolationism” augured by a Hitler-led world, it 
was principally the prospect of losing intercourse that absorbed officials and semiofficials. Public 




As Britain halted the German war machine, the CFR’s postwar planners stopped 
speaking of the quarter-sphere concept that had reigned in June and July. Not only were the 
British Isles increasingly perceived as America’s first line of defense, but it was apparent that 
neither interventionists nor anti-interventionists would countenance a retreat from the defense 
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of the entire Western Hemisphere. If the United States withdrew anywhere in South America, 
one planner noted, the concession would be perceived as a “Munich.”67 Yet studies from the 
summer indicated the hemisphere was undesirable as an economic unit. The planners had 
found that the U.S. economy, if hemispherically bounded, would “suffer severely,” they recalled 
in stronger terms than before.68 Further, something would have to be done about South 
American agricultural surpluses normally sold to Europe. Just how much of the world did the 
United States require? 
At the request of the State Department, the CFR’s Economic and Financial Group 
undertook a monumental study of this question from August to October.69 A more formidable 
group of liberal economists would have been difficult to assemble. Jacob Viner, a leading 
neoclassical economist, and Hansen, the “American Keynes,” served as joint rapporteurs. They 
led the group as it set out to devise a self-sufficient international space, not dependent on trade 
beyond its boundaries, for the United States to lead in the postwar world. If this U.S. area could 
be made more self-sufficient than the Nazis’, then the United States would enjoy a strong 
bargaining position and thus prevent Germany from expanding its political influence through 
trade. 
The economists thus aimed to achieve a basically geopolitical objective. At the same 
time, they sought to “minimize the economic costs of adjustment by the United States economy 
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to the world in which it may function in the future.”70 Particularly anathema was the use of 
government policy to adjust economies to the loss of imports or exports; “we wished to avoid 
adopting a totalitarian economy,” one planner explained.71 This left only one way to increase 
the self-sufficiency of the non-German area: add new regions that would absorb surplus exports 
and supply desired imports. In effect, the price of preserving liberal economies and their 
maximum prosperity would be borne through “increased military expenditures and other risks,” 
in one memorandum’s phrase.72 
Indeed, the velvet glove of commerce seemed clearly to demand an iron fist behind it. 
The planners now anticipated that the war would end in a stalemate approximating the status 
quo. Britain would blockade Europe while Germany controlled the Continent along with much 
of North Africa and the Near East. In such a divided world, only armed force would keep order 
within the U.S. area and keep Germany at bay; trade would extend no further than force 
allowed. Commerce, previously imagined as free and peaceful, as the very antidote to war, was 
to become the basis for the United States’ postwar military responsibility. 
Moving commodity by commodity, the planners assembled scores of tables using figures 
that accounted for more than 95 percent of total world trade in 1937. They divided the postwar 
world into three regions: a “German-Dominated Europe” (including the Mediterranean Basin), 
the Western Hemisphere, and the “British Empire and Far East,” which was subdivided into a 
“Pacific Basin” area (encompassing India, Japan, China, Southeast Asia, and Australasia) and 
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a grouping of the United Kingdom, Ireland, and South Africa.73 Strikingly, the planners 
excluded the Soviet Union from their study due to the small size of its foreign trade. They would 
later regret the decision — but not until the German army turned east in June 1941. Until then, 
the Soviet Union was cooperating with its ideological enemy and, to boot, technically a neutral. 
Planners did not know how to project the Soviet position in the postwar world. Nazi aims and 
achievements, by contrast, were all too clear. Germany, not the Soviet Union, set the 
fundaments of American planning. 
Distressingly, the data ascribed the greatest self-sufficiency to the German-dominated 
area and the lowest to the Western Hemisphere. The German area could absorb 79 percent of 
its exports from 1937 and 69 percent of its imports. For the Western Hemisphere, the numbers 
were 54 and 65 percent, respectively.74 The Western Hemisphere sent eastward nearly $3 
billion in goods, especially machinery, grains, cotton, petroleum, copper, and cattle products.75 
The planners therefore ruled out postwar U.S. leadership over the hemisphere alone. This was 
insufficient: even if the United States assembled a cartel-like unified seller to market the surplus 
to the German area, the Western Hemisphere would need to trade with Germany more than 
vice-versa. A deficient bargaining position would not do. (Not contemplated by the planners 
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was that self-sufficiency might, by the same token, allow Germany to leave the Western 
Hemisphere alone.) 
Next the planners envisaged integrating the Western Hemisphere with the “Pacific 
Basin,” a vast grouping that seemed to represent the largest commercially significant area 
available to the United States should Germany successfully invade the British Isles. They 
included Japan — hitherto a near-afterthought in the Eurocentric planning — in the Pacific 
Basin, assuming that somehow warring Asia could be integrated into the non-German area. 
The planners found that the U.S. economy would benefit substantially from the addition of 
Asia, which contained a large market for U.S. manufactures and industrial products and 
constituted the “foremost source” of such crucial raw materials as rubber, jute, and tin.76 For 
South America, however, the Pacific Basin was more competitive than complementary. 
Australia, New Zealand, and India exported the same agricultural commodities as did southern 
South America, especially Argentina. In the cases of meat and gain, Western Hemisphere 
surpluses would even be “seriously aggravated.”77 Thus the planners rejected the Western 
Hemisphere-Pacific Basin area. It too foundered on the twin priorities of maintaining national 
and international liberal capitalism (namely, maximizing prosperity while minimizing 
readjustments) and securing geopolitical advantage (namely, policing the Western Hemisphere 
and establishing superior bargaining power vis-à-vis Germany). 
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In early September, the Economic and Financial Group hit upon the answer it would 
proceed to advocate through the middle of 1941: join the Western Hemisphere to the British 
Empire and the Pacific in a “great residual area” embracing the entire non-German world. By 
integrating the United Kingdom, a major importer of agricultural products, the planners went 
far in solving the problem of surplus exports from South America. As a consequence, they 
calculated the non-German area, later named the Grand Area, to possess “substantially greater” 
self-sufficiency than German Europe, for it could consume 86 percent of its exports and supply 
79 percent of its imports.78 Finally, after months of study, the planners had discovered that if 
German domination of Europe endured, the United States had to dominate everywhere else. 
In short, “the United States should use its military power to protect the maximum possible area 
of the non-German world from control by Germany in order to maintain for its sphere of 
interest a superiority of economic power over that of the German sphere.”79  
No one expressed surprise at this expansive conclusion, perhaps because it followed all 
too readily from the planners’ assumptions. They stipulated that the U.S. area had to exceed 
the German area in self-sufficiency and minimize dislocations of trade: small wonder the whole 
of the available world fit the bill. Viner said, “It was clear that if the political costs were not too 
great the United States should aim at the largest possible bloc.” Or, as economist Eugene Staley 
explained, small units would simply promote a “tendency to expand the area to its optimum 
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economic limits in spite of contractions which might be advisable for political or military 
reasons.”80 
The result of this analysis was a novel proposition in the history of U.S. foreign relations: 
the United States had to hold “unquestioned power” in the world. Such was the Economic and 
Financial Group’s recommendation to the State Department, delivered in an October 19 
memorandum entitled “Needs of Future United States Foreign Policy.”81 The planners 
endorsed the Grand Area because it exceeded the projected German area in both productive 
capacity and bargaining power. Within the Grand Area, moreover, the United States would be 
supreme, the world crisis having destroyed Britain’s ability to maintain its positions in Europe 
and Asia simultaneously.82 What the Roosevelt administration needed, in short, was an 
“integrated policy to achieve military and economic supremacy for the United States within the 
non-German world.”83 
The planners turned briefly, at the end of their recommendations, from establishing the 
need for U.S. global preeminence to suggesting means of implementing it — the issue that 
would orient postwar planning in the coming years. One set of recommendations concerned 
military intervention. Foremost in importance was the rapid fulfillment of ongoing U.S. 
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armament drive.84 The United States also had to render “every assistance, except by 
expeditionary force,” to the British Empire in order to rescue its control of the world’s sea lanes 
and thereby the Grand Area.85 The planners recognized that this process was already 
underway, but they grew bolder in advising the incorporation of Japan into the Grand Area 
“through peaceable means if possible, or through force.”86 The latter method looked 
increasingly necessary after Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact, a defensive alliance with 
Germany and Italy, at the end of September. By November the planners devoted several 
meetings to the question of how to convince or compel Japan to join the Grand Area.87 
The other set of recommendations seemed on the surface to revive the crowning 
achievement of Wilsonian internationalism: world organization. “Political arrangements should 
be developed for the kind of ‘world organization’ that the United States formerly has wished for 
all of the world — not only for a part of it,” one planner summarized.88 The idea of world 
organization thus resurfaced in CFR planning, albeit embryonically, for the first time since 
Hitler’s conquests destroyed its appeal. But now world organization acquired a new purpose: 
achieving the global economic and military supremacy of the United States rather than realizing 
the liberal utopia of perpetual peace. By organizing the non-German, the United States world 
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would aim to secure “the greatest measure of economic bargain-power to maintain economic 
superiority which, in turn, can lead to decisive military superiority.” Having attained this 
superiority, the United States might one day make the divided world whole again. “Perhaps 
ultimately such a non-German world organization can become a complete world organization,” 
the memorandum ended.89 
The Economic and Financial Group took evident pride in its plentifully underlined 
blueprint for U.S. supremacy. (The Grand Area was “the basis of which United States foreign 
policy may be framed.”90) But when it presented its study at an October 16 meeting of other 
CFR planners — also attended by Leo Pasvolsky, a Brookings Institution economist whom 
Secretary Hull brought into the State Department to head up research on postwar foreign policy 
— members of the Political Group were intrigued but not convinced. One balked at the 
economists’ desire to have the Political Group draft a constitution for “this statistical, economic 
utopia.”91 It was not the objective of U.S. global supremacy, per se, that elicited the Political 
Group’s skepticism. All, Pasvolsky included, regarded the hemisphere as a grossly inadequate 
basis for U.S. foreign policy. The political planners pointed out, however, that the Grand Area 
presupposed a postwar peace that actually represented a cold war between Germany and the 
Allies. “Better to fight at once,” the group felt, “than to face the prospect of such a prolonged 
and feverish armed truce.” A divided world would necessitate “increasing our economic and 
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military might ad infinitum, lest the German area succeed in closing the war-potential gap.” 
The upshot would be another world war, or at best a peace with warlike characteristics.92 
Clearly this was not the kind of world that the American people were not yet fighting 
for. Planner Henry Wriston, the president of Brown University, doubted whether “American 
men would be willing to fight and die for such a scheme.”93 The CFR members worried that 
the U.S. public still opposed extra-hemispheric commitments. The public might recoil at the 
proposal to forcibly integrate Japan into the Grand Area, which smacked of the “crassest kind 
of imperialistic methods…at radical variance with our traditional stand that peaceable 
international relations must rest on a moral basis.”94 If globalism was a tough enough sell 
already, an imperialistic-sounding globalism might be impossible. In November the Political 
Group suggested splitting the Grand Area into two “Anglo-Saxon-dominated areas,” allowing 
the United States to limit its political obligations to the Western Hemisphere and reap the 
benefits of trade with the Eastern area, led politically and militarily by Britain.95 The CFR’s 
Political Group, then, accepted the need for a globe-spanning non-German living space but 
questioned the American public’s will to lead it. 
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The dissent of the Political Group revealed that a presentational problem stood in the 
way of realizing U.S. world leadership. Prepared though they were to play power politics on a 
global scale, foreign policy elites believed the American public was not. How could the 
projection of U.S. political and military power beyond the Western Hemisphere be made to 
look different from the imperialism of European and Asian powers, against which the United 
States defined itself? The planners did not yet pose this questions squarely, so novel was their 
argument for U.S. global supremacy. Yet even the economists began to grasp the challenge. 
“To be acceptable to those who favor isolation, a policy of world leadership must be framed in 
such a way that its positive gains are shown to be unmistakably greater than the apparent 




Nothing as extravagant or concrete as the CFR’s blueprint for global supremacy 
appeared in public discourse in the fall of 1940. The election campaign dampened expansive 
expressions of U.S. responsibilities; both FDR and Willkie, despite favoring all aid to Britain 
short of war, highlighted their intention to avoid full-scale belligerency. Interventionist-
internationalists nonetheless began to promulgate positive alternatives to the assumptions that 
brought the United States to the verge of seeming “isolation” in the world.  
Their primary response was to build support for aiding Britain and its empire, in effect 
constituting the global alliance of the non-German world envisioned by the CFR planners. In 
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May and June, Gallup polls recorded that 64 percent of Americans preferred to stay out of the 
war than to aid Britain at the risk of war. September 1940 was the first month when the majority 
switched sides. By January the transformation was complete: 68 percent prioritized helping 
Britain win, a level maintained throughout 1941.97 A new consensus identified the U.S. national 
interest with the survival of Britain and therefore with a global preponderance of power. When 
the anti-interventionist America First Committee, which became known as the epitome of 
domestic “isolationism,” formed in early September, its leaders argued not that Britain’s survival 
was irrelevant to the United States but rather that Britain would endure without U.S. aid, 
permitting the United States to concentrate its resources on the defense of its entire 
hemisphere.98 
Interventionists, for their part, never abandoned hemispheric defense but steadily 
expanded its requirements as to include substantial participation in European politics. Whereas 
anti-interventionists touted the defense of hemisphere territory, interventionists accentuated the 
importance of controlling the seas as well. “When we speak of defending this Western 
Hemisphere,” the President declared in October, “we are speaking not only of the territory of 
North, Central, and South America and the immediately adjacent islands; we include the right 
to the peaceful use of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.”99 Thereupon Lippmann, the preacher 
of Anglo-American sea power, added that controlling the seas required “the unquestioned 
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friendship of free peoples living on the other shores of the seas.”100 Now the defense of the New 
World led into the heart of the Old. The hazy frontiers of future U.S. responsibilities extended 
all the way to Africa when State Department officials and CFR planners contemplated taking 
positions in West Africa lest Germany establish naval or air bases there. Increasingly the whole 
of the British Empire, in North Africa and the Far East, looked imperative to defend.101 “We 
have been saying that the English Channel is our first line of defense,” read an internal CDA 
memorandum in September. “What will people say when we urge tanks for the campaign in 
Egypt?”102 
In theory, such expansions of U.S. interests remained tethered to hemispheric defense. 
Another line of argument, however, threatened to sever the cord: that it was not the Axis but 
the United States that had to realize a new world order. After Germany, Italy, and Japan 
concluded the Tripartite Pact at the end of September, Japanese Prime Minister 
Fumimaro Konoye proposed to recognize U.S. leadership in the Americas provided the United 
States did the same for Germany and Italy in Europe and Japan in East Asia. Together the 
powers could cooperate “in the construction of a new world order,” Konoye suggested.103 
Neither the Roosevelt administration nor writers in the U.S. press seriously considered 
accepting the offer. To the contrary, the pact provoked declarations of U.S. aims that 
transcended nominal hemispherism. Already on the day after the announcement of the 
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Tripartite Pact, Welles delivered a speech that, despite its theme of Pan-Americanism, linked 
U.S. national security with worldwide conditions. The United States, he said, must “aid in the 
construction of that kind of a world peace based on justice and on law through which alone can 
our security be fully guaranteed.”104 
But why not accept a world peace compatible with the Axis vision of Europe for the 
Europeans and Asia for the Asians? In responding to the Tripartite Pact, the U.S. foreign policy 
elite foregrounded the exceptionalist argument: that Axis supremacy in Europe and Asia would 
deny the destiny of the United States to define the direction of world history. “Ours is the new 
order,” Lippmann wrote in reply to Konoye’s offer. “It was to found this order and to develop 
it that our forefathers came here. In this order we exist. Only in this order can we live.”105 In a 
remarkable address six days after his election to a third term, FDR echoed Lippmann in 
asserting America’s inherent right to set the terms of world order. “In almost every century since 
the day that recorded history began, people have thought, quite naturally, that they were 
creating or establishing some kind of ‘new order of the ages,’” he began, belittling the 
pretensions of the Axis. In fact, “civilization” had produced few genuinely new orders. These 
FDR traced from ancient Greece and Rome, the birthplaces of democracy and orderly 
government, to the British Isles and finally the United States. Britain and America — joined 
together, notably — had “led the world in spreading the gospel of democracy among peoples, 
great and small.” But it was the United States that “truly and fundamentally…was a new order.” 
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In FDR’s account, the Axis bid to lead the world to a new order was undertaken by the wrong 
party. 
Hence the problem with the Tripartite Pact: a German-dominated Europe and 
Japanese-dominated Asia would reverse the progressive realization of America’s role in human 
events. It would negate the United States as a political project — “that new order for the ages 
founded by the Fathers of America,” as FDR put it, blurring the distinction between the United 
States proper and its world environment.106 FDR said precious little, at this juncture, about the 
means by which America’s sense of destiny would be maintained after the United States denied 
leadership to the Triple Axis. He nonetheless delivered a public statement of American 
objectives that surpassed the defense of any particular territorial space, that framed the stakes 
of the war in terms of who would lead the world in the epoch to come. 
Nothing was unusual, of course, about holding up a consensual, American order against 
Old World force and domination. Lippmann spoke as a good nationalist and internationalist in 
averring that “our order is founded on the free consent of men and of peoples,” completely 
unlike the “fire and sword” wielded by the Axis. More innovative was that the proclamations of 
a new world order went only that deep. Lippmann and FDR said next to nothing about the 
problems of international society itself. They put forth no proposal for replacing a system of 
power politics with a scheme to prevent war, as did the legalist internationalists in the League 
to Enforce Peace prior to U.S. entry in World War I. They conveyed no sense that the need to 
use force would one day disappear. A “new world order” was becoming a mere idea, detached 
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from concrete programs. Its only tangible content was the mobilization of U.S. power, first to 
defeat the Axis and then, presumably, to preserve an American-style world order. “What our 
neighbors fear among us,” Lippmann wrote, “is not our power but the insufficiency of our 
power and the hesitations and divisions which paralyze our power.”107 Lippmann prefigured 
FDR’s “arsenal of democracy” concept by three months as he argued that America must 
become the “workshop and arsenal of the free nations” and outbuild the combination of 
Germany, Italy, and Japan.108  
Lippmann did make an initial effort to reconcile his nominal aspiration for a consensual 
world order with his arguments for U.S. military superiority. Inheriting centuries-old 
justifications of the British Empire based on its maritime methods, he suggested that “sea 
power,” distinct from the “military power” of land armies, nurtured freedom.109 As he sensed, 
the contradiction between a new world order and armed supremacy, between internationalism 
and world leadership, had somehow to be papered over. Achieve this and the presentational 
problem on which the CFR planning foundered might be solved. Against appeals to America’s 
non-entanglement tradition, interventionist-internationalists could reply that the higher 
objective was always to redeem the world: better to preserve free intercourse and the American 
destiny, at the price of entanglement, than to hold fast to non-entanglement, at the price of 
isolation. 
                                                   
107 Lippmann, “On a New Order in the World,” 26. 
108 Walter Lippmann, “Sleepwalking in Washington,” New York Herald Tribune, October 5, 1940, 13.  
109 Lippmann, “Seapower: Weapon of Freedom,” 45, 110-2; Walter Lippmann, “The Reasoned 
Courage of the British,” New York Herald Tribune, September 17, 1940, 23; on the linkage of sea power 
and liberty in the British imperial imaginary, see David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British 





“We Could Win Everywhere” 
 
Admiral Harold Stark did not need explicit orders from his commander in chief in order 
to tell which way the wind was blowing. Stark, the Navy’s top official, and his Army counterpart, 
General Marshall, were responsible for approving war plans in case the United States became 
a belligerent. Military leaders had spent the summer obsessed with hemispheric defense and 
wary of civilian enthusiasms for aiding Britain; the United States appeared to present a classic, 
lamentable case of political objectives outstripping military capabilities. But hemisphere-
centered war plans did not survive the summer. As Stark, Marshall, and their planning staffs 
saw — General Strong, chief of the war plans division, attended numerous CFR planning 
meetings — neither their civilian leadership nor the U.S. political class would accept the 
strictures of hemisphere defense. At the end of October, with FDR closing in on a third term, 
Stark drew up a comprehensive statement of U.S. objectives, finalized on the day after FDR’s 
“new world order” speech and then approved by Marshall. 
Historians have recognized the resulting “Plan Dog” memorandum, named for its 
endorsement of paragraph D’s course of action, as “perhaps the most important single 
document in the development of World War II strategy,” for it originated the Europe-first war 
strategy of concentrating U.S. forces in the Atlantic while holding a defensive posture in the 
Pacific.110 Stark’s memorandum was also seminal in another way. It was the first U.S. war plan 
to posit the importance of the global balance of power, and hence the survival of the British 
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Empire, to the security of the United States.111 “A very strong pillar of the defense structure of 
the Americas has, for many years, been the balance of power existing in Europe,” Stark wrote. 
“The collapse of Great Britain or the destruction or surrender of the British Fleet will destroy 
this balance and will free European military power for possible encroachment in this 
hemisphere.”112 
Stark’s rationales for supporting Britain showed their debt to the anti-isolationist 
arguments articulated since May. One held that a world open to economic intercourse required 
a favorable preponderance of political power. Stark claimed that the United States required a 
“profitable foreign trade” in order to produce heavy armaments, and it might lose that trade if 
Britain lost its fleet. Trade — “particularly with Europe,” Stark added, surpassing the CFR’s 
ambitions for the Grand Area — depended on the “continued integrity of the British Empire.” 
Stark’s second rationale combined discourses of security and sociability. If Germany won, “we 
would find ourselves acting alone, and at war with the world. To repeat, we would be thrown 
back on our haunches.” Stark found no need to argue that the territory of the continental United 
States would be in danger of invasion if American haunches had to be activated, although he 
surmised that the Axis might, after “some years,” turn on Latin America. It sufficed to cite the 
lack of initiative, the loss of sociable relationships in the world, that the United States would 
suffer — and the gains that a British victory would enable. If Britain lost, Stark wrote, “while 
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we might not lose everywhere, we might, possibly, not win anywhere.” On the other hand, “if Britain 
wins decisively against Germany we could win everywhere.”113 
Over the coming year, FDR and his cabinet acted on Plan Dog’s prescription to defend 
Britain in the Atlantic while neglecting to adopt the strictly defensive posture in the Far East 
preferred by the Navy and especially the Army. After Plan Dog, as before it, civilians led the 
military toward more expansive commitments in the world, not the other way around. That 
Plan Dog constituted relative restraint testified to the transformation that had taken place since 
the summer. Within six months, the world role imagined for the United States changed as 
dramatically as it had in the previous half-century. At first Nazi Germany, having steamrolled 
France, seemed destined to seize Britain and induce a U.S. retreat to a position of dominance 
over little more than North and Central America — a hegemonic space closer to that of 1890 
than 1939. British resistance provided the most immediate reason why the United States 
avoided such a fate and then began envision a preeminent world role. And the strength of the 
American economy, despite its halting recovery from depression, made plausible a policy of 
U.S. world leadership as it became evident that Britain, unable to defend its positions in the Far 
East and the Mediterranean at once, would end up severely weakened however it survived. 
Berle seemed to have these factors in mind when he recorded in his diary, on September 2: “I 
have been saying to myself and other people that the only possible effect of this war would be 
that the United States would emerge with an imperial power greater than the world had ever 





seen; but I thought of it as something that would happen more or less in the future. It has 
happened off the bat, and there isn’t much that anyone can do about it.”114 
Still, important though they were, geopolitical and macroeconomic circumstances 
cannot fully explain why U.S. policy elites began to develop a new conception of their nation’s 
world role. After all, they might have agreed with anti-interventionists that Britain’s survival 
would allow the United States to return to normalcy, leaving the pursuit of military supremacy 
to the European powers. Essential to the rethinking of the foreign policy elite was its point of 
departure in ideas of internationalism descended from the eighteenth and nineteenth century. 
From the founding of the republic up to the summer of 1940, the United States had two 
universalist aspirations — the promotion of liberal intercourse and the realization of America’s 
world-historical destiny — that might have militated against the nation’s secondary ranking in 
political and military power, were it not for the work performed by internationalist ideology. 
According to this ideology, the processes of liberal intercourse operated organically and 
consensually, independent of politics and antithetical to war. They would progressively replace 
power politics with a peaceful, rational order, and the United States was leading the way: not 
by acquiring a preponderance of power to impose its writ, but by reforming international society 
through the arts of peaceful exchange. When Hitler conquered France, he seemed to disprove 
the very premises of internationalism, which the rise of “totalitarianism” had already called into 
question. In a Nazi-led world — in any case, in a world in which the Nazis could come close to 
leadership — no harmony was immanent. There could be no intercourse without force. 
                                                   




Americans could no longer imagine themselves as ushering in a new and better order, unless 
they acquired political and military power to make it so. 
In Plan Dog, Stark defined “our major national objectives in the near future as…the 
territorial, economic, and ideological integrity of the United States, plus that of the remainder 
of the Western Hemisphere.” Stark’s three-part schematization usefully frames the interests that 
convinced foreign policy elites of the necessity of pursuing political and military preeminence. 
First, concerns for territorial and economic integrity jointly rendered worldwide intercourse 
more imperative than non-entanglement. Over the summer, the Roosevelt administration and 
its postwar planners came to perceive that the United States was committed to the defense of 
the entire Western Hemisphere at a minimum; domestic politics would accept no less. When 
this hemispheric territorial imperative combined with liberal-capitalist economic imperatives 
— of maximizing trade and of minimizing disruptions to the socioeconomic status quo — the 
CFR planners concluded that the United States had to dominate the entire non-European 
world if Germany held continental Europe. Finally, the prospect of Nazi preeminence appeared 
to contradict America’s ideological integrity as a world-historical nation ushering in a new and 
better order. Regardless of whether it would eventually attack North America, Germany would 
seem to enfeeble the United States by defining the terms on which nations would live and relate. 
 
After a grim summer, what foreign policy elites called “interventionism” and 
“internationalism” was on the make. Yet as they eyed U.S. leadership of some new world order, 
basic questions remained to be asked, let alone answered. How would the American political 
system, hitherto averse to European war and power politics, be convinced to go along? How 




responsibilities? Could the United States accept an Anglo-German armed truce that left the 
Nazis hegemonic in continental Europe? How would the Far East, the Soviet Union, and 
colonial areas figure in an American new order? And what would become of world organization, 
the American elite’s answer to the last world war? 
For all the agitation of self-styled internationalists, confidence in previous generations of 
internationalist beliefs and prescriptions reached a nadir. From Geneva, a group of League 
supporters, including Americans in CSOP, issued a despairing report assessing why the League 
failed. “There is at present no possibility to appeal to values which are held in common by the 
various nations and political systems,” the group wrote in October. Case in point was the 
belligerents’ avowed desire to annihilate their opponents. Even eighteenth-century practices 
compared favorably. In present circumstances, international law was “practically meaningless,” 
international organization scarcely better: both depended on a common ethos and “it is 
precisely that international ethos that has lost its binding force.”115 No harmony lay waiting to 
be unleashed while the world remained spiritually and ideologically divided.  
The Leaguers could have left hope for the internationalist project to resume once some 
new political unity was forged, yet they indicated deeper doubts about the possibility of 
international harmony. Until now, they wrote, internationalism had been premised on the belief 
“that the human mind has not yet been given its real opportunity and that if all reactionary and 
obscurantist influences which still play upon men can be removed and if true education can be 
universalized, men will recognize each other as men, forget their sterile conflicts, and proceed 
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to build a better and brighter world.” Alas, this universalism had too clearly demonstrated a 
“facile optimism concerning the nature of men and the power of human reason.”116 
Those who spoke assuredly of the future subscribed to a concept of internationalism 
different from the old. For these Americans, “internationalism” now meant anti-isolationism 
and therefore less the realization of world harmony than the projection of world power by the 
United States. In the same month of the desperate postmortem from Geneva, Berle marveled 
at his country’s fortunes. In the last war, the United States became “virtually an adjunct to the 
British war machine,” Berle noted. But “this time it seems to me that the thing should be the 
other way around. We have the ultimate strength. We also have the ultimate consistency of 
principle; we are the inevitable economic center of the regime which will emerge — unless, of 
course, we all go under.”117  
Anti-isolationism was acquiring the program it lacked before the fall of France. The 
world leadership of the United States was in the offing. “For twenty years we have been longing 
for a job — longing for a task worthy of our heritage and our faith,” declared Miller, fresh off 
the destroyers deal, to the Daughters of the American Revolution. “We became unhappy and 
distraught because we did not know what to do next. Now we have found our job.”118 When 
Miller went to rent a Manhattan office for his fellow interventionists, he got number 2940 of 
the Albee Building on 42nd Street. 2940 was the year until which Hitler vowed his thousand-
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year Reich would rule. The room number delighted Miller and his compatriots. It was, they 
felt, a “good omen for free men.” Their cause was the one that would last until then.119 
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Chapter 3: The Anglo New Order of 1941 
 
“It may change our entire way of living  
but if there has to be one top dog in this world  
we are going to be that top dog and not Adolf Hitler.”1  
 
– Life, December 1, 1941 
 
 
The American Century commenced by means of folksy prose. As publishing mogul 
Henry Luce summed up his instantly famous essay of that name: “The big, important point to 
be made here is simply that the complete opportunity of leadership is ours.”2 That Luce could 
write these words, as he did on February 17, 1941, reflected yet another spectacular reversal. 
Not six months before, in the wake of the French collapse, Americans had steeled themselves 
for a hemispheric future within an Axis-led world order. But by the new year, the fortunes of 
the war, and thus the imagined peace, had reversed so dramatically that Luce and other 
American observers now judged it was Nazi Germany that would end up confined to its own 
continent, perhaps rolled back further. Why then were interventionists not content to aid Britain 
and restore the status quo ante bellum? Why seek to seize the “complete opportunity of 
leadership” if the actual geopolitical danger was lessening and could be opposed by simpler 
means?  
The reason was that American foreign policy elites were rethinking the very nature of 
international society. Pacific forms of exchange no longer appeared capable of transcending 
power politics and war, as generations had hoped. To the contrary, “peaceful” intercourse 
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seemed to require the backing of armed force in order to exist at all. For the first time, policy 
elites believed the United States could enjoy liberal trade and common norms of conduct no 
farther than their military force would permit. Even if Nazi Germany were defeated, power 
politics would not be. The world would remain prone to war, ordered only by a superior armed 
force imposing its own “philosophy of life,” in a contemporaneous phrase.3 To the extent that 
American interests spanned the globe, so must, for the first time, American political and military 
power. It was to impart this lesson that Luce took to the pages of Life, which, less than five years 
after Luce founded it, ranked as the nation’s most popular magazine.4 
Immediately after the fall of France, Luce had channeled his alarm into helping to 
organize and fund the interventionist Century Group. Its few dozen men, operating out of a 
private club in New York City, gave FDR the idea to send 50 destroyers to Britain in return for 
99-year, rent-free leases on British military bases in the Caribbean and Newfoundland.5 After 
the consummation of the destroyers deal in September 1940, however, the group could no 
longer contain Luce’s ambitions. He left it in November, judging the country to be “pretty 
generally agreed” on the merits of arming itself and backing Britain.6 The urgent task, Luce 
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thought, was not to persuade the president about the war; it was rather to exhort the public 
about the postwar.  
To this end, Luce threw himself into political advocacy as he had never done before. He 
crisscrossed the country to deliver speeches that became the basis for his American Century 
essay. The results justified Luce’s enormous confidence in his capacity to mold middle-class 
opinion. Life received an extraordinary 4,541 letters, overwhelmingly favorable, in reply to “The 
American Century.” In 1941 alone, the essay was reprinted in the Washington Post and Reader’s 
Digest and as the centerpiece of a short book. It was assigned in high schools and universities.7 
Not merely in retrospect, it mattered in its own moment as an argument that one fawning Life 
editor dubbed a “modern Federalist Papers for this world A.D. 1941.”8 
The foundational principle of this new world was simple and sweeping: “America is 
responsible, to herself as well as to history, for the world environment in which she lives.” 
Although Luce disclaimed U.S. responsibility for the “good behavior of the entire world,” any 
place that seemed to bear on the overall “world environment” warranted American action. 
Luce did not shrink from appropriating the language of the Third Reich to articulate the 
epochal scale he envisioned. “Tyrannies may require a large amount of living space,” he wrote. 
“But Freedom requires and will require far greater living space than Tyranny.”9 No less world-
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historical than Hitler’s vision of a Thousand-Year Reich were the ambitions of American elites 
like Luce — the latter ultimately proving more successful. 
In 1941, however, success hardly appeared foreordained. True, the rest of the world 
had, Luce believed, served up a golden opportunity for American leadership. But Luce wrote 
“The American Century” because he feared his countrymen would decline the invitation. 
Down to Pearl Harbor, according to surveys, 75 to 80 percent of the public opposed an 
immediate declaration of war on Germany despite supporting aid to Britain in equal numbers.10 
America’s will to power would not flow automatically from its physical capacity, as Luce saw at 
the start of 1941. The nation’s leaders could not simply mobilize the economy and build up the 
military and expect to lead the world for a century to come. They would also have to convert 
the American people to a new way of thinking, contrary to the old. 
Luce’s anxiety derived from more than a reading of the latest polls. After all, that he 
could write “The American Century,” to the plaudits of readers, indicated the direction of 
popular sentiment; just glimpsed by elite planners at the end of 1940, global supremacy was 
now a matter of vigorous public discussion. But Luce’s anxiety arose from a newly formed 
ideological worldview according to which popular “isolationism” obstructed the 
“internationalism” that Luce favored. Like many others, Luce read this dichotomy back 
through decades of history, referring to “those old, old battered labels — the issue of 
Isolationism versus Internationalism.” Even though hardly anyone before the thirties had heard 
of “isolationism,” much less considered “internationalism” to be its negation, Luce blamed the 
ills of U.S. foreign relations on the stubbornly isolationist public and its equally isolationist 
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representatives in Congress. “The fundamental trouble with America,” Luce wrote, “has been, 
and is, that whereas their nation became in the 20th Century the most powerful and the most 
vital nation in the world, nevertheless Americans were unable to accommodate themselves 
spiritually and practically to that fact.”11 
Thankfully, Luce thought he possessed the antidote to “this virus of isolationist sterility” 
infecting (or sterilizing) much of the country. Luce wanted his fellow interventionists to turn 
world leadership, political and military supremacy, into the only thinkable mode of American 
engagement in the world. “We can make isolationism as dead an issue as slavery,” Luce 
envisaged, “and we can make a truly American internationalism something as natural to us in our 
time as the airplane or the radio.”12 With this, Luce set forth the objective of the campaign that 
American political elites embarked on in 1941 and completed by the close of World War II. 
During the epic battles across Europe and Asia, they would keep one eye fixed at home. They 
would refashion armed supremacy from a strange-sounding proposition to the obvious 
consummation of America’s destiny. They would create the will to lead the world. 
 
This chapter shows that Luce was hardly alone. The idea of an American Century 
became a mainstream proposition in 1941. Countless officials and intellectuals decided that the 
United States must attain political and military supremacy across the globe and sustain it in the 
epoch to come. America’s future world leadership seemed so likely indeed that postwar planners 
began to work out the institutional form it should take. As the second part of the chapter reveals, 
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policy elites conceived not only whether but also how to achieve postwar American world 
leadership, all before the United States entered the war. 
On March 7, less than three weeks after the appearance of Luce’s essay, this effort began 
in the Council on Foreign Relations. For the past year, the Council had used Rockefeller 
Foundation funds to conduct postwar planning for the short-staffed State Department. Now the 
State Department asked the group to orient its efforts around a new question: “What are the 
alternative methods open to the United States for maintaining the peace of the world after the 
current conflict?”13 The request presupposed the planners’ conclusion from the autumn that 
“this country must squarely face the issue of political responsibility for world peace,” in the 
words of planner Henry Wriston, the president of Brown University.14 At the time, that 
conclusion was undeniably speculative, but by the spring of 1941 it seemed the country might 
actually be able to follow through. Germany’s advance had been halted, and the American 
public, as the State Department noted, was showing interest in what would follow the war. U.S. 
elites thus set out to devise a framework for postwar world politics.  
One year later, their discussions produced the basic structure of international relations 
after 1945: American supremacy operating through a world organization with universal 
membership but profound great-power privilege. Yet the path there was anything but linear. 
Through most of 1941, postwar planners eschewed world organization with wide participation. 
As this chapter shows, they thought America should police the world through an exclusive 
alliance with Great Britain and its white Dominions. This chapter recovers postwar planners’ 
                                                   




extensive blueprints for building joint military bases and extending a form of citizenship to 
Anglo-Saxons the world over. 
The most vocal advocate of American-British partnership was the prominent military-
affairs commentator George Fielding Eliot, who had lived Anglophone unity as a Brooklyn-
born Australian infantry lieutenant turned Canadian mountie and then U.S. Army major.15 An 
advocate of hemispheric defense before the fall of France, Eliot now reasoned America and 
Britain should police the world as the only powers possessing the requisite moral solidarity and 
military might. No general grouping of states, with divergent interests and ways of life, could do 
the same. In his words, “the chief lesson of the post-war years is that peace cannot be assured 
without force.”16 And not the kind of force half-contemplated in the League of Nations 
Covenant: “This force must be of adequate dimensions, capable of immediate application, and 
under the control of those whose self-interest will ensure its utilization.”17 
The popularity of Eliot’s view, and the corresponding unpopularity of international 
organization, challenges the narrative of the origins of the United Nations that historians have 
told for decades. Ever since the events themselves, historians have detected no contradiction 
between world leadership and world organization, between the projection of power 
internationally and the international control of power. They treat the United Nations as the 
linear elaboration of the Four Freedoms speech, the Lend-Lease Act, and the Atlantic Charter, 
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even though none of these statements mentioned world organization. By casting the events of 
1941 as teleological precursors, historians pass over the pivotal period when U.S. elites went 
from mocking international organization to thinking it vital. The turn to international 
organization needs to be explained, not assumed to emanate naturally from America’s rise to 
world leadership. 
That explanation begins in 1941 with the widespread perception that world leadership 
precluded world organization. When planners and intellectuals devised the first blueprints for 
U.S. political-military supremacy, they envisioned America and Britain forming a police force 
with hardly any role for other powers and peoples — which is to say most of the globe. 
Unambiguously, they valued the projection of power internationally to the exclusion of the 
international control of power. Years later, the United Nations Organization would be founded 
on, not despite, this contradiction. 
 
World Leadership Without World Organization 
 
In the month after Luce wrote “The American Century,” a political scientist from the 
University of Cincinnati posed a question. “When the United States has its thousands of 
airplanes, its mass army, properly mechanized, and its two-ocean navy, what are they to be used 
for?” The outline of an answer was becoming clear to Harold Vinacke. It involved, he discerned, 
much more than defending the Americas. After months of debate, Congress had passed the 
Lend-Lease Act, an unprecedented grant of executive authority to open the spigots of aid to 
Great Britain and any other country the president deemed vital to U.S. defenses. The American 
political system was now acting on the presumption that the security of its hemisphere depended 
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on the balance of power in Europe and Asia. This newfound axiom, Vinacke wrote, liberated 
U.S. policy from its “territorial and geographic basis,” rendering it “world-wide rather than 
hemispheric in outlook.”18 
Would the global outlook vanish into thin air after hostilities ceased? Vinacke thought 
not, for the country was acquiring a new consciousness of itself and its place in the world. In 
Vinacke’s words, the United States now resolved to “use the power which it possesses to create 
world conditions satisfactory to it rather than prepare to adjust itself passively to world 
conditions as created by others.” “Others” meant not only the Triple Axis. Great Britain so 
coveted an immediate alliance that Vinacke believed the United States would “call the tune” 
— as long, he added, as Americans accepted the duties of leadership that they had heretofore 
refused.19 
Vinacke went on to head the Japan section of the Office of War Information. After the 
war, he returned to the University of Cincinnati to teach. He had, safe to say, no singular 
significance in the making of American foreign policy. Hence the significance of “What Shall 
America Defend,” his article in the Yale Review. Its very obscurity indicates the distance that the 
aspiration to world leadership traveled in a few short months. Vinacke was part of a whole 
panoply of elites who, by the spring of 1941, saw the United States emerging as the supreme 
political-military power. And they said so in public. They filled newspapers, magazines, and 
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journals with discussion of the new world order, in the ubiquitous phrase of the moment, that 
America could build and lead.20 
America’s largely self-appointed planners understood the limited capacity of their 
government’s small bureaucracy to undertake far-sighted research in the midst of the present 
crisis, although the State Department did establish a Division of Special Research in February 
through which it later conducted official postwar planning.21 But they did not all intend to be 
ersatz policymakers, aiming solely to influence state policy. They also appreciated the power of 
civil society, in its own right, to define the parameters of thought in American and international 
society. In mobilizing for a new world order, American unofficials followed a venerable tradition 
of internationalist groups across the North Atlantic, dating to the advent of the pacifist 
movement in the final years of the Napoleonic wars and intensified by the twentieth-century 
proliferation of private foundations. “Everyone is planning a post-war world,” CFR-turned-
State Department planner Isaiah Bowman observed a year later, not entirely happily.22 So 
many postwar groups formed in 1940 and 1941 that it became difficult to survey planning work 
as a whole. Various organizations assembled bibliographies of postwar proposals, the 
multiplicity of bibliographies replicating the original problem.23 
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The following section shows that anticipations of the American Century were not 
confined to a few personages, like FDR or Luce, on whom historians have lavished attention as 
if they possessed a unique prescience.24 It recovers the breadth of postwar thinking in the first 
four months of 1941. This period saw American officials and intellectuals publicly articulate a 
new goal: the acquisition of global political and military supremacy by the United States, 
working in tandem with Great Britain but without a wider world organization. 
 
Although a number of officials and intellectuals began to envision postwar U.S. 
supremacy toward the end of 1940, this prospect still verged on the fanciful. It remained more 
a perceived necessity than a program to be implemented, more should than could. One reason 
was geopolitical. In late 1940, Germany and Italy, working in concert with the Soviet Union, 
extended their conquest of Europe, making allies of Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania. The 
Luftwaffe rained bombs on London. Japan occupied Indochina, displacing France. These 
military setbacks hardly seemed to auger greater U.S. participation in the postwar world, nor 
did America’s halting response to them. No one knew how far the Roosevelt administration 
would escalate its support for the British Empire. The new world order could wait: the most 
urgent question at the year’s end was how to continue delivering military aid. Both halves of 
America’s “cash and carry” policy were losing relevance as Britain hemorrhaged the dollars it 
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required to purchase U.S. arms and faced mounting Nazi attacks on the shipping of supplies 
across the Atlantic.25 
The impasse convinced Roosevelt to act boldly. In a series of speeches surrounding the 
New Year, he proposed that America become the “great arsenal of democracy” by equipping 
the front lines against the Axis without requiring immediate compensation. This time, unlike 
with the destroyers deal, the president sought the assent of Congress. He wagered that anti-
interventionists, brought into the open, would suffer a crushing defeat. He was right. The Lend-
Lease Act, debated in January and February, passed in early March, constituted more than a 
crucial step from neutrality to belligerency. It decisively overcame the imagined separation 
between the Old World and the New, constitutive of the Monroe Doctrine. 
FDR made his first declaration of America’s postwar aims in his State of the Union 
Address. Against the “new order of tyranny,” he propounded Four Freedoms — of speech and 
worship, from want and fear — to be realized, he repeated for each, “everywhere around the 
world.”26 (“At least the Crusades of a thousand years ago had a more limited objective,” griped 
the anti-interventionist international lawyer Edwin Borchard.27) As Anders Stephanson points 
out, the maximalism of the Four Freedoms contradicted FDR’s coexisting tendency to accept 
dictatorial and totalitarian governments as legitimate members of the postwar order, provided 
they eschewed the lawlessness and “gangsterism” he ascribed to the Nazis.28 Either of FDR’s 
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positions, however, presupposed a novel U.S. interest in policing the balance of power centered 
in Europe, despite the president’s frequent appeals to hemispheric security. As Raymond Leslie 
Buell observed to his colleagues in the Time/Life/Fortune Postwar Department, Roosevelt 
“supposedly imposes a hemispheric limitation on U.S. intervention, but this means very little. 
For under his own definition the U.S. would be justified in using force to destroy hostile land 
bases in other continents, and this doctrine can lead us to the defense of British and even Red 
Sea ports before we are through.”29 
By shedding the vestiges of neutrality, FDR freed up interventionists to think and speak 
about the kind of world for which the Anglophone Allies stood. Even before Lend-Lease passed, 
Borchard lamented that anti-interventionists had been “out-shouted.”30 After the program’s 
passage, commentators widely acknowledged that the United States was at war in all but name. 
“America is arming on a great scale and is manifestly intervening in the war,” Walter Lippmann 
noted in passing.31 U.S. military spending was en route to constituting 13.1 percent of gross 
domestic product in 1941, dwarfing its 1.5 percent for most of the 1930s.32 And under 
international law, no neutral could assist one belligerent as America was aiding Britain. Thus 
America was not a neutral, interventionist lawyers decided; led by Quincy Wright, the political 
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scientist and international lawyer, they popularized the category of “non-belligerent” to 
characterize the U.S. position.33 
Having all but achieved their proximate goal of getting the United States into the war, 
interventionist elites now considered America fated to define the future of international order 
— a volte-face from six months prior, when the fall of France sent planners scurrying to figure 
out how much of the Western Hemisphere they could preserve in a world led by Hitler. Five 
days after Luce’s essay came out, Vice President Henry Wallace declared that whoever won the 
war, America’s responsibility afterward would be “enormously increased.” “The wisdom of our 
action during the first three years of peace,” Wallace said, “will determine the course of world 
history for half a century.”34 Wallace, speaking in the thick of the Lend-Lease debate, risked 
antagonizing Congressional opposition, but he went ahead anyway. A few weeks later, Lend-
Lease passed, and Wallace proceeded to double the lifespan of his imagined U.S.-led peace. 
Now he called on the country to “build a Pax Democratica which will bless us and the whole world 
for a century to come.”35 
As prominent politicians spoke of a new postwar vocation for the United States, many 
middle-ranking elites gave more sustained attention to the subject. When the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science held its annual meeting in early April, the guiding 
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theme was America’s future as the premier world power. The columnist and political scientist 
Max Lerner urged that “America assume the world leadership which she must assume if that 
will help to achieve some degree of world order.”36 Another speaker, Otto T. Mallery, summed 
up the premise of the conference in similar terms. A New Deal economist with the National 
Resources Planning Board, Mallery averred that “destiny offers to the United States the 
ultimate balance of power and of resources in the world after the war.” The remaining question 
was: “What will the United States do with this power and treasure?”37 
Likewise, Buell convened his Fortune Roundtable in mid-February and found a sea 
change from the previous year. In early 1940, members of the Roundtable, like the State 
Department planners, had wanted the United States to maintain its traditional neutral rights 
and mediate in the European war “in favor of a just peace.”38 Now, however, all but two of the 
group’s 26 economists, businessmen, diplomats, academics, and journalists presumed that 
Britain would and must win, creating an opportunity for the United States to “play a decisive 
role in formulating the next peace.” As the war devastated land armies, America and Britain 
could use their “supremacy on the sea and in the air” to police the postwar world, Europe in 
particular. One of the dissenters captured the consensus for the readers of Fortune: “The 
assumption has been made by the majority here and with surprisingly little dissent that America 
is going to emerge from the present conflict rich, strong, ready, and eager to take on those duties 
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and obligations to distribute its largess throughout a stricken world and at the same time play 
the major part in underwriting New Orders on three or four continents.”39 
This consensus was capacious in ambition as well as conception, leaving many questions 
open. If America were to police the world, could it manage solely through naval and air power 
or would it require a large standing army? Even less clear were the economic and social 
principles of the new order, a subject that elicited individual idiosyncrasies and domestic 
political cleavages. Mallery, having asked how America should use its power and treasure, 
answered with the promotion of reciprocal trade agreements and the universal right of 
recreation. (A champion of playgrounds since the Progressive Era, Mallery went on to found 
the International Recreation Association during the Cold War as a means of bringing nations 
together.40) For every Luce and Willkie who envisioned U.S. leadership heralding the next era 
of free trade, a New Dealer like Wallace spoke of America “insuring to all humanity those 
minimum living standards” to banish hunger from the earth.41 Wallace’s counterpart in 
unofficial circles was Vera Micheles Dean, the director of research for the progressive-minded 
Foreign Policy Association and a rare Jewish woman ensconced in the Northeast policy elite. 
Dean wanted to redress the way the last postwar settlement had privileged political and 
territorial arrangements over the social and economic “standard of living” of the masses. She 
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proposed a new slogan of “human welfare” and later promoted this agenda as a founder of the 
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.42 
But the common denominator of postwar discussions was not welfarism. It was rather 
that whatever shape international society took, the United States should be the one to define it. 
As Buell wrote to the Luce publications’ Postwar Department: “Despite the demand for Peoples 
Charters and new social orders, the immediate issue of this war is Power.”43 On this score New 
Dealers and anti-New Dealers could agree. Dean herself argued that by failing to assume world 
leadership, the United States had doomed the Versailles order and nearly forced Americans to 
live within their continental boundaries. This above all had to change. “It must be recognized 
that this conflict will determine the political, social, and economic shape of the world in 
accordance with the general philosophy of life formulated or practiced by the victor,” she wrote. 
In the “struggle for world order,” as she titled her book, America had to win, then lead.44 
The implications were not lost on anti-interventionists in Congress. “If we enter the war 
today to save the British Empire, we will be involved in war for the rest of our lives,” Senator 
Robert Taft cautioned. He predicted that the United States would find constant cause to enter 
European wars if it placed its effective frontier on the English Channel.45 Historian Charles 
Beard agreed, warning the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that interventionists sought 
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to “make over Europe and Asia, provide democracy, a bill of rights, and economic security for 
everybody, everywhere, in the world.” Such enthusiasms Beard denounced as “the childish 
exuberance of the Bolshevik internationalists who preach the gospel of one model for the whole 
world.”46 For the final time, it turned out, opponents of American world leadership stood up in 
Congress as a political force. 
 But they did not stand tall. Senator Hiram Johnson had trouble convincing his anti-
interventionist allies to testify against Lend-Lease. Liable to stand accused of “isolationism,” 
they feared for their reputations.47 Anti-interventionists also underestimated the country’s new 
criterion of judgment. In opposing intervention in the war, they argued principally that North 
America was impregnable against any power or combination of powers that might attack from 
across the ocean.48 But most interventionists conceded the point. More than the safety of 
territory, interventionists sought a new global order with America setting the rules. In reply, 
anti-interventionists sounded the familiar alarm that rather than right the wrongs of Europe 
and Asia, the United States would become entangled in age-old patterns of power politics and 
war. But what if the United States could wield power so great as to bend the rest of the world 
to its will? What if it alone could “build and outproduce the whole of Europe,” as Walter 
Lippmann foresaw in rejecting a proposal for a negotiated peace from anti-interventionist 
Montana Senator Burton Wheeler?49 
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Accused of favoring entanglement in Old World politics, interventionists answered, in 
effect, that America would be too mighty to entangle. This solution differed fundamentally from 
the one Woodrow Wilson had offered in 1919 — namely that the League of Nations would 
constitute a “disentangling alliance” that would rid the world of rivalry and war, thus 
Americanizing the world.50 Like Wilson, the new generation of interventionists posited an 
Americanized world, but not through international organization or the transcendence of power 
politics. The world would be Americanized because America, unfettered, would dominate the 
world. “The cure,” Luce wrote, “is this: to accept wholeheartedly our duty and our opportunity 
as the most powerful and vital nation in the world and in consequence to exert upon the world 
the full impact of our influence, for such purposes as we see fit and by such means as we see 
fit.”51 
Indeed, until the fall of 1941, interventionists evinced little interest in reviving an 
international political organization after the war. They emphasized projecting power, not 
controlling it, highlighting the strong hand America would enjoy vis-à-vis the British Empire 
and any other international grouping. It was therefore possible for Luce, writing in the name of 
“internationalism,” to mention international organization not once in his American Century 
essay. Likewise, in April 1941 interventionists formed a new citizens group called Fight for 
Freedom to advocate an immediate declaration of war, and despite calling for a “new world 
order,” the group scarcely referenced international organization.52 It was the struggle for 
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supremacy between America and Germany that would “decide the future of the world for a 
thousand years as Hitler has said.”53 Those who bothered to speak of international organization 
usually condemned it. “Why is it that the members of the Group are so opposed to the League?” 
one postwar planner asked his colleagues in the Council on Foreign Relations.54 When a Time 
editor pitched a story idea on the League of Nations and the World Court, she immediately had 
to add: “(Don’t laugh.)”55 
Even the most dedicated supporters of the League prioritized the achievement of world 
leadership first and world organization a distant second. The Commission to Study the 
Organization of Peace mustered only the vaguest public pronouncements through 1941. 
Members deferred hopes of some world organization to the indefinite future, following a 
“transition period” of American-British leadership. By January 1941, the transition period 
preoccupied CSOP’s increasingly misnamed subcommittee on international organization, 
headed by Wright.56 CSOP came out in June for a “joint American-British sea and air force, 
with the necessary bases and servicing facilities, strong enough to police the seas and to localize 
outbreaks of violence in land areas.” This arrangement would last “at the initial stage, or,” 
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rather differently, “as long as may be necessary.”57 In other words, one member complained, 
CSOP envisioned a “rather indefinite dictatorship by Britain and America.”58 
In the formative period of America’s will to lead the world, international organization 
constituted no better than an afterthought. At worst, it seemed to embody the naïve hopes of a 
generation of American diplomats and intellectuals. As Francis P. Miller commented to the 
CFR planners, “One of the great fallacies of American thought during the last twenty years was 
that war could be eliminated by ‘incantation.’”59 Force, not incantation; armed supremacy, not 
world organization — these dichotomies prevailed through most of 1941. They might well have 
maintained themselves throughout the war. For in 1941, in the eyes of the American political 
and intellectual elite, world leadership and world organization did not go together. The one 
ruled out the other. And the one U.S. elites wanted was world leadership.  
Yet now that they wished to ascend to world leadership and define the structure of 
international society, the question became what that structure should entail if not world 
organization. It was this question that postwar planners set out to answer. “The job is a 
staggering one,” Assistant Secretary Adolf Berle recorded in his journal as the State Department 
prepared to assemble an official committee of planners.60 Fortunately for him and his 
department, the foreign policy elite stood ready to help. 
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Planning to Lead by Leading the Planning 
 
For a century before 1941, Anglophiles the world over dreamed of joining together in a 
single, globe-spanning polity. They hoped the “English-speaking peoples” would manifest their 
racial unity in a loose federation that would lead even the misfortunate non-English speakers 
toward peace and democracy.61 They counted supporters not only in the British Isles but across 
the Dominions of the white settler Commonwealth: from Australia and New Zealand to South 
Africa to Canada and Newfoundland. In the United States, however, their ranks were thin. 
Despite increasing Anglo-American intimacy since the turn of the century, Americans could not 
see themselves partnering officially with Great Britain or its Commonwealth of Nations. 
Although some advocates of the League envisioned Anglo-American power underwriting the 
collective security system, few sought a formal or exclusive alliance with Britain, much less with 
the white Dominions that made up the Commonwealth.62 
Yet in 1941 Anglo-American unity vaulted into the mainstream of American political 
thinking. “The question of any sort of union between Britain and America had never been 
discussed in the same way before,” Whitney Shepardson, the director of the CFR, told a crowd 
at the CFR’s London counterpart, Chatham House, that July.63 Shepardson thought the issue 
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had “gone beyond the stage of speculating on what the future might look like if wishful-thinking 
people had their way.” Receiving ample consideration from Shepardon’s colleagues at the CFR 
and the public at large, the idea of Anglo-American unity had “advanced to a stage where it has 
become an acute political question.”64 
Shepardson knew whereof he spoke. For three decades, since thriving as a Rhodes 
Scholar at Oxford, he had been one of those “wishful-thinking people,” devoting himself to the 
furtherance of Anglophone unity, at least when not discharging his duties as an international 
business executive. He headed the American branch of the Round Table, an elite transnational 
society for the promotion of the Commonwealth ideal, and wrote frequently for the Round Table 
journal.65 After Pearl Harbor, FDR sent him to London as a special assistant to the U.S. 
ambassador and named him the first Secret Intelligence Chief of the Office of Strategic Services, 
the forerunner of the CIA.66 But it was in the year before Pearl Harbor that Shepardson found 
his moment. Of the various possible foundations of postwar U.S. policy, there was little question 
which had the most appeal — to the point that the CFR planners talked about creating a 
subcommittee called “Relations between English-Speaking Peoples,” before concluding that 
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they were giving the subject ample consideration as it was.67 At last, other Americans seemed 
to want what Shepardson had long sought: a world order run by the Anglo-Saxon nations, 
aligned in a permanent partnership. 
Better yet, the United States would take the lead, effective immediately. Shepardson, as 
chairman of the CFR’s Political Group, saw to it that America would lead the peace by first of 
all leading the planning. He and several other planners had attended the Paris Peace 
Conference in 1919 and learned that the more detailed proposals of the British yielded greater 
influence.68 This time the United States would come prepared. In the summer of 1941, 
Shepardson visited the UK to strengthen ties with British planners and found the roles reversed 
already. As he reported back to the Council, British peace planning had not “reached as 
concrete or specific a stage as in the United States,” even though America was not yet a 
belligerent.69 Delighted, Shepardson did not consider whether the progress of U.S. planning, 
based on calculations of the nation’s own interest, implied that the wave of Anglo-American 
enthusiasm might recede as quickly as it surged. 
 
By 1941 Shepardson’s commitment to Anglophone unity was decades in the making. 
Harder to explain was why so many of his colleagues suddenly shared his passion. Why, from 
January into the fall, did the framework for American postwar policy become a close partnership 
with the British Commonwealth? Shepardson aside, the answer cannot be reduced to 
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Anglophilia, which some historians, echoing the claims of anti-interventionist participants, have 
featured in explaining Americans’ willingness to aid Britain at the risk of war.70 Simple 
Anglophilia had never before sufficed to generate widespread interest in practical proposals to 
join the United States with the other “English-speaking peoples.” 
The interest was widespread indeed, stemming from elite civil society more than state 
bureaucracy. The newly Anglo-minded planners spanned dozens of loosely connected semi- 
and unofficial bodies. Their sole coordinator was the Princeton-based American Committee for 
International Studies, which, despite the energetic efforts of its chairman, military strategist 
Edward Mead Earle, performed its task lightly, mostly by circulating information. Despite the 
organizational diversity, American planners converged around a reorientation of U.S. policy 
away from the hemisphere and toward close collaboration with the British Commonwealth. In 
February 1941, Earle’s committee reported on the emerging consensus, evident since the launch 
of its “Studies of an American Peace” initiative in November. The committee saw little need for 
studies of U.S. relations with Latin America: “A purely hemispheric policy offered no 
satisfactory basis for policy,” the committee wrote. “More significant was the growth in Anglo-
American cooperation — or, more broadly, the grouping together of the United States, the 
British Commonwealth, and Latin America.”71 At the suggestion of Quincy Wright, the 
committee began to plan a large conference on postwar North Atlantic relations that came to 
fruition in September. 
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Inside the U.S. government, by contrast, “clear authority for planning action is still 
lacking,” as economist Alvin Hansen reported to the CFR’s Economic and Financial Group on 
returning from Washington in mid-February. When it came to planning the future, the 
Roosevelt administration strained to prepare for the war that was still to come.72 As Hansen 
acknowledged, a handful of interdepartmental commodity committees were studying postwar 
trade patterns in Latin America. But larger considerations of international order, integrating 
political, military, and economic aspects and extending beyond the Western Hemisphere, fell 
to Council planners as well as dozens of unofficial organizations taking initiative on their own. 
These planners foresaw a new world order of Anglophone unity for reasons more robust 
than Anglophilia. For one, developments at home and abroad had clarified the likely outcome 
of the war, removing the obstacles to American-British leadership that planners had previously 
encountered. In the closing months of 1940, as the last chapter described, the CFR’s Economic 
and Financial Group had begun to conceive a “Grand Area” of Anglo-American global 
preeminence against a German-dominated European Continent. Back then, however, the 
planners still worried that Germany might defeat Britain and establish a grand area of its own. 
And the Political Group objected that even if Britain won, it and not the United States would 
be the senior partner of a postwar alliance. Its members doubted the willingness of the American 
public to extend political and military power beyond the Western Hemisphere. Facing a 
                                                   




kaleidoscope of plausible outcomes, the planners wondered aloud how far into the future they 
could really plan.73 
These doubts reversed themselves at the start of 1941. Now the planners felt they could 
see years beyond the war. Shepardson opened a series of animated meetings of the Political 
Group by asserting the “importance of considering relatively long-term national objectives.”74 
The group was impressed by the deluge of public proclamations of America’s stake in the peace, 
particularly the Four Freedoms speech. Moreover, it saw a power structure taking shape across 
the Atlantic along the most optimistic lines of Grand Area planning. Postwar Germany 
appeared likely to end up confined to the European Continent, if not defeated completely. The 
rest of the world would belong to the Anglophone powers, their fleets intact, as they waged a 
warlike peace with Nazi Europe. 
Indeed this projected Anglo-Nazi standoff was the cold war that mattered at the time. 
Although amply represented in the historiography of World War II and the Cold War, the 
Soviet Union figured peripherally in Americans’ postwar thinking until Germany invaded it in 
June 1941.75 It was against Nazi Germany, before Pearl Harbor, that Americans developed the 
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cold war concepts they then applied to the Soviet Union in the late 1940s. Here they confronted, 
for the first time, a world divided into two armed camps, each standing for its own political, 
economic, and social order. And they decided that the United States, leading the “Free World” 
— the name of an interventionist association and magazine established in 1941 — must possess 
a preponderance of power over the slave world of its implacably expansionist, totalitarian 
adversary.76 
Such geopolitical projections provide an important part of the explanation for 
Americans’ sudden interest in leading the world through a formal and exclusive partnership 
with the British Commonwealth: the idea reflected the probable centers of postwar power in 
early 1941, extrapolating the wartime status quo forward. However intent on leading the 
postwar world, the United States still needed to integrate itself closely with Great Britain, and 
Greater Britain, in order to do so. America was arming, but Britain was fighting. Its fleet, more 
than the American, stood between Hitler and North America. Furthermore, Britain possessed 
an imperial system that seemed to be proving itself vital in the war against the Axis and seemed 
equally vital to the preservation of order after the war, especially if, as planners envisaged, the 
United States could jointly administer British bases. As FDR reflected privately, using words 
drafted by Under Secretary Welles: “The British Isles, the British in those Isles, have been able 
to exist and to defend themselves not only because they have prepared strong local defenses but 
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also because as the heart and the nerve center of the British Empire they have been able to draw 
upon vast resources for their sustenance and to bring into operation against their enemies 
economic, military and naval pressures on a world-wide scale.”77 
This realization generated a paradoxical attitude toward the British Empire. On the one 
hand, which historians have emphasized, America’s rising power positioned it to demand liberal 
reforms. The Roosevelt administration wasted no time in doing so, attempting to use Lend-
Lease negotiations beginning in 1941 to extract a British pledge to eliminate commercial 
discrimination across the empire.78 FDR went on during the war to pressure Britain to 
relinquish control of India and France to place Indochina under international trusteeship.79 But 
the bigger picture is that after the fall of France, FDR and other policy elites concluded that 
America’s essential interest was to preserve and expand the fundaments of the British “world-
system,” as historian John Darwin dubs it: the global network of military bases, the common 
allegiance to laws and norms, the circulation of finished goods and raw materials — and the 
desire to stay supreme over any possible rival.80 
Between their Anglophilic ideology and their reading of geopolitical reality, then, U.S. 
planners singled out the British Commonwealth as America’s primary postwar partner. Yet 
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their reasons for partnering with Britain do not explain why they evinced little interest in 
including anyone else. American elites did not simply take their old concept of international 
order and organization and apply its universalism wherever Nazis weren’t; the concept of 
American-British leadership did not equal that of the League writ small. 
 
In the eyes of the same diplomats and intellectuals who designed and promoted Wilson’s 
League of Nations, world order now required a coordinating center solely responsible for 
maintaining it through routine armed policing. Force, “we know now,” is essential to any 
objective, George Fielding Eliot underscored in presenting the American-British concept to the 
Political Group. Force had to be overwhelming in scale and capable of rapid deployment, or 
else it became “useless.”81 Eliot had no doubt that the League experiment fell into the latter 
category. Nor would another general international organization fare better. The obstacles were 
insuperable: the diversity of interests and outlooks, the diffusion of responsibility, the absence of 
superintending authority. Unlike a wider association of nations, “Anglo-American sea-power is 
in fact a world-wide power capable of immediate application and seems likely to be the only 
power answering that description.”82 
Of all the planners, Eliot ranked alongside Miller as the most zealous advocate of Anglo-
American exclusivity, of involving none but the Anglophone peoples and powers in any postwar 
set-up. Yet no one really disputed the basic vision of a “new international order under 
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American-British auspices,” as the Political Group phrased its objective for the postwar world.83 
This, in addition to Anglophilia and geopolitics, was what propelled ideas of Anglophone unity 
into popularity: the promise that American-British leadership might succeed in creating 
international order, where international organization had failed. For American planners, the 
joint armed power of America and Britain, no one else, would keep order among nations and 
do so under terms favorable to the hegemons and the demands of their liberal capitalist systems.  
Hamilton Fish Armstrong, in the fourteenth of his 44-year reign as the editor of Foreign 
Affairs, aptly summarized the assumption uniting Council planning: “the primary responsibility 
for the maintenance of international order would rest upon the United States and the British 
Empire for an indeterminate period following a Nazi defeat.”84 Such an arrangement did not 
forbid the nominal participation of others — a fact that loomed larger later in the year. For 
now, however, planners’ thinking was all about the essentials, America and the Anglo 
constituents of Greater Britain. Armstrong continued: “Whether this responsibility is discharged 
openly or whether it is under the guise of enforcing the decisions of a new or revived League of 
Nations is of secondary importance from a technical military point of view. The important thing 
is that the two powers must be in possession of such facilities as will ensure their ability easily 
and effectively to deal with any possible situation which might arise.”85 Miller applied his 
characteristic candor to the tactful phrasings of Armstrong. “Small states,” he announced, “were 
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parasites on the international body politic” that failed to share responsibility for maintaining 
international order.86 
Here the means circled around to change the ends. Planners were not eager to give up 
all hope of ending the system of war and power politics, the goal articulated by almost all sides 
in the debate over joining the League. They wanted to think of themselves as extending the 
work of prior internationalists, themselves not least. But the most they could realistically imagine 
was scaling down war to a series of policing operations, which in turn required the maintenance 
of armed supremacy across the globe. One could of course consider, or dress up, policing 
(“intervention,” in later nomenclature) to be something other than war. But to a remarkable 
degree the planners resisted the temptation. They decided to exclude “the ultimate eradication 
of war” from their list of basic U.S. interests, lest they evoke, one planner explained, a “false 
pacifism.”87 Instead, they proposed that FDR encourage Americans to “dedicate their 
intelligence to the supreme task of establishing a stable world order” — one of many 
articulations of American objectives in terms of preserving order more than establishing peace 
or eliminating war.88  
As they reached the conclusion that America should maintain world order, planners did 
not shrink from articulating U.S. objectives in the language of supremacy, domination, and 
taking the offensive. Their language provided more than rhetorical flourish; it highlighted what 
was analytically novel. Americans had long thought of themselves as leading the world toward 
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bigger and better things, but only now did leadership appear to require the global 
preponderance of military power. The first mention of “supremacy” in CFR memoranda came 
in October 1940, when the Economic and Financial Group called for an “integrated policy to 
achieve military and economic supremacy for the United States within the non-German 
world.”89 By 1941 planners spoke frequently of achieving “domination” and taking the 
“offensive.” Hanson Baldwin, the respected New York Times military analyst and co-chairman of 
the CFR’s Armaments Group, matter-of-factly described the planners’ conception of American-
British leadership as consisting of “world domination by the United States and the British 
Empire acting in close and continuous collaboration.”90 
Baldwin added that he favored a posture of “aggressive defense,” citing Walter 
Lippmann’s proposals for the rapid acquisition of military bases.91 Eliot, for his part, dispensed 
with the pretense of defense: “Defensive war is the worst kind of war.” As he viewed it, 
American-British leadership would be “a policy essentially offensive in character,” replacing “a 
purely defensive one geared to the Western Hemisphere.”92 (That dominance over the entire 
Western Hemisphere seemed to epitomize defense — the position of many anti-interventionists 
too — itself marked a shift from the late 1920s and early 1930s, when popular and 
Congressional criticism of U.S. intervention in Nicaragua and Haiti led the Hoover and 
Roosevelt administrations to renounce Theodore Roosevelt’s Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine 
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and adopt the Good Neighbor Policy instead.93) In a May memorandum, Eliot laid out his 
“doctrine of advanced bases” that collapsed the distinction between offense and defense. “Even 
from the purely defensive viewpoint,” Eliot contended, “it is always better to keep the enemy at 
a distance from one’s own vital centers.” Pure defense thus mandated the same strategy as 
offense. Eliot formulated two principles in particular. First, “never allow the enemy to gain 
possession of a base from which he can attack your vital centers.” Second, “seek to obtain for 
yourself advanced bases from which the enemy’s vital centers can be attacked.”94 As 
dramatically as these principles departed from all prior ones, they also simply generalized the 
principles on which America based its ongoing aid to Britain. 
Unlike its hemispheric counterpoint, the posture of offense or aggressive defense had no 
limiting spatial referent but applied most immediately to Europe. Adopting the terminology of 
classic balance-of-power politics, planners spoke of the postwar American-British alliance 
possessing a “reservoir of power to hold the balance” in the Continent.95 Actually, their 
seventeenth-century allusion was inexact; especially as 1941 wore on, they proved more inclined 
to establish a superior authority that might eliminate balancing forces altogether. By September 
the Armaments Group foresaw America and Britain disarming Germany — some thought 
permanently — and dismantling the military aircraft industry from all of Western Europe. It 
hoped the Anglophone powers would deploy force “unstintingly at the first indication of any 
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rearmament attempt.”96 At the same time, it eschewed, with scant discussion, any legal 
commitments to obligate America or Britain to act in case of rearmament or other acts. Self-
interest, not law, received the planners’ trust. 
As the Armaments Group studied how to organize the police force, Eliot and retired 
Major General Frank McCoy, who served as President of the Foreign Policy Association 
throughout the war, found a model in British imperial policing.97 They suggested that America 
and Britain rely on air power to shuttle around small, elite land forces, as Great Britain used in 
the North-West Frontier Province of India and nominally independent Iraq.98 This airborne 
army could overcome two obstacles imposed by domestic opinion: it could comprise “a small 
number of highly-trained troops and not a mass citizen army,” as Miller observed, and it could 
avoid the bombing of civilians on a large scale.99 After Pearl Harbor, this idea of a combined 
American-British police force won little support from heads of government, but it stood as an 
early example of some enduring patterns of thought. One was the idealization of air power as a 
substitute for citizen armies, the airplane thereby adapting global policing to democracy. 
Another was the reduction of Europe from subject to object of international society, to a 
geopolitical space previously reserved for colonial and neocolonial lands. Hitler had initiated 
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this transformation by seeking in Eastern Europe his version of the subjugated American West 
or British Raj; now American planners anticipated extending the principle throughout the 
Continent, right through Germany itself. 
Yet if Europe drew the lion’s share of the planners’ attention, it was only because the 
balance of power had centered on Europe for hundreds of years and seemed poised to continue 
as such. The planners did not limit American-British responsibilities to the North Atlantic or 
any other discrete area, nor against the defeated Axis states. They sought a preponderance of 
power wherever power lay. “It is obvious,” wrote Armstrong, summing up the consensus of his 
colleagues, that America and Britain “must be in control of the necessary air and naval bases 
which will enable them, acting jointly or in close cooperation, to contain any possible hostile 
force.”100 This objective, not merely the policing of the fallen Axis, guided the Armaments 
Group in its principal task of 1941: mapping the military bases from which the American-British 
alliance would police the postwar world. 
The planners quickly discovered that if the British Empire did not exist, they would have 
to invent it. Beyond North America, Eliot posited that global supremacy required three vital 
centers for naval and air bases: the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, and the South China Sea.101 
Fortunately, as he noted, America and Britain currently possessed most of the needed bases. 
The group underscored that Britain must retain and expand its control over the Mediterranean 
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in particular, by acquiring positions in Sicily, Casablanca, and Mogador.102 The United States 
would not only support Britain but potentially jointly occupy the bases. Throughout the year, 
the planners debated whether bases would be apportioned between the powers or run by a 
genuinely integrated force.103  
But even combining with existing British forces would not suffice. The group wanted an 
archipelago of new bases in the Atlantic and Pacific. Most important were naval bases “for the 
purposes of Atlantic and European domination,” especially in the North (in Newfoundland, 
Greenland, Norway, and Demark) and along the approach to South America (in the Cape 
Verde Islands or West Africa near Dakar and perhaps in Natal on the eastern bulge of Brazil). 
The planners could not be as precise about the Pacific, where American belligerency and British 
survival were less assured. They nevertheless contemplated new bases off the Alaskan Coast and 
along the “Malay Barrier,” running from present-day Malaysia and Singapore to Indonesia, 
well beyond the U.S. Navy’s outpost in the colonial Philippines.104 
In plotting world domination (by their own reckoning), the CFR planners moved 
decisively past both hemispheric defense and universal organization, the two sides of the old 
dialectic of American foreign policy. Pan-Americanism denied U.S. interests in world order. 
Leagues of nations denied America the means to order the world. These were fateful 
conclusions, and brand new ones, not anticipated at the beginning of the war. As Shepardson 
                                                   
102 Armaments Group, Memorandum of Discussions, No. A-A11, June 4, 1941, CFRWPS. 
103 Francis P. Miller, Political Group, “Note on a Program of Joint Action for the American and 
British Governments,” Memorandum, No. P-B18, May 2, 1941, CFRWPS; Armaments Group, 
Memorandum of Discussions, No. A-A11, June 4, 1941, CFRWPS; Armaments Group, 
Memorandum of Discussions, No. A-A14, September 10, 1941, CFRWPS. 
104 Armaments Group, Memorandum of Discussions, No. A-A11, June 4, 1941, CFRWPS. 
 
 166 
told British planners, the CFR’s Armaments Group “started as a Disarmament Group searching 
for the solution of the problem of how best to disarm, but from there had gone on to the idea of 
the need to maintain security, for a longer or a shorter period, by American and British 
arms.”105  
But conceiving a new course would not be as simple as marking down bases on a map. 
In May Isaiah Bowman, chair of the Territorial Group, posed a challenge that went beyond the 
Armaments Group’s purview. “How could the taking over of Dakar and Singapore be justified 
on the basis of a Western Hemisphere doctrine?” he mused. “If freedom of opinion and of 
choice were cut out of the Monroe Doctrine, it would then resemble the Nazi doctrine very 
closely.”106 But the planners found a readymade model for seeming to reconcile the stark 
coercion of superior, organized force with liberal freedom. They found this model in the British 
Empire. 
 
As Bowman implied, American-British leadership could not be, and especially could not 
seem to be, solely about maintaining military supremacy over all potential rivals. Throughout 
1941 America and Germany squared off in the arena of global public opinion, each staking its 
claim to lead the world toward a better way of life. FDR issued the Four Freedoms explicitly for 
this purpose, proclaiming his vision of a free world to be “the very antithesis of the so-called 
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new order of tyranny which the dictators seek to create with the crash of a bomb.”107 His 
planners understood that they needed to develop an affirmative concept to counterpose to the 
Nazi New Order. Of course, there was no going back to the Versailles settlement and the 
League of Nations. But although they thought world policing ruled out world organization, the 
planners realized that they needed to craft a compelling substitute. They therefore endeavored 
to expand American-British policing into a full-fledged, Anglo-ruled international society that 
advanced freedom as well as stability. 
In a series of memoranda from May to September, Shepardson’s Political Group laid 
out sweeping plans to institutionalize postwar cooperation with the British Commonwealth of 
Nations.108 The planners began by rejecting not only the halfhearted “associated power” 
relationship from World War I, but also a “complete defensive alliance with the British 
Commonwealth by formal treaty.” Even this radical measure failed to provide a sufficiently 
positive and comprehensive vision. Instead they decided American-British leadership should 
take the form of a “permanent political tie-up.” The tie-up would begin with the “unified use of 
sea and air power” for global policing. It would also include “cooperative policy on trade, raw 
materials, shipping, commercial aviation, currency, and investment” and “general collaboration 
on such matters as health, nutrition, migration, resettlement, and the development of backward 
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regions,” all implemented as far as the non-German world extended.109 That is, the Anglophone 
nations would take over the entire apparatus of international governance centered in Geneva 
— a process that wartime events had already initiated, sending the League’s Economic and 
Financial section to take refuge in Princeton, New Jersey, courtesy of Rockefeller Foundation 
largesse.110 
In early June, at the peak of Anglophone feeling, the Political Group went so far as to 
draft an Act of Congress to grant near-citizenship to citizens of the British Commonwealth. It 
appointed the Canadian-born historian and CSOP chairman James Shotwell to be the framer 
of this quasi-constitutional document, whose purpose, as stated in the preamble, was to “extend 
the Freedom of the United States of America to Citizens of the British Commonwealth of 
Nations.” Shotwell’s draft conferred almost every right short of suffrage and office-holding to 
what it dubbed “the ‘defenders of freedom’ throughout the English-speaking community.” By 
this Shotwell meant the white citizens of the Dominions; the group immediately excluded 
Indians and other residents of the crown colonies. Under the act, white English speakers across 
the Dominions would receive the unrestricted right to immigrate and reside in the United 
States, where they could conduct business and own property like any citizen.  
Rather than projecting the principles of American federalism to the world, the planners 
found inspiration in fin-de-siècle fantasies to unite the white peoples of the non-contiguous 
Anglosphere. These fantasies added nineteenth-century notions of racial unity to the ancient 
Greek practice of extending common citizenship to members of other states. Through “racial 
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isopolitan citizenship,” as Duncan Bell terms it, British and American theorists saw an 
opportunity to create a supreme global-spanning polity at the vanguard of civilization.111 In 
1941, suddenly, American policy elites in New York saw a similar opportunity, albeit one with 
risks. Arthur Sweetser, a journalist close to the League Secretariat, wondered aloud whether the 
act “might not be interpreted by the rest of the world as a move toward Anglo-Saxon 
domination.” But the group sided with Miller, his riposte preserved by the meeting minutes: 
“Noting that a common language was the principal basis of community, Mr. Miller did not care 
what other peoples might call the action.” In fact, the group regarded the act merely as the 
beginning of Anglophone integration. It hoped the extension of American freedoms to white 
Anglos everywhere would constitute a “symbolic first step toward that long-term American-
British association which the Group had debated for months.”112 
But despite wishing to institutionalize American-British cooperation, the CFR planners 
ultimately decided to rely on the commonality of interest and sentiment they believed to exist 
among the Anglophone powers, not on formal legal obligations. They had learned from the 
League experience that binding duties would matter little once the time for action came. So 
they shrunk from advocating paper commitments requiring America and Britain to act against 
aggression. (And they gave no consideration to measures for restraining the big two from 
committing aggression.) Although political scientist Walter Sharp, the group’s research secretary, 
proposed that conferences between the Anglo-American powers should “exceed advice or 
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recommendation and assume an executive character,” he admitted his inability to “envisage 
just what such machinery would look like or how it would operate.”113 
The group’s final blueprint called for the American-British security council, as it were, 
to reach decisions through a “round-the-table consensus of views,” without holding a vote.114 
There were to be no safeguards against abuses of power. What could an abuse of power even 
mean in a scheme that explicitly reserved to a few powers the prerogative to do as they saw fit? 
The planners were now miles from the League of Nations and other internationalist 
prescriptions. For all the hierarchies it inscribed, especially in the colonized world, the League 
had created formal standards by which abuses of power could be conceptualized and claims 
advanced in its name, as they were by the thousands.115 It was this possibility that the idea of 
American-British leadership obliterated. 
Little wonder, then, that in designing their blueprint, the planners did not so much 
modify the League template as scrap it altogether. They did consider retaining the International 
Labor Organization and the functional or “non-political” sections of the League, in which 
experts quietly studied and implemented economic, social, and humanitarian programs.116 
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They also contemplated retaining something like the League’s Mandates system, which 
provided limited international oversight of colonies taken from the defeated German and 
Ottoman powers in World War I, and applying it to all colonial territories. Through a new 
Mandates system, with U.S. participation, Americans could trade and invest across the colonial 
world on equal terms with the colonial powers.117 But as a model for high politics, for keeping 
the world orderly, the League was anathema. 
Rejecting the League, the planners also declined to take the other locus of prewar U.S. 
foreign policy, the Pan-American system, as a point of departure. In making the leap from 
hemispherism to globalism, they did not understand themselves as extending the Monroe 
Doctrine to the world.  If any part of the Western Hemisphere captured the planners’ 
imagination in 1941, it lay to the north, not the south. Anglophone Canada, the CFR planners 
repeatedly argued, deserved Lend-Lease aid and new programs of economic assistance and 
cultural exchange, all of which would complement the intergovernmental Canadian-American 
Permanent Joint Board of Defense, created the previous August. The planners reasoned that 
whereas Nazi influence in Latin America remained an omnipresent worry, Canada was “the 
one nation of the Hemisphere that is opposing Hitler with the force of arms.”118 And not by 
coincidence: the folk-minded planners reasoned that “Canada’s population of twelve million, 
half of whom are of British descent, would certainly be more congenial in partnership with the 
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United States than would Latin America with its 120 million, chiefly of Latin or Indian 
descent.”119 
In short, neither League-style internationalism nor Pan-Americanism inspired the 
Council planners. They looked elsewhere for guidance — to the intra-imperial machinery of 
the British Commonwealth. In the Commonwealth, they found a successful model of 
international order that, making no pretense of universality, maintained close cooperation 
among the white Dominions even as settler nationalism drove them formally apart. Since World 
War I, in response to rising nationalism, Great Britain and the Dominions formed the 
Commonwealth and convened at regular conferences empowered only, as the planners noted, 
to “advise and recommend.” The Commonwealth system, enshrined in the Statute of 
Westminster in 1931, therefore showed how mere consultation might prove effective among 
likeminded nations. The planners believed they knew why the system worked while the League 
did not: “the English-speaking people have a genius for extemporizing order.”120 Much as this 
Burkean genius had produced the domestic common law, so too would it develop procedures 
of international cooperation in response to concrete situations.121 Lest their theory seem 
farfetched, the planners felt the process was well underway in the destroyers-for-bases and Lend-
Lease programs.122  
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As British officials streamed into Washington, the planners studied a second model for 
postwar cooperation, drawn again from the Anglophone world: the intergovernmental 
machinery used by the Allies in World War I to coordinate their war effort.123 Like 
Commonwealth conferences, which they helped to inspire, inter-Allied bodies possessed no 
executive authority but seemed to secure concerted action. The Supreme War Council, the 
Allied Maritime Transport Council, the Inter-Allied Food and Munitions Councils — all these 
instruments of wartime alliance impressed the planners as superior to universal organization, 
including in times of peace. “It is now generally recognized,” they wrote, “that one of the tragic 
errors of statesmanship in 1919 was the abrupt scrapping of this inter-continental 
machinery.”124  
Similarly, in the Time/Life/Fortune Postwar Department, Buell detected that expanding 
collaboration against Nazi Germany was initiating a new era of “Americo-British” supremacy 
modeled on the British Commonwealth and the Allied war councils. “Under Lend Lease a vast 
web of administrative relationship is quietly being built up between Britain and the U.S. — a 
relationship which has not yet been described or analyzed by any periodical for the benefit of 
the American public,” Buell observed at the end of the year. He estimated that 3,000 British 
officials, from every department of government, were already present in Washington and New 
York. Just as the Imperial War Cabinet of 1915 supplied a template for the British 
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Commonwealth, so perhaps the Lend-Lease program was “creating a nucleus of Americo-
British power which will dominate the post-war world.”125 
It was this nucleus that mattered most to American planners even as, in the summer and 
fall, they began to pay attention to other organs of international society. The CFR Political 
Group contained some of the most prominent Leaguers in the county, but in 1941 they stood 
convinced that world organization would not produce an acceptable world order. Only the 
armed supremacy of the United States could do so, in partnership with the British 
Commonwealth and carrying on the torch of British world leadership. All of a sudden, the 
record of nineteenth-century British diplomacy looked better than Americans had thought at 
the time. In column after column, Walter Lippmann reinterpreted the Monroe Doctrine as an 
Anglo-American alliance directed against the Holy Alliance, ignoring that nineteenth-century 
Americans invoked the Monroe Doctrine against Great Britain as much as any other power.126 
The British, Lippmann wrote, “have organized the largest security that the world has known 
since the Romans, and with all their mistakes they have extended more widely the area of law 
and order than it was ever before extended on earth.”127  
More candidly, Buell acknowledged that Americans had condemned British supremacy 
so often before, but he condemned their condemnation. Anglophobic Americans had suffered 
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from a “colonial inferiority complex.”128 They blinded themselves to the truth that nineteenth-
century Britain “maintained almost single-handed the nearest semblance to world order known 
in modern history.”129 Although the United States had an opportunity to partner with Britain 
in 1919, its president failed to appreciate the world-ordering role of the British navy. Inevitably, 
Wilson’s League of Nations turned into a “fruitless search for a substitute for the Pax 
Britannica.”130 This time would be, had to be, different. Americans would accept no substitute, 
except perhaps a Pax Americana. 
 
The Apogee of American-British Leadership  
 
In 1941 anti-isolationist internationalism finally acquired a positive program. Its 
adherents grasped for some way to effect world order during the thirties and the phoney war, 
when collective security failed and the most they could ask of the United States was to refrain 
from selling arms and extending loans to aggressor nations. Now they identified the United 
States as the ultimate enforcer of law and order, the leader, by all means necessary, of a new 
epoch in world affairs. Henceforth “internationalism” would signify a commitment to U.S. 
world leadership. At the same time, anti-isolationists figured that American leadership should 
take the form of a close partnership with the British Commonwealth. This was not a perfect fit. 
American-British internationalism was neither wholly American nor fully internationalist, at 
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least under the latter term’s once dominant and still present connotations of universal equality 
and harmony. Looking back, one might dismiss the plans of 1941 as the vivid imaginings of low-
level intellectuals that would never have become policy. 
To the contrary, a version of the Anglo new order might well have been implemented if 
the geopolitical configuration of 1941 had endured. The American-British framework fit 
projections of a postwar stalemate against Nazi Europe, with the Soviet Union neutral and the 
United States an “arsenal of democracy” straddling neutrality and belligerency. Even as those 
conditions changed, foreign policy elites did not yet judge a wider political structure to be 
worthwhile or reconcilable with U.S. world leadership, as the next chapter discusses. Thus far, 
world leadership seemed desirable for the very reason world organization seemed dispensable, 
if that. At the highest levels of the U.S. government, officials subscribed to these views and 
evinced interest in exclusive American-British institutions for leading the postwar world. 
As a British planner found in April, the State Department was thinking along joint 
American-British lines much like the Council members who worked for it. Dispatched to 
ascertain American thinking about the peace, historian Charles Webster discovered to this 
surprise that U.S. policy elites “realize the longer and deeper issues better than many 
Britishers.”131After speaking with four planners at the CFR in New York, Webster found 
Washington officials equally congenial. Even the typically Anglophobic Berle “obviously 
thoroughly believed in Anglo-American cooper[ation] after war,” Webster recorded in his 
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diary.132 Although the State Department was not yet ready to establish a postwar planning 
committee of its own, research director Leo Pasvoslky was already formulating plans to do so, 
having maintained close contact with the Council throughout the war. By the autumn, officials 
began to lobby FDR to endow the State Department with the sole authority for official postwar 
planning — part of a scramble within Roosevelt’s anarchic bureaucracy to secure such a role.133 
Webster’s observations had more foundation than he recognized. Each bureaucratic 
aspirant sought to follow the lead of the CFR planners. In July, when William Donovan founded 
the intelligence office that evolved into the CIA, he made a priority of setting up a new World 
War I-style Inquiry and brought in several academics from CFR planning, unsuccessfully 
inviting Armstrong to be his second in command.134 For his part, Vice President Wallace, the 
vocal anti-isolationist, headed the Board of Economic Warfare and invited Council planners to 
a series of dinner meetings at the Hay Adams Hotel in Washington. At the first dinner, on May 
3, Wallace welcomed 13 members of the Council and six other non-officials in order to discover 
“the direction in which our minds are moving.”135 That direction followed all the major lines 
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of CFR planning as Wallace translated into military terms the meaning of his speeches pledging 
a Pax Democratica to raise the living standards of the worldwide common man.  
First and foremost, the United States must not fail to lead as after the last war, when it 
placed the fate of the world in a general peace conference and the ineffectual League. “This 
time,” the group agreed, “the instrument of execution will be an American-British agreement,” 
and “we must not again say things that we won’t underwrite.” To wit, America and Britain 
would police the world via sea and air power for years after the war. The group proceeded to 
list 14 essential “strong points” around the globe to be placed under joint control.136 It 
emphasized, not least, that America and Britain should pursue the fastest and closest possible 
“fusion” of their political and economic as well as military institutions. As it turned out, the 
Anglophilic CFR planners had no trouble making common cause with the relatively 
anticolonial Wallace. Suspicion of British aims provided a rationale for American-British 
partnership too: anticipating that Britain would otherwise resort to currency controls and 
bilateral trade, Wallace and company wanted to forge a union straight away.137 
Council planners continued to urge FDR to issue a declaration of postwar principles 
that would “dramatize” American-British cooperation, firing the public imagination as the 
League ideal did in World War I.138 On August 14, 1941, the president obliged. Eager to 
prevent an Anglo-Soviet carve-up of Eastern Europe — “the Russians are making peace 
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commitments like beavers,” Berle reckoned — Franklin Roosevelt met Winston Churchill off 
the coast of the British Dominion of Newfoundland.139 From the seas, the two navy men issued 
the Atlantic Charter, originally called the Eight Points to evoke Wilson’s Fourteen. It was the 
first official statement of postwar aims, proclaimed by America and Britain alone as Panzer tanks 
closed in on Leningrad. The eighth and final point called for the disarmament of nations that 
may threaten aggression, “pending a wider and permanent system of general security.” On this 
basis, historians have interpreted the Atlantic Charter as a momentous step toward the revival 
of world organization.140 
To FDR, it was nothing of the kind. When Churchill proposed to endorse an “effective 
international organization,” Roosevelt struck the phrase. He told the Prime Minister that only 
America and Britain, not some world body, could keep peace in the aftermath of war.141 
Roosevelt’s own adviser, Welles, protested, disheartened by Roosevelt’s casual suggestion that 
“nothing could be more futile than the reconstitution of a body such as the Assembly of the 
League of Nations,” in Welles’s paraphrasing. Welles thought an Assembly could be established 
in a second postwar era, after a transition period run by America and Britain; the body could 
act as a “safety valve” where small nations could voice their complaints or associate themselves 
with the big powers. But Roosevelt did not budge. Perhaps a new League might become useful 
sometime in the future, he said. Until then, the United States and Great Britain would exercise 
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police trusteeship and no other nation could take part effectively.142 FDR refused to pledge the 
United States in favor of world organization, even as a distant prospect. 
In Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, the Charter electrified subjects of empire who 
insisted that its pledge of self-determination applied to them.143 It figures in historiography as 
an anticolonial, or at least potentially anticolonial, pronouncement.144 But one might equally 
ask how colonial was the Atlantic Charter. The Charter marked the zenith of American interest 
in joining with the British Empire to police the world. In substance, it scarcely differed from 
Navy Secretary Frank Knox’s call, two months later, for American-British domination of the 
seas one hundred years hence. “You may say it is a dangerous power when controlled by so 
few,” Knox said, “and there is truth in that reflection.  
But, feeble and inadequate as may be the impulses in American and British 
hearts for the common good and the advancement of civilization, and likely as 
it may be that this power will sometimes be abused, it is far safer thus than if that 
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power should be permitted to pass into the hands of aggressive nations who seek 
their own selfish aggrandizement.145 
Knox almost elaborated the counterargument in the argument itself. A more perfect union of 
exceptionalism and internationalism would not need to make excuses. 
                                                   
145 Frank Knox, “World Peace Must Be Enforced: We Should Prevent the Rise of New Hitlers,” 
Address to the American Bar Association, Indianapolis, October 1, 1941, in Vital Speeches of the Day, 
Vol. 8, No. 1 (November 15, 1941), 18. 
 
 182 
Chapter 4: Instrumental Internationalism, 1941-1943 
 
The world was a dangerous place in which America had to take up arms: no one needed 
to convince Edward Mead Earle of that. Before Henry Kissinger, Hans Morgenthau, Hans 
Speier, and the cavalcade of émigré realpolitikers transplanted the dark lessons of Weimar 
democracy to the United States, homegrown academics like Earle, born and raised in New York 
City, readied the soil.1 In the mid-1930s, Earle established a “grand strategy” seminar in 
Princeton as young strategists in New Haven set up the Yale Institute for International Affairs. 
Although both institutes dedicated themselves to the study of power politics, only after the fall 
of France did the strategists morph into advocates of American globalism and critics of the 
bugaboo they called “isolationism.” Earle in particular became a full-throated interventionist 
spokesman, taking his message to the pages of Political Science Quarterly and Ladies’ Home Journal 
alike. He averred that in order to preserve a “universal concept of international order,” 
previously underwritten by British arms, Americans had to attain a “primacy of our own.”2 
The Yale institute, meanwhile, produced the most elaborate geopolitical argument 
against hemispheric defense and for postwar U.S. participation in the power balances of Europe 
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and Asia. This was Nicholas J. Spykman’s America’s Strategy in World Politics, published in 1942 
but mostly written in the year after the fall of France.3 Spykman contended that German and 
Japanese domination of Eurasia would deprive the United States of the raw materials it needed 
for industrial-military production. He also maintained that this particular threat merely proved 
a general truth. “States,” he wrote, “can survive only by constant devotion to power politics.”4 
Even after the present war, Spykman wanted the United States to police the Eastern 
Hemisphere as Britain had formerly policed Europe, continually intervening with superior force 
to ensure acceptable political equilibria.5 The irrelevance of a universal organization like the 
League of Nations almost went without saying. At most Spykman envisioned a series of regional 
councils or a great-power conclave along the lines of the nineteenth-century Concert of 
Europe.6 
In so arguing, the academic strategists occupied the vanguard of foreign-policy thinking 
in 1940 and 1941. Yet in another respect they marched increasingly out of step with private 
planners and public intellectuals. Earle and Spykman used power politics not only as a 
framework of analysis but also as a language of legitimation. They wanted the reading public to 
accept the same severe conclusions they had drawn. Blaming liberalism for imbuing Americans 
with an excessive faith in legal-moral sanctions and world organization, Earle and Spykman 
attempted to recast power politics as the most American of pursuits. Just as the Founders sought 
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to check and balance power domestically, they argued, so would balanced power prevent 
tyranny internationally.7 Yet insofar as the strategists envisioned the United States as the 
preeminent balancer, they implied that American power might constitute a tyranny. Spykman 
did little to dispel this implication. He frankly judged U.S. behavior in the Western Hemisphere, 
where “our so-called painless imperialism has seemed painless only to us,” and baldly stated 
that Hitler was seeking the kind of Lebensraum in Europe that the United States had long enjoyed 
in the Americas.8 The academic strategists, however attuned to the need for public legitimation, 
offered a bleak message: seek maximum power, imperialistic though it may be. 
Quincy Wright thought this “realism” (as it was just coming to be called) would never 
work. Already in August 1940, Wright wrote Earle to explain why — in the process articulating 
a new rationale for world organization. Although claiming the mantle of Wilsonianism, Wright 
did not say that power politics could and should be overcome. Wright heartily approved of 
Earle’s assault on “isolationism,” and at that moment Wright was struggling to work out his 
own preferred vision of world order in the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace. 
Instead Wright out-strategized the strategist, arguing that Earle’s methods subverted his aims. 
The American public, he wrote, would never agree to play power politics, a system of shifting 
alliances suited to seventeenth-century princes. “The United States is, I think, positively 
precluded from the balance-of-power politics with its existing constitutional and democratic 
structure,” Wright concluded.9 The only practical alternative to “isolationism,” the only way to 
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ensure Americans would permanently punch their weight on a global basis, was international 
organization. Without quite giving up on the internationalist dream of a warless and lawful 
world, Wright developed an instrumental rationale for the “Wilsonian” program. Absent 
international organization, America could not lead the world. If only to secure its own global 
supremacy, Wright’s logic implied, the United States had to claim the mantle of 
internationalism — to appear, at least, to organize world politics around principles other than 
power alone. 
 
Wright, this chapter shows, was prescient. At the time he originally wrote to Earle, and 
for 12 months thereafter, most officials and intellectuals followed the academic strategists in 
dismissing any idea of a new League. They did envision an international organization of a 
different kind, namely an intimate and exclusive partnership among the Anglophone nations. 
Yet as the previous chapter argued, such American-British hegemony seemed appealing 
because it promised to provide order internationally as no wider formula could. Whether 
endorsing racial empire, power balances, or some measure of each, U.S. policy elites were one 
in seeking to participate in — indeed to dominate — power politics and no longer to transcend 
it through universal methods. Through most of 1941, U.S. supremacy and world organization 
each appeared to preclude the other. Particularist and universalist prescriptions remained poles 
apart. 
It was Wright, the “idealist,” who anticipated the eminently realistic logic by which 
world organization came to appear consistent with, even essential to, U.S. supremacy. 
Beginning in the second half of 1941, advocates of supremacy perceived the force of Wright’s 
criticism and the appeal of his solution. They worried that the supremacy of America alone 
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appeared as brute domination. If exercised in tandem with Britain, U.S. supremacy looked even 
more imperialistic no matter how tenderly supporters described the traditions of Anglo-Saxon 
law and liberty. It would look that way first of all to non-Anglo powers, especially the Soviet 
Union. Surprised when the Nazis attacked the Soviets in June 1941, and again when the Red 
Army proved its mettle over the following months, American planners started to envision the 
Soviet Union as a potentially significant postwar player, one that might seek to counter blatant 
American-British hegemony. 
Yet why not simply bring the Soviet Union into the fold, reviving the Concert of Europe 
for the twentieth-century great powers? Why include small states, roundly dismissed as obstacles 
to international order? Wright had suggested the answer: U.S. global supremacy would 
otherwise offend Americans themselves. It was principally as a means of legitimating U.S. 
supremacy domestically that international organization entered the agenda in late 1941 and 
1942. By working through a universal body, with every nation a member, the United States 
would seem to lead an enlightened world order, respecting the equality of others and bound by 
rules of law. This, at any rate, was the lesson that interventionist elites drew from their own self-
diagnosed failure to pitch global supremacy without world organization. After the Atlantic 
Charter fell flat at home, planners began to propose a universal organization or, more precisely, 
to graft a universal organization onto an American-British power base. By 1942 even Earle was 
criticizing Spykman’s book for advocating “irresponsible force, irresponsibly controlled.”10 
Arnold Wolfers of the Yale Institute likewise wondered whether, “given the temper of the 
American people, it may even prove impossible to organize Anglo-American 
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cooperation…except under the more universal auspices of some league or association of 
powers.”11 Members of both Earle’s seminar and the Yale Institute went on to advise the U.S. 
government to create the United Nations Organization.12 
Solving the problem of legitimacy, however, raised a further challenge: how to reconcile 
particularism and universalism, the practice of power politics with the appearance of 
transcending it. Postwar planners felt the contradiction keenly. Through most of 1942, they 
groped for some way to square the circle, hoping to yoke world supremacy to world organization 
without yet knowing how to do so, or whether it could in fact be done. In this, they followed the 
path not so much of Woodrow Wilson and his Inquiry as of David Lloyd George and his War 
Cabinet, which had sought to reconcile the popular demand for a league of nations with the 
imperatives of British world leadership.13 
The road to the United Nations, then, paved over contradictions. The new world 
organization emerged in American thought dialectically, as the synthesis of American(-British) 
supremacy and League-style universalism, the two alternatives that planners weighed at the 
start of 1941. This chapter’s explanatory framework therefore differs from the linear one that 
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appears in existing narratives, as though world organization were immanent in the program 
and ideology of “internationalism” from the beginning. Such narratives cannot identify a 
qualitative break in U.S. thinking, let alone explain why it occurred. 
To the extent scholars have tried to explain why the United States sought to create a 
world organization, they have missed the domestic audience at which the organization was 
primarily aimed. Historians both celebratory and critical foreground the kind of international 
environment that the United Nations was to produce: in one version, a peaceful, open, rule-
based order; in another, a world made safe for capitalism.14 In political science, one finds a more 
explicit debate over why states cooperate with international institutions, but there too external 
benefits take precedence. The main axis of debate pits “realists,” who deny or minimize the 
significance of international organizations, against “liberal institutionalists,” who counter that 
international organizations help states to collaborate with each other and coordinate their 
interests.15 Both camps ascribe to states a narrow rationality determined by the international 
system and insulated from domestic political contestation and ideological formations.16 Neither 
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can explain why the United States wanted the United Nations in the first place — why, amidst 
a ferocious war, officials and intellectuals preoccupied themselves with the problem of domestic 
legitimacy and developed a new concept of internationalism, embodied in international 
organization, as the solution. 
 
Inadequacies of the Anglosphere 
  
Through the first half of 1941, a chasm separated the alternatives of U.S. global 
supremacy and international organization. In the Council on Foreign Relations, postwar 
planners took turns lambasting the moribund League of Nations, which they associated with 
pacifism.17 Arthur Sweetser and James Shotwell, the two greatest supporters of the League 
system within the CFR’s Political Group, were the non-exceptions that proved the rule. 
Sweetser, previously a fixture in the League’s secretariat and information section, declined to 
defend the organization’s relevance in matters of politics, arguing only to retain the financial 
and economic experts assembled under its auspices.18 Shotwell showed less enthusiasm still. 
Despite chairing CSOP, he concluded it was “far better to emphasize the liberties of mankind 
against the menace of a Gestapo and let the problems of international government work 
themselves out later.”19 Indeed, the CFR planners determined that any future world 
organization would have to follow a “transitional period” of unspecified duration after the war. 
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In short, American interventionists saw no way to have American-British policing at the same 
time as general international organization, for which they evidenced little regard in any case. 
Over the second half of the year, however, American-British supremacy and 
international organization came together, less because the latter gained in appeal than because 
the former lost some of its own. At first, welcome developments in the war compelled planners 
to consider broadening the American-British concept, although not necessarily through 
international political organization. As Great Britain defended its home isles against the 
Luftwaffe and received mounting Lend-Lease aid from the United States, planners began to 
imagine that Nazi conquests could be rolled back within Europe rather than merely contained 
to the Continent. Perhaps the United States could avert a postwar cold war avant la lettre pitting 
the Anglosphere against the Nazi New Order. Instead it could usher in a unified “one world,” 
as Wendell Willkie titled his bestselling book two years later.20 Such an outcome seemed far 
from assured, but its mere plausibility sufficed to compel the CFR planners to envision the 
application of the globalist lessons of the fall of France on a truly global scale. As we will see, 
though, the expansion of the U.S.-led order scarcely implied the expansion of international 
institutions beyond American-British control. The United Nations emerged as a second-best 
option, called forth to secure legitimacy at home as much as abroad. 
 
I. Toward One World, under America and Britain 
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The CFR’s Economic and Financial Group embodied one set of concerns driving the 
expansion of the Anglosphere. Since the fall of France, the economists developed 
comprehensive recommendations for postwar U.S. foreign policy by assessing the requirements 
of the American economy in the context of geopolitical competition with a German-dominated 
Europe. In September 1940, they had devised the Grand Area, an Anglo-led, politically and 
economically integrated combination of the Western Hemisphere and the British Empire. On 
the basis of prewar trade patterns, they calculated the Grand Area to provide the minimum 
“elbow room” needed to maintain U.S. hegemony and liberal capitalism in the Western 
Hemisphere and economic superiority over a German-dominated Europe.21 This integrated 
political-military-economic sphere — a kind of global liberal autarky — could absorb export 
surpluses through trade and ensure adequate raw materials for defense.  
In 1941 the Grand Area grew grander as the planners sought first to enlarge the 
American-British advantage over Nazi Europe and then to incorporate Europe into the U.S.-
led order. The Economic and Financial Group clarified that its Grand Area contained large 
swathes of Africa and Asia, including the whole of the “British Commonwealth and Empire, 
the Dutch East Indies, China, and Japan.”22 Members also advised that the Nazis should be 
prevented from gaining control of the Soviet Union, the Near East, and North Africa. By May 
the Grand Area was morphing from a self-contained economic unit into a “nucleus” of what 
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planners now called an integrated world economy.23 Within six months, U.S. strategy in the 
prospective cold war with Nazi Germany advanced from containment to rollback, in the 
terminology of the following decade.  
Rather than redo their formal studies, the economic planners moved the goalposts. They 
shifted from minimum requirements to maximal objectives, casting the latter in the language of 
necessity. Quietly contradicting the group’s original calculations, economist Winfield Riefler 
concluded that “the existence of the German ‘grand area,’” confined to Europe, “would be 
fundamentally incompatible with the American economic system.”24 Riefler was soon to be 
appointed Vice President Henry Wallace’s chief adviser on the Economic Defense Board, and 
his views found support elsewhere in the government.25 Lynn Edminster, a special adviser to 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull, announced in May that the United States sought to “establish 
and maintain the largest possible sphere in the world within which trade and other economic 
relations can be conducted on the basis of liberal principles.”26 Having already determined, in 
the wake of the fall of France, that the United States needed to lead a globe-spanning order, 
planners found little reason not to seize any opportunity to enlarge the Grand Area to the 
maximum. After mid-June, they ceased to discuss the Grand Area except as a stopgap measure 
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awaiting the incorporation of Europe after a full Nazi defeat.27 Thus the traditional American 
preference for universal intercourse overtook the emergency planning for liberal autarky, but 
the former bore the mark of the latter: universal intercourse now entailed universal armed 
policing. 
The expansion to universal economic integration implied a small step toward universal 
political organization as well. As several CFR economists noted, because of the trend toward 
governmental direction of economic processes, even a liberal economic order would require 
some degree of coordination by international political institutions.28 From September to 
December 1941, the Economic and Financial Group formulated plans for an international 
currency stabilization and lending authority in which governments would cooperate to finance 
the reconstruction of industrial economies and the development of what it termed backward 
areas. Three years later, this authority became the International Monetary Fund and World 
Bank, owing partly to the direct efforts of the group’s co-chairmen, Jacob Viner and Alvin 
Hansen, who were influential wartime advisers in the Treasury Department and the Federal 
Reserve Board, respectively, and who mediated between leading negotiators John Maynard 
Keynes and Harry Dexter White.29 The work of the CFR planners constitutes one point of 
origin of the Bretton Woods system and of America’s postwar commitment to reconstruction 
and development.30 
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On balance, however, the economic globalism of the CFR planners scarcely diluted 
their commitment to American-British world leadership. Nor did it lead them to envision a full-
scale international political organization, which, they recognized, represented a much more 
controversial proposition than an economic body. In fact, they devised the World Bank-to-be 
specifically for the purpose of cementing Anglo-American cooperation and dominance. As 
Riefler characterized the group’s objective: “We must establish interpenetration between the 
European economy and that of the rest of the world, and we want the United States and the 
United Kingdom to be running it.”31 For the Council economists, the proximate aim of global 
development was to address the balance-of-payments deficit that Britain would face after the 
war. The British Isles were hemorrhaging foreign reserves and invisible exports, a problem 
exacerbated by the State Department’s demands to dismantle the imperial preference system in 
compensation for Lend-Lease aid. Britain therefore seemed certain to struggle to finance heavy 
imports — particularly from the United States — for postwar reconstruction.  
After bringing British economists into the Council for a series of meetings, Hansen went 
to London to discuss the problem at a conference of government officials and experts from 
Chatham House and other bodies. He reported back that Keynes favored the continuation of 
bilateral exchange controls after the war; the United States would agree to buy British exports 
so that Britain would return the favor.32 But Hansen and the other planners preferred a 
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multilateral approach that was also acceptable to Keynes. By building up the world economy, 
they thought, the Anglophone powers could create a market for British exports without having 
to negotiate and maintain clearing agreements, which might strain Anglo-American relations. 
For this reason, the economists devised plans to guarantee private investment in 
underdeveloped regions through an international lending authority, controlled either wholly or 
two-thirds by American and British directors.33 
Given the clear expansionist aims of the Council’s economic planners, one might be 
tempted to join some interpreters in concluding that the perceived imperatives of capitalism 
drove America’s assumption of global political responsibilities and its recasting of international 
institutions.34 Yet politics cannot be reduced to economics so neatly, even when one looks no 
further than the Council economists. The Economic and Financial Group embedded political 
considerations into its calculations at every turn. In the immediate aftermath of the German 
conquest of France, it deemed a quarter-sphere area to be adequate for the U.S. economy alone, 
reversing itself when interventionists and anti-interventionists alike demanded the defense of the 
entire Western Hemisphere. In 1941 it sought to devise a living space not merely to maintain 
liberal capitalism by absorbing export surpluses, but also to out-compete Nazi Europe through 
greater self-sufficiency in trade and raw materials. In a prospective cold war with the Nazis, 
geopolitics and economics would be intertwined. Nor did the group yet think that economic 
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globalism required international political organization; it preferred exclusive American-British 
leadership instead.35 
 
Moreover, the economists hardly clamored the loudest to expand the divided-world 
Grand Area to one-world globalism. It was instead the most politically oriented Council 
planners who occupied the vanguard of the turn to globalism and, eventually, world 
organization. From March 1941 onward, the three other committees — the Armaments, 
Political, and Territorial groups — attacked the strictures of the Grand Area despite continuing 
to treat it as the most realistic basis for planning. They put the economists on the defensive 
throughout the year, forcing them to repeat that the Grand Area represented a mere 
minimum.36 When Riefler deemed a German Europe to be incompatible with the American 
economy, he was accommodating the criticisms of Foreign Affairs editor Hamilton Fish 
Armstrong.37 Armstrong and his colleagues worried that the Grand Area assumed the present 
war would give way to a destructive and uninspiring armed standoff with the Nazis, a peace in 
name only that would “go on until Germany either was defeated or ruled the world.”38 They 
first articulated their objection at the end of 1940, recommending that the United States police 
the Western Hemisphere and let Britain take the east. In 1941 their objection remained but 
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their prescription flipped: America should defeat the Nazis within Europe and lead the globe. 
Francis P. Miller, the Anglophilic Virginia politician and Protestant intellectual, put the issue as 
bluntly as ever. “The goal of democracy must be world conquest, a world-wide victory for its 
ideal,” Miller said, doubting that democracy could long survive within a limited area. 
(Democracy was “not aggressive in spirit,” replied Harvard Soviet expert Bruce C. Hopper, 
either in agreement or in disagreement.)39 Months before Operation Barbarossa, Germany’s 
surprise invasion of the Soviet Union in late June, American postwar planners chafed against 
their own months-old plans for global supremacy, deeming them not global enough. 
At the same time, they remained staunchly American-British in their conception of the 
postwar political structure. That began to change after Barbarossa introduced the most 
important international rather than domestic consideration to provoke a rethinking of formal 
American-British exclusivity: the entrance of the Soviet Union into the Grand Alliance and 
potentially the peace settlement. When Hitler ordered his Wehrmacht east, surprising American 
officials and analysts no less than Stalin, postwar planners in the Council immediately if vaguely 
detected the challenge to their Anglophone framework. Their entire staff met three days later, 
on June 25, and recognized that wartime events might outstrip their plans. Until now, 
Armstrong remarked, the group had thought only in terms of “Anglo-American naval and air 
strategy.”40 Economist Percy Bidwell confessed that the Grand Area studies, based on prewar 
trade patterns, had mistakenly ignored the Soviet Union altogether. More important than 
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international trade, it turned out, was industrial capacity.41 (Actually one planner in February 
did imagine that the postwar Soviet Union could pose an obstacle to American-British 
dominance: he feared a “German-Russian bloc” that would fuse German technicians and 
Russian labor.42)  
After the launch of Barbarossa, however, the Council men, and government officials, 
saw that an exclusively Anglo-American political settlement might create enemies. In the State 
Department’s postwar research division, a July report warned of the emerging “United States 
Empire” in the Atlantic and the Pacific: “Any fundamental so-called lasting or enduring peace 
settlement must avoid planting, by a great expansion of our own world power, antagonisms 
which would render this country vulnerable in the future.”43 Under Secretary of State Sumner 
Welles likely had this concern in mind when, on July 22, he gave a speech calling for the 
complete destruction of Nazi Germany and the creation of a new “association of nations.”44 It 
was the closest an administration official had come to endorsing world organization, although 
neither Welles’s superior, FDR, nor colleagues like Assistant Secretary Adolf Berle shared 
Welles’s sentiment.45 
By September the CFR planners gave full expression to the international political 
rationale for broadening, in some way, the American-British concept. As League enthusiast 
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Sweetser summed up, “alliance begets alliance.” In a memorandum to the State Department, 
written on behalf of the Political Group, he warned that “Anglo-Americanism, if not carefully 
directed, may be made to appear as an attempt at world hegemony and Pan-Americanism as 
an exclusivist or divisive effort.”46 But this appearance might yet be averted. Combine the “Pax 
Anglo-Americana” with a new world organization, Sweetser proposed, and the latter could 
rescue the former. By involving other states in some sort of activities — Sweetser barely outlined 
what those might be — America and Britain could have domination without the optics of 
domination.  
In other words, the Political Group valued world organization for its symbolic power. 
Common participation would evoke common control. Planners gave no more than an 
afterthought to which formal functions a new league would actually perform. While the 
Americans and British would “handle the Realpolitik,” Sweetser suggested, the general 
organization might deal with economic, social, and technical matters. “The substance of such 
an organization is obviously a far more complex problem,” he added, and left it at that.47 What 
mattered was how the organization, whatever form it took, could cleanse American-British 
hegemony for the rest of the world. 
International legitimation therefore constituted a significant rationale for widening the 
formal structure of the postwar order. It would remain so throughout the war. By itself it 
nevertheless falls short in accounting for policy elites’ sudden interest in world organization 
during the last third of 1941. Although planners sought to remedy their neglect of the Soviet 
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Union after the German invasion, they remained far from certain that the Soviets would survive 
the onslaught, much less win the war. If the Soviet Union lost, they recognized, the war would 
leave Eastern Europe in a shambles and the reconstruction effort would require even closer 
postwar cooperation between the United States and Great Britain than the planners had 
anticipated.48 In October the CFR planners divided over whether the Soviet Union would even 
be a party to the peace settlement. Miller regarded the prospect as “doubtful,” and all agreed 
that, as Miller wrote, “the negotiations that determine the outlines of the world to come will be 
between Americans and British.”49 An assumption of American-British exclusivity continued to 
dominate the planning up to and including the mid-August Atlantic Charter — the war aims 
declared by the United States and the United Kingdom as Nazi forces closed in on Leningrad. 
In any event, even if the Soviet Union had obsessed American planners, they could have 
sought to incorporate it alone into the postwar power structure. A Big Three concert would 
bring the Soviets in and solve that problem. But in 1941 the Council planners never 
contemplated an American-British-Soviet paradigm along with the American-British. Why did 
they posit a general world organization as the leading alternative? Why ponder including all 
other states besides the Big Three? Neither the territorial enlargement of U.S. postwar aims, 
nor the advent of the Soviet alliance, suffices to explain the surge of interest in international 
political organization starting in the autumn of 1941. The answer lay closer to home.  
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II. The problem of “public opinion” 
 
Virtually from the moment they conceived of U.S. global supremacy, foreign policy 
elites identified the production of domestic political will to be a paramount challenge and an 
immediate priority. The exigencies of war did not prevent them from monitoring and 
strategizing about public opinion throughout the planning of the American-British Grand Area; 
on the contrary, for all their talk of a new interdependence in world affairs, it was the United 
States’ insulation from the conflict, unique among the great powers, that afforded them the 
luxury to worry about their own public as frequently as they did the Wehrmacht. Self-consciously, 
then, policy elites developed a formidable rationale by which “power might commend itself to 
the American public in other ways than as an expression of traditional imperialism,” as Miller 
put it.50 This rationale hinged on two exceptionalist nationalisms, American and Anglo-Saxon, 
deployed equally in the secretive CFR planning and in prominent essays by Henry Luce and 
Walter Lippmann. Further, interventionist policy elites diminished the appearance of 
“traditional imperialism” by touting the potential of mobile sea and air power to replace 
occupying land armies (or, in Luce’s case, by barely referencing military force at all). The 
formula had worked for the British Empire since the eighteenth century; to judge from the 
passage of Lend-Lease and the quickening march to war, it might suit a Pax Americana too. Not 
for nothing did Whitney Shepardson figure, in July 1941, that U.S. public opinion would sooner 
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accept an exclusive postwar partnership with the British Commonwealth than a universal league 
of nations.51 
But when Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill declared joint Anglo-American 
war aims, their Atlantic Charter failed to impress one of its primary audiences: the American 
political sphere. Anti-interventionists like Senator Hiram Johnson assailed the declaration for 
creating a de facto “offensive and defensive alliance between the United States and Britain.”52 
Senator Robert Taft denounced the Charter as an American-British assertion of “complete 
power over the territorial disposition of the world” since it required the disarmament of the Axis 
powers.53 To the Saturday Evening Post, finally, Roosevelt had committed the country to the job 
of “policing and minding an Anglo-American postwar world.”54 Using the language of 
traditional internationalism, opposed to power politics, these critics highlighted the imperialistic 
appearance of global policing in partnership with Britain. 
It was not only committed anti-interventionists who bridled at the Atlantic Charter. In 
the postwar planning commission of the Federal Council of Churches (FCC), members were 
split between interventionists and anti-interventionists but knew what they thought about the 
Charter. John Foster Dulles, the chairman of the Protestant ecumenical group and the future 
cold warrior, announced that the Charter envisaged “Anglo-Saxon military and economic 
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hegemony” that would freeze the status quo. In this regard, the Charter fell “far short” of 
Wilson’s formula. It smacked of a victors’ peace whereas Dulles and his commission wished 
America and Britain would create “international organs having the power to make decisions in 
which others will participate as a matter of right.”55 If the ideals of nineteenth-century 
internationalism were dying, they were not quite dead. Dulles’s reaction illustrates that at the 
birth of U.S. world leadership, prominent Americans found the prospect imperialistic.  
American-British advocates took note, unable to deny the poor reception of their idea. 
Lippmann conceded the point in his column, although he continued to tout the unity of the 
“English-speaking peoples” through the rest of 1941.56 In the Council on Foreign Relations, 
however, the postwar planners changed course. Concluding that the Charter “fell like a dead 
duck” upon Congress and the public, they doubted that exclusively American or American-
British arrangements could ever be made acceptable.57 Sweetser led the Political Group in 
penning a stinging rebuke to the Atlantic Charter, less for its content than for its optics. As the 
group wrote to the State Department: “An imperialistic connotation may all too easily be given 
to the projected American-British policing of the seas, not only by Axis propaganda-mongers, 
but by perfectly sincere people as well.”58  
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As the Political Group saw it, the problem was that Roosevelt and Churchill relied too 
narrowly and overtly on exceptionalism, on the superiority of their nations. Exceptionalism 
needed internationalism too — a sense of law, equality, and peace among nations offered by 
Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points but missing from FDR’s Eight. Whereas Wilson promised 
universal disarmament, at least eventually, Roosevelt envisaged the victors remaining “heavily 
armed themselves — for an indefinite period,” Sweetser noted.59 Although Wilson wished to 
reincorporate the defeated powers into the world community, Roosevelt appeared to condemn 
them to permanent subjugation. Worst of all, Roosevelt said nothing about international 
political organization, which Wilson put at the center of a program to overcome power politics. 
In short, the president had just committed the United States to a military alliance too naked to 
command popular support. Sweetser delivered a harsh verdict to the State Department: “It 
would be harder to sell the ‘Atlantic Charter’ to the American people than it was Wilson’s 
program.”60 
Having heaped scorn on world organization for the past two years, American policy 
elites now began to debate whether to create a new one. On August 26, less than two weeks 
after the declaration of the Atlantic Charter, the Council planners held extensive discussions on 
international organization for the first time since of the fall of France.61 Soon officials in other 
postwar groups also noticed a change. “Nearly all the best people in America,” the FCC’s British 
liaison reported in September, “are thinking in terms of the all-in association of nations of the 
                                                   





League of Nations kind.”62 Next month leaders of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation likewise 
noted “very definite indications of the return to public interest and favor of both Mr. Wilson 
and the program for which he stood.”63 Through the rest of the year, the CFR Political Group 
entertained proposals for international organization alongside its exclusively American-British 
schemes. In the Armaments Group, planners went so far as to contemplate an international 
police force, possibly including “token” German units, that would impose disarmament on 
Central and Western Europe.64 The Economic and Financial Group, for its part, figured it 
ought to allow one-third of the directors of its postwar development and finance organization 
to come from states other than America and Britain.65 
This was a subtle but significant shift, triggered by domestic considerations more directly 
than international ones. Postwar planners feared that under the Atlantic Charter formula, the 
U.S. public would recoil from world leadership, perhaps from international participation 
altogether, once the war concluded. What necessitated world organization was the “critical 
importance of beginning here and now to re-educate the American people up to their 
international responsibilities,” historian Henry Wriston, president of Brown University, 
commented to the rest of the Political Group. The best antidote, Wriston continued, was to 
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involve the United States in international institutions and joint obligations in relatively 
uncontroversial areas, eroding public resistance through symbolic acts of cooperation.66 
Suddenly, only weeks after they got the official American-British declaration they wanted, 
postwar planners and thinkers decided that naked world leadership might be an impossible sell. 
Instead of working toward a better pitch of the Atlantic Charter, they determined that no words 
could prettify the “imperialistic connotation” of American-British exclusivity. For so tall an 
order, the United States would have to create a new world organization, however undesirable 
in its own right. 
Why did postwar planners reach this sweeping conclusion on the heels of the president’s 
first major expression of the American-British concept? They articulated their rationale in terms 
of “public opinion,” but what they meant by the multivalent phrase requires explication. Most 
literally, they referred to momentary mass preferences, as represented in opinion polls and 
public expressions. Some evidence from such sources did suggest that American-British 
supremacy faced a legitimation problem unlikely to go away. Influential if not centrist 
commentators had criticized American global supremacy ever since interventionist journalists 
Lippmann, Luce, and Dorothy Thompson floated the idea early in 1941. They consistently 
identified armed supremacy with imperialism broadly conceived. Months before the declaration 
of the Atlantic Charter, Freda Kirchwey, the editor of The Nation, condemned the American 
Century as a “new brand of imperialism” cloaked in sweet words; Norman Thomas, a 
prominent leader of the Socialist Party and the Keep America Out of War Congress, denounced 
a fast growing “imperialist feeling in the United States of America…altogether lacking until the 
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last four months”; not to be outdone, The Christian Century, the periodical of mainline 
Protestantism, shuddered that Lippmann would involve the United States in “the greatest 
imperialistic venture in history.”67  
The critics likened U.S. global supremacy both to nineteenth-century European empire 
and to the contemporaneous Nazi New Order — specters united in Thomas’s reference to “that 
British Nazi poet, Rudyard Kipling.” But they required few other semantic innovations in order 
to make their case. They simply appealed to the longstanding internationalist values of equality, 
democracy, and disarmament among nations. As Kirchwey contended, U.S. global 
preeminence would traduce “honest internationalism,” despite Luce and company’s effort to 
appropriate the term and cast their opponents as un-internationalist isolationists. “The fact is,” 
she wrote, “no democratic basis for national dominance can be found in any formula, no matter 
how you slice it. It cannot be found because it does not exist.” Kirchwey ruled out American 
world leadership root and branch, writing with the confidence of someone who expected her 
assumptions to make intuitive sense to her readers. 
Yet few others drew the same implication from the hierarchical nature of global 
supremacy. Kirchwey lacked the social position of Luce; Thomas was no Roosevelt; Senator 
Taft and the anti-interventionists were losing ground in Congress. More typical of the criticism 
than Kirchwey’s outright rejection was the center-left meliorism of Max Lerner. A columnist 
and political scientist, Lerner detected the same peril that Kirchwey did, stating that Luce would 
anoint an “American imperialism,” antithetical to democracy, around the globe. But he wanted 
                                                   
67 Freda Kirchwey, “Luce Thinking,” The Nation, March 1, 1941, 229; Norman Thomas, “How to 
Fight for Democracy,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 216 (July 1941), 58; 
“A War for Sea Power,” The Christian Century, April 16, 1941, 520-1. 
 
 208 
to think that world leadership and participatory democracy could be reconciled. By entering 
into some sort of “partnership” with countries in Europe, Latin America, and the Far East, he 
wrote, the United States could fulfill “our great role of leadership” after all.68 It was this logic 
that FDR’s planners adopted in the wake of the Atlantic Charter: a symbolic internationalism 
could cleanse imperialism, squaring it with the democratic impulses that were the wellspring of 
public legitimacy. 
Taken as a whole, opinion surveys and political commentary indicated no clear rejection 
of the American-British leadership concept. Postwar planners feared “public opinion” far out 
of proportion to actual public expressions. In their many discussions of the problem, they rarely 
cited any particular extant political force that menaced their plans. When they did mention 
opinion polls, they found them more encouraging than not. As several Council planners 
remarked in September, recent Gallup surveys indicated that majorities of the public eschewed 
postwar disarmament and now regretted America’s abstention from the League of Nations in 
1919.69 Although the Atlantic Charter did not fire the public imagination, neither did most 
Americans dismiss it as an instrument of American-British imperialism. In late August, as 
postwar planners lambasted the Charter, a poll showed that 42 percent of Americans approved 
of the Roosevelt-Churchill program while 17 percent disapproved.70 The outstanding reaction, 
perhaps, was none at all: 41 percent had no opinion, and in another poll five months later, 
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upwards of 80 percent could not name one provision of the Charter.71 Indifference might have 
disappointed the planners, but it does not explain their about-face. 
Therefore when planners and intellectuals expressed anxiety about “public opinion,” 
they did not, in the main, mean the phrase literally. “Public opinion” sometimes denoted mass 
preferences and utterances but more often loosely signified ethico-political legitimacy in the 
national political sphere. Under this second meaning of public opinion, policy elites understood 
their public to be fundamentally opposed to power politics — the defining quality of prewar 
internationalism, which they now called “isolationism.” Whatever the polls said now, the public 
seemed liable to “recoil” from international responsibilities once the fighting stopped.72 
Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle had this conception in mind when he worried in his 
diary that “the American public, with its natural aversion to war and its natural inclination to 
optimism,” might welcome Hitler’s promises of peace.73 From this standpoint, interventionists 
faced an uphill battle in legitimating U.S. global supremacy. 
But not an insurmountable one. Instead of separating from political entanglement, the 
United States could redeem the world through intervention aimed at transcending power 
politics. Wilson had proposed just this alternative through his “disentangling alliance” of the 
League. Yet his United States, in 1919, seemed too weak to remake the world and stayed 
politically and military apart. Two decades later, the United States finally possessed the material 
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power to make Wilson’s vision more credible — except that Wilson’s heirs no longer wished to 
do so. In the wake of the Atlantic Charter, postwar planners pioneered a third way. Gesture at 
ending power politics while implementing power politics on a global scale: a simulacrum of 
Wilsonianism could flatter the public’s sensibilities, making supremacy safe for democracy. 
And not only the public’s. The language of “public opinion” served a third and final 
function, in addition to denoting actual preferences and expressions and connoting general 
norms of legitimacy. It allowed interventionists to express indirectly their own anxiety that their 
vision might be imperialistic as their critics charged. Perhaps those “perfectly sincere people” 
whom the CFR planners fingered included themselves. Projecting their qualms onto the public, 
interventionists could vent, and contain, their cognitive dissonance. For in envisioning U.S. 
political-military preeminence, they were violating their own values as internationalists long 
committed to the transcendence of power politics. To a blistering critic who thought great-
power dominance was the way to “imperialism” not “permanent peace,” Shotwell replied only 
that he had a “strong conviction that liberty loving people will not make themselves over into 
international police forces for any length of time.”74 
Occasionally interventionists gave voice to the contradiction, sounding indistinguishable 
from anti-interventionists. Several CSOP members, for example, protested Shotwell’s plan for 
a “rather indefinite dictatorship by Britain and America”: did it not resemble great-power 
imperialism more than permanent peace?75 When several dozen Anglophone academics and 
officials convened at Prout’s Neck, Maine, for a Conference on North Atlantic Relations — 
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seeking to implement the Atlantic Charter, promulgated three weeks prior — one objected that 
his colleagues envisioned an “Anglo-American Holy Alliance.” He complained that the group 
was assuming the benevolence of American and British power, but nations on the other end 
might react as Americans and Britons had received Metternich’s monarchs.76 But if mid-
twentieth-century internationalism seemed to be morphing into the opposite of nineteenth-
century internationalism, that was not how proponents of the former wanted to see it. After the 
Atlantic Charter held up a mirror, they needed a new way to legitimate American global 
supremacy to themselves. 
 
In the four months from the Atlantic Charter to Pearl Harbor, world organization rose 
from the dead, but not via a linear resurrection. American policy elites did not revalue the 
League, originally conceived and still perceived as a vehicle for expressing public opinion and 
controlling military power. To the contrary, the new world organization gained appeal as a 
device for managing public opinion and projecting military power. Planners hoped to synthesize 
the substance of American global supremacy, in partnership with Britain, with the form of 
League-style universalism. 
How, exactly? Once reduced to a blueprint, how would world organization convey a 
sense of common participation without involving common control? How would it seem more 
serious than the League about meting out armed sanctions and yet be less binding upon the 
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great-power enforcers? Such questions only began to be posed in 1941 as the paradigms of 
American-British policing and world organization jostled against one another. Two days after 
Pearl Harbor, Shepardson acknowledged that his Political Group should “make up its mind 
whether the object of this collaboration was to perpetuate an American-British hegemony or to 
provide nucleus of a general system of collective security.”77 Shotwell conveyed the same 
ambivalence in addressing the public as chairman of CSOP and once of the League of Nations 
Association. “The postwar world,” he cautioned, “will not be ready for anything so splendid as 
the immediate establishment of a stronger and more universal League of Nations.” Perhaps 
such a new League would follow, after the United States and Great Britain exercised “chief 
responsibility” for setting the terms of peace.78 
However abstractly, American policy elites forged a powerful argument before the 
nation entered the war: the United States had to lead the postwar world, and world organization 
could make it happen. As Sweetser wrote, “it would be one kind of world with America active, 
another with America inactive.”79 When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and made the United 
States a formal belligerent, the event caused none of the shock of the fall of France. Far from 
reexamining their assumptions, postwar planners affirmed them. On December 15, geographer 
Isaiah Bowman wrote to Armstrong and exulted that the United States “must accept world 
responsibility.” In the past, he admitted, the nation had been “rather timorous in our approach 
to this question,” in his view justly so: “We are not imperialistic in outlook. We have no desire 
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to dominate the world.” To seek domination was wrong, Bowman implied — as he argued that 
the United States must seek domination. “The measure of our victory,” Bowman concluded, 
“will be the measure of our domination after victory.”80 
  
“The Kind of a World We Want” 
 
 
Two weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor sent the United States into the war, 
President Roosevelt approved the establishment of a fully governmental planning committee to 
pick up where the CFR left off.81 The State Department’s Advisory Committee on American 
Foreign Policy first convened on February 12, 1942, in the office of Sumner Welles.82 FDR’s 
man in the department, Welles led the Advisory Committee into 1943, guiding discussions and 
pronouncing when a consensus on a subject had been reached. He also went over the head of 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull to keep FDR apprised of the committee’s work. More than 
anyone, it was Welles who convinced the skeptical president to get behind a world organization 
and persuade Great Britain and the Soviet Union to follow suit.83 
In public Welles positioned himself as the second coming of Woodrow Wilson. Standing 
at Wilson’s tomb in November 1941, he became the first member of FDR’s inner circle to 
endorse U.S. participation in world organization. Americans, he said, “must turn again for light 
and for inspiration to the ideals of that great seer,” Woodrow Wilson. “How rarely in human 
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history has the vision of a statesman been so tragically and so swiftly vindicated.”84 High praise, 
yet faint; a prophet sees but does not do. From the start of the planning, Welles held up the 
League as an anti-model. What was needed, he said, was a “completely fresh approach.”85 A 
decade after the war ended, Welles expected that “we would not have arrived in any Utopia.” 
Rather “the same old jealousies and fears and hatreds and tensions would be reasserting 
themselves.”86 Led by Welles, State Department planners set out to determine how the United 
States could project its full power in a world prone to war. 
That they inherited the assumptions of CFR planning was no coincidence, for the State 
Department brought in the CFR planners themselves. Months before Pearl Harbor, officials 
looked forward to drawing upon “the best brains outside the government” when they took 
planning in-house.87 Thus when the new, official planning group convened, it was not quite 
new nor fully official. Council planners chaired two of the four original subcommittees: Norman 
Davis, the CFR president, headed the Subcommittee on Security Problems, and Isaiah 
Bowman took over the Subcommittee on Territorial Problems. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, too, 
proved an influential member and a crucial coordinator with the CFR planning staff, which 
continued to operate throughout the war. The State Department brought in several other 
outsiders as well: Anne O’Hare McCormick, a New York Times columnist; Myron Taylor, a 
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former executive of U.S. Steel; and later James Shotwell and Clark Eichelberger, the two 
leading organizers of non-official anti-isolationist elites.88 
Early in 1942, with the United States finally in the war and assured of its standing in the 
peace, what impressed the assemblage of diplomats and semiofficials was that America was 
already supreme. Extending the confidence of the Council men, State Department planners 
foresaw the whole world unified under U.S. leadership. Gone were the elaborate geographical 
calculations performed in the year after the fall of France; now globalism was an axiom, 
requiring no justification. American interests and responsibilities “embrace the whole world,” 
as Bowman put it.89  
Although news from the battlefield was mixed in the spring of 1942, the planners 
imagined a prostrate postwar world looking to America for leadership. “The peoples now sunk 
under the pressure of the enemy forces would really need leadership with respect to everything,” 
Bowman commented in March. “It had been so in 1918 and 1919. Their minds no longer were 
self-reliant and independent, and they looked desperately for someone to give orders.” 
Conveniently, Hitler’s wrecking of the old international order appeared to have wiped clean the 
slate of history, allowing the United States to define a new order for the future. In discussing the 
problem of minorities in Europe, for instance, Welles remarked that although the current 
generation saw the transfer of populations as a harsh practice, “the next generation would not 
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feel that way, and we must look a long way ahead.” Bowman agreed. “People were getting used 
to the idea of moving minorities,” he said, “because Hitler had carried the process so far.”90 
If “the kind of a world we want,” in one planner’s phrase, seemed within reach, one 
obstacle stood out above the rest.91 It was not the Soviet Union. Although the planners worried 
about Russian domination of Eastern Europe, and thence Germany and Western Europe, such 
fears stayed toward the background of their discussions through 1942, while the Soviet Union 
battled for survival. By contrast, American “public opinion” preoccupied the State Department 
planners as much as their predecessors in the Council. Few meetings elapsed without someone 
interjecting that everything they were planning depended on the public overcoming its 
traditional aversion to full extra-hemispheric participation. “Our very biggest problem may be 
at home,” Bowman said, to Welles’s affirmation on behalf of the group. “How should we go 
about keeping our present sense of responsibility, so prevalent today throughout the American 
public — keep it into and throughout that postwar period.”92 
Opinion polls were heartening to a degree. “Every poll of opinion,” Welles noted, 
showed the public willing to enforce peace and join an “international organization with teeth.”93 
But no amount of data could quell the planners’ anxiety, convinced as they were that 
“isolationism” might always surface. Shotwell wrote the very first draft for world organization 
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that the planners considered, and he did not mention the Soviet Union. Instead he began 
confidently that “the present war has caused a major revolution in American thinking with 
reference to the problem of national security” — and yet, sentences later, “the innate longing 
of Americans for their old-time isolation is probably as strong as ever.”94 This was the planners’ 
most salient concern as they decided to create a new world organization. 
On March 7, 1942, the Subcommittee on Political Problems, composed of the principals 
of the larger committee, ended its inaugural meeting with Welles stating that the planners 
“should definitely assume that an international political organization would be established.” 
The planners had barely discussed how such an organization would look. For the most of the 
meeting, they merely asked when to hold a peace conference. Even though they felt the last 
conference in Paris had tried to solve too many problems at once, they concluded that the 
United States should orchestrate a peace conference during rather than after the war, lest “our 
national will to handle the peace problems, with all their difficulties, might be dissipated.”95  
The next meeting, on March 21, reiterated the point. Only one aspect of international 
organization merited discussion: the need to set it up quickly so as to lock internationalism into 
the public mind and keep isolationism down. If world organization were delayed, “American 
opinion might not be in support of our program to the extent necessary ‘to put it across,’” 
warned Benjamin Cohen, from FDR’s brain trust. Intensive work now “would give time for 
ideas to crystalize favorably prior to the armistice.” Welles agreed. “Postponement of 
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international organization,” he said, “might give American opinion time to veer away from 
necessary international participation.”96 It was decided, Welles affirmed: the United States 
should establish a world organization and do so before the war was through. 
Having accepted the bare idea of world organization, the planners turned next week to 
the nature of the security apparatus that might be erected during the war. The basic structure 
of what became the U.N. Security Council can be traced to this March 28 meeting. Here the 
planners figured out how to reconcile great-power privilege with a world organization’s 
universal form. Three objectives guided them: establishing an effective policing apparatus 
directed by the great powers, making the small powers feel included, and ensuring American 
freedom of action and the Senate’s ultimate approval of U.S. participation. The solution, they 
decided, was to start by vesting real power to make decisions solely in the U.S.-led Big Four. As 
a small body possessing the force of arms, it could take decisive action as the League Council 
did not.  
Yet this could and should be accomplished without kicking out the small powers. The 
aim should be that of “instilling the fullest possible sense of participation,” said the CFR’s 
Hamilton Fish Armstrong. Participation could be instilled because it was actually to be a 
simulacrum of participation. The planners decided that four or five small powers, each 
representing a region on a rotating basis, could sit on the new council as long as they were 
stripped of the veto power all representatives had enjoyed under the League’s unanimity rule. 
Perhaps the Big Four would also “hand pick” the delegates sent by these nations in order to 
assure their suitability. When Berle objected that the plan sounded like the “sterile intellectual 
                                                   




mold of the Council and Assembly of the League of Nations,” Bowman assured him of the 
contrary. The Big Four would retain control in a “quiet intangible organization” behind the 
scenes. All the planners desired was some method whereby “all states could be given recognition 
and given opportunity to regard themselves as participants in the decisions made.” “Speaking 
frankly,” Welles summed up, “what we required was a sop for the smaller states: some 
organization in which they could be represented and made to feel themselves participants.”97 
In mid-July, Welles formed a new Subcommittee on International Organization, 
chaired by himself, in order to formulate a draft constitution to present to FDR. After some 
hesitation, the planners decided to retain a successor to the League Assembly so that defeated 
powers and small states could “meet and ventilate their grievances.”98 Shotwell had spent much 
of the interwar period promoting criteria for defining aggression in order to make collective-
security obligations more binding, but now he led the way in rejecting any such thing. The 
planners jettisoned the collective-security requirements of the League, Articles 10 and 16, the 
former being the main provision that had prevented the Senate from approving the League. 
Now the great powers would enjoy full discretion in identifying aggressors and deciding whether 
and how to act.99 Certainly, the planners agreed, an international court was no place to decide 
matters of war and peace. Shotwell decried “the American tendency (in contrast to the British) 
to lump together all kinds of international disputes within a juristic framework. The 
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identification of acts of aggression was a political matter which could only be handled by a 
politically constituted agency.” At one point he suggested discarding the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in order to revert to the informal methods of arbitration ascendant before 
World War I.100 
Shotwell’s reference to an outmoded “American tendency” underscored how far ideas 
of internationalism had traveled over the past decade and especially within the past two years. 
Previously a second-ranking power holding up international law and organization as the 
ultimate solution to conflict, America now viewed international society from the position of the 
world leader, as jealous of political discretion as Britain had been. Ironically, the evolution 
brought about a more suspicious attitude toward the British government itself. The heroic 
Britain of 1941, standing between Hitler and America, never completely disappeared, but the 
planners increasingly viewed Britain as a postwar competitor standing between American 
capital and the colonies. Welles, for example, wanted to disabuse the British of any assumption 
that the United States was fighting to save their empire. Even a remodeled British Empire, he 
said, would be “valuable asset” only if it operated on a broad basis of international 
partnership.101  
As U.S. diplomats tried to convince Britain to end imperial preferences in return for 
Lend-Lease aid, State Department planners studied the colonial world in the fall of 1942 and 
found American power and world organization to be congruent there too. Rather than 
                                                   
100 Subcommittee on International Organization, Chronological Minutes 2; Subcommittee on 
International Organization Chronological Minutes 3, August 7, 1942, Box 85, HN. 




decolonize subject peoples, freeing each to close the open door, planners sought to 
internationalize colonialism. In the heady period between the autumn of 1942 and the spring 
of 1943, before great-power negotiations began in earnest, Welles and his planners hoped to 
extend to all colonies a strengthened Mandates system with U.S. representation on regional 
councils.102 They even entertained proposals to bring the current Mandates under “direct 
international administration,” where U.S. officials could serve.103 Once again Americanization 
and internationalization went hand in hand: the new trustees administering French North 
Africa, FDR told Welles, might well be American.104 Those plans would prove difficult to 
implement, but the torch of world leadership had clearly passed from London to Washington. 
By the beginning of 1944, FDR delighted in finding himself “unquestionably better prepared 
than the British” regarding proposals for the postwar world — a reversal, he pointed out, of 
Wilson’s fate.105 
As FDR’s planners contemplated what kind of world they wanted, they emphasized the 
global projection of American power and worried chiefly that the American people would stand 
in the way. World organization emerged as a means to this end, as a device for suppressing what 
they perceived as the public’s natural disinclination to lead the world. Yet the planners’ 
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instrumental attitudes toward world organization should not obscure the genuine, hierarchical 
ideal that the organization symbolized. In the new epoch of American leadership, the United 
States would exercise control but every nation would speak. The small powers would “ventilate” 
in the American forum, the United Nations — recognizing the laws America gave them even 
as they blew off steam. 
One of the planners put the matter concisely at the end of an early, winding meeting 
(described by Welles as “‘jumping around’ too widely”) full of uncertainty about how to redraw 
the map of Europe. “The endurance of our terms of settlement would be the great test,” said 
Anne O’Hare McCormick, the New York Times columnist. America needed to see “popular 
acquiescence in those settlements.” Welles agreed. “If the people agree to their destiny as we 
see it,” McCormick continued, “we can expect the peace to last.”106 Whatever course the United 
States chose, no matter how arbitrary the choice, would be the only way. All others should be 
expected to follow. That they might act otherwise, and fail “the great test,” the planners did not 
discuss. 
 
From Four Policemen to United Nations via American Power 
 
They thought they could determine the fate of the peoples of the world, but for some 
time, postwar planners struggled to convince their boss to entertain their big idea, a new world 
organization, at all. In the year following the declaration of the Atlantic Charter, Franklin 
Roosevelt inserted the Soviet Union and China to his vision of American-British world-orderers, 
                                                   




but he refused to go further. In April 1942, Welles sent him a sketch of a “United Nations 
Authority.” Adding five regional representatives to Roosevelt’s Four Policemen, the authority 
would eventually expand into a full world organization. But Welles found his proposal 
“summarily turned down at the highest level.”107 According to everyone who discussed postwar 
matters with Roosevelt in 1942, the president felt firmly that the Big Four should dictate the 
peace.108 The United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, perhaps China — they would 
police the world and “all other nations save the Big Four should be disarmed,” FDR told the 
Soviet Foreign Minister.109 Roosevelt was not about to relinquish control of war and peace to 
another League with a hundred signatories to satisfy. 
Then Welles showed him he did not have to. In a two-hour meeting in January 1943, 
Welles laid out how the postwar planners had squared great-power control with universal 
participation.110 Embedded in a world organization, the United States could exert more control 
than in an informal four-power concert. Welles’s draft, for example, required every member 
nation to make their forces and facilities available to the great powers. By internationalizing 
colonies and strategic bases, it opened the world to American access.111 Welles’s detailed 
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exposition might have converted Roosevelt; by 1943, too, Roosevelt was more willing to make 
territorial settlements and more suspicious of Soviet intentions, deciding to revive France as a 
counterweight rather than disarm it completely.112 Clearly, though, Roosevelt did not 
metamorphose into an advocate of subordinating American power to international law and 
multilateral procedures. In March he proposed a new world organization to the British for the 
first time and spoke in Wellesian terms. The Big Four would make “all the more important 
decisions,” the president said. Once a year or so, the universal assembly would meet, but not to 
take action. Small countries, the president said, would merely “blow off steam.”113 
From 1943 to 1945, Roosevelt convinced his allies to sign up to a new world 
organization, which neither Stalin nor Churchill, thinking along regionalist lines, had 
favored.114 Without the initiative of the United States, nothing like the United Nations 
Organization would have come into being. But the subsequent negotiations over the veto 
power, and related provisions on which historians have focused, shed dim light on why the 
United States made a top diplomatic priority of establishing the organization, an objective that 
ranked as high as any other in the horse-trading at Yalta and other summits.115 As Warren 
Kimball points out, FDR himself regarded subsequent disputes over the veto as a triviality, 
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relevant mainly for domestic political reasons.116 More illuminating is the moment of 
conception — revealing in particular that the origins of the United Nations in American 
thinking are explicable only as part of the origins of U.S. world leadership. 
As they first envisaged the United Nations, officials and intellectuals assumed other 
powers would go along with American prerogatives in the future. They never debated the merits 
of multilateralism versus unilateralism: the United States had nothing to gain from the latter so 
long as the postwar world remained an abstract ideal. In a few instances, however, they 
indicated a preference if events should force a choice. “The United States must exercise power 
after this war,” Buell reflected in March 1942, as the officials he advised made the decision to 
set up a new world organization. “It must not allow its initiative to be vetoed by other countries 
but it must be willing to allow other United Nations to associate themselves with us in the 
exercise of this power.”117 Buell was not alone in prizing America’s freedom of action. In the 
Board of Economic Warfare, the vice president’s New Dealing lieutenant, Milo Perkins, laid 
out a ten-page wish list of gifts that the United States could bestow upon the postwar world.  
“We have power,” Perkins wrote. Foreseeing that some nations would not go along with this 
power, he insisted the United States must exercise leadership nonetheless. Perkins concluded: 
If we attempt active participation in postwar world affairs before ridding 
ourselves of the fear that an indecisive position might displease certain nations 
because it sets forth frankly what we want, we shall end by pleasing nobody and 
by bringing ruin to ourselves. This nation from its beginning has stood for certain 
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basic ideals; we must work boldly for their world wide fulfillment and let the 
chips fall where they may.118 
Multilateralism where possible, unilateralism if necessary: with this formula Perkins 
asserted American sovereignty over international society.  
                                                   




Chapter 5: The Debate that Wasn’t, 1942-1945 
 
Arnold Toynbee had not visited the United States in a decade when Rockefeller 
Foundation money brought him back in the fall of 1942. But Toynbee, officially the director of 
studies at Chatham House, unofficially the dean of British liberal internationalism, knew exactly 
whom to see.1 He spent two weeks meeting with postwar planners in the State Department and 
another week in New York with the Council on Foreign Relations. Then he circulated around 
the country, renewing acquaintances with Raymond Leslie Buell, Edward Meade Earle, and 
Quincy Wright, among other postwar-minded semiofficials. He failed in his attempt to establish 
formal exchanges of personnel between planners in America and Britain; Leo Pasvolsky, chief 
of research in the State Department, brushed the request aside, determined to maintain control 
in American hands.2 Yet when Toynbee reported back to the Foreign Office, he had nothing 
but good news to deliver. 
Finally British diplomacy was seeing the realization of one of its foremost objectives since 
1914: rousing the United States fully into world politics. Toynbee found his American 
counterparts preparing a massive campaign of public education in the evils of “isolationism” 
and the corresponding virtues of projecting U.S. power in the postwar world. Toynbee himself 
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doubted the need for such a campaign. Most everyone he met seemed as committed to world 
leadership as they were anxious that the rest of the country would recoil. “I was frequently told 
that Isolationism is dead,” Toynbee reflected, “but just as often that it is likely to rise again in 
some new avatar or metamorphosis.”3 Toynbee concluded that the former was true but the 
latter revealing. American internationalists were mobilizing not to defeat extant opposition but 
rather to create a “bulwark” against any resistance that might arise later. In nominally rallying 
around participation in international organization, they worked to legitimate the American 
Century. 
Toynbee noted a second curiosity about his American friends, this one as welcome as 
the first. In the past year, American internationalists like Vice President Henry Wallace had 
made grand if vague pronouncements about the future disposition of the colonial world, 
alarming British officials already contending with the Roosevelt administration’s demand for 
the destruction of the imperial preference system in consideration for Lend-Lease aid.4 For all 
the talk of instituting international control over colonized territories, however, Toynbee 
reported that as discussions became concrete, Americans became pliable. When informed that 
internationalization would hinder the progress of subject peoples toward self-government, 
Toynbee’s American interlocutors “nearly always” proved ready to combine some sort of 
                                                   
3 Ibid. 
4 For pronouncements on colonialism by Wallace and others in 1942, and British reactions, see 
Lloyd Gardner, “FDR and the Colonial Question,” in FDR’s World, 123-7; James P. Hubbard, The 
United States and the End of British Colonial Rule in Africa, 1941-1968 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & 
Company, 2011), 11-4, 30; Henry Wallace, The Price of Free World Victory (New York, L. B. Fischer, 
1942). On Anglo-American negotiations over Lend-Lease compensation, see Hearden, Architects of 
Globalism, 28-32, 42-6, 64-91, 247-9, 314-5; Kimball, The Juggler, ch. 3; the classic work is Richard N. 
Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: Anglo-American Collaboration in the Reconstruction of Multilateral Trade 




international supervision with existing national administrations.5 They might well decide merely 
to update the Mandates system devised by the British government in the last world war, 
Toynbee forecast presciently. Here too the great internationalist ferment seemed more symbolic 
than substantial. Fearing “isolationism,” Americans fixated on whether their country would 
accept “internationalism.” They pushed to the background what kind of internationalism it 
should be. 
For understanding America’s effort to win the peace as it helped to win the Second 
World War, Toynbee’s observations provide a better point of departure than the historiography 
that has followed. Adopting the intellectual frameworks of wartime interventionists, historians 
have structured their narratives around the assumption that in creating and joining the United 
Nations Organization, the United States seized its “second chance” and witnessed the “triumph 
of internationalism.”6 This triumph supposedly came against a contemporaneous adversary — 
isolationism or something like it, which having thwarted American participation in the League 
of Nations might well have won out again. The result was a “vociferous public debate,” a wide-
open “Grotian moment,” to quote Elizabeth Borgwardt.7 Americans, both in the elite and at 
the grassroots, weighed multilateral and institutional solutions to global problems as never 
before and, after democratic debate, committed themselves to internationalism. 
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The triumph thesis takes interventionist-internationalists’ self-presentation at face value, 
with the effect not only of flattering a particular political agenda but also of failing to appreciate 
the significance of the mobilization around internationalism. That mobilization scarcely 
constituted a competitive debate. To extend Toynbee’s insights, advocates of the United 
Nations arrayed themselves against the ideological construction of “isolationism” rather than 
actual contemporaries. When the Senate voted to ratify the United Nations Charter by a vote 
of 89 to 2, the outcome reflected the paucity of outright opposition all along. Hegemonic from 
the start of 1942, interventionist-internationalists faced nothing like the political uncertainty of 
the previous two years, when challengers organized themselves and put forward plausible 
proposals for U.S. policy during and after the war. Nor did mainstream “internationalists” 
welcome disagreements within their ranks. They self-consciously suppressed the discussion of 
alternatives at every turn, lest internal divisions play into the hands of imagined isolationists. It 
made little difference whether they were government officials or non-partisan activists: U.N. 
proponents framed the decision around whether to embrace world leadership and world 
organization (“internationalism”) or abstain from the world (“isolationism”), dampening 
consideration of how to govern the world. These anti-isolationist internationalists stood to gain 
by claiming victory in a contested and participatory debate — an “experiment in democracy,” 
one activist titled her memoir — but scholars need not accept such claims.8 
What transpired from 1943 to 1945 was less a debate than a campaign of legitimation. 
Viewed in this way, it acquires stakes that justified the effort. By mobilizing in the name of 
internationalism, foreign policy elites turned U.S. world leadership into an unanswerable 
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position in American politics. This outcome, unlike the vote to ratify the U.N. Charter, was not 
assured. From 1940 to 1942, a small set of political and intellectual elites, concentrated in the 
two hundred miles between New York and Washington, drew up the first plans for postwar 
political-military leadership. Aware of their own insulation from popular and partisan politics, 
they persistently worried that the American people, and their representatives in Congress, 
would refuse to go along; armed supremacy might be judged un-American and un-
internationalist, as many had criticized the Atlantic Charter. The attack on Pearl Harbor 
allayed this fear only partially. Despite producing near unanimity in favor of prosecuting the 
war to a decisive end, it did not necessarily imply that the United States should police the world 
afterward. There might have ensued a vigorous public debate over whether and how postwar 
America should use its unprecedented military, political, and economic power to keep the peace 
and shape world order. Global supremacy might have faced attacks from both standpoints from 
which Americans had historically opposed power politics: a hemispherism that eschewed Old 
World political-military commitment and a universalism that sought to control and transcend 
balance-of-power and great-power politics.  
Yet the attacks never came. The harshest critics of Roosevelt’s foreign policy, led by 
Senator Robert Taft, rose to the floor of Congress to discuss (and mostly applaud) the United 
Nations.9 Some argued, from the other direction, that only a genuine federation among nations 
could tame international rivalry and prevent another war, but world federalists remained 
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marginal and sought their own kind of vehicle for hegemonic power.10 The outstanding fact 
was the approval of America’s global preeminence and the absence of much-anticipated 
objections.11 “We tell ourselves that we have emerged from this war the most powerful nation 
in the world — the most powerful nation, perhaps, in all history,” an exultant President Harry 
Truman remarked in a radio address given one week before Japan’s surrender.12 Truman 
continued that the nation’s ideals of self-government and dignity ultimately explained its armed 
strength. The president found little need to justify global supremacy. As World War II ended, 
global supremacy functioned as a foundational good against which other values would be 
measured. Almost unthinkable before the war, it now appeared as the telos of American history. 
It was no such thing: too much intellectual and cultural work had to be performed in 
order to make global supremacy seem natural. It was this work that wartime interventionists 
undertook in the name of internationalism and the United Nations. Promulgating a narrative 
in which American foreign policy swung between the poles of “internationalism” and 
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“isolationism,” they obliterated the intellectual resources that countered armed supremacy. 
Their narrative expelled anti-interventionists from the ranks of internationalism and the sphere 
of legitimate discourse. The restraint of American power became the height of isolationist 
selfishness. By extension, no vision for a better world could fail to include the United States as 
the supreme power and defining agent. Once opposed to nationalism and defined by the 
transcendence of power politics, “internationalism” came to denote American world leadership 
first and foremost. Thus interventionists did not merely argue that an internationalism without 
U.S. supremacy would be undesirable. They rendered the prospect conceptually impossible, 
thinkable only outside the terms of American political discourse. 
 
“Stop Isolationism Now” 
 
Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Norman Davis, Whitney Shepardson, James Shotwell, and 
Arthur Sweetser were among the few dozen people responsible for planning the postwar policies 
of the nation whose economy would emerge from the war as large as that of the rest of the world 
combined. In 1942, in their time away from planning, they hired the public-relations firm 
Thomas Fizdale, Inc. To be precise, it was the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, of which they 
were directors, that employed Fizdale to develop a plan of action for the rest of the war years. 
In the view of the foundation’s leaders, Wilson had failed for one key reason: the American 
people did not understand his ideas. Internationalists back then mounted no attempt to educate 




Goebbel’s [sic] for isolationism,” he continued anachronistically.13 Who better than a PR man 
to tell the foundation how to even the supposed scales by unloading its substantial coffers, which 
were already funding the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace? The time had come 
to put academic studies aside, the foundation resolved, and “go to work for ‘Internationalism’ 
now.”14 
By the war’s end, U.N. advocates would claim to have defeated their isolationist 
opponents in a competitive democratic debate. Yet a competitive debate was manifestly not 
what the Wilson Foundation prepared for in 1942, nor what it got after. Despite referencing 
Goebbelsesque isolationist propaganda from the last war, Fizdale did not identify a single 
adversary in the present. He placed no emphasis on devising superior arguments. Instead he 
assumed the forces of internationalism possessed free reign to propagandize to a passive public. 
Through the latest techniques of persuasion, the foundation could reach “that greater mass of 
Americans…who prefer ‘soap operas’ to Wagner.”15 Exhibiting the popular Freudianism that 
informed mid-century public relations, Fizdale wanted the foundation to blanket the public in 
print, radio, and film with quasi-religious dogma.16 Give the people a “catechism in 
internationalism,” Fizdale urged.17 
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The foundation needed little persuading. It threw itself into the anti-isolationist crusade 
over the next three years, producing a widely read pamphlet called “Our Second Chance”; 
helping Twentieth Century Fox release the Academy Award-winning film Wilson, a biopic that 
dramatized the League fight; and publicizing the Dumbarton Oaks proposals for world 
organization even before the State Department did.18 In all these activities, the foundation’s 
president explained at the outset, the goal was to present Wilson as an American hero with a 
“prophetic gift” and a “symbol of international organization.”19 Such gauzy language did not 
indicate diffuse cultural objectives. Through canonizing Wilson, the foundation’s officers 
envisioned winning a legislative fight and elevating anti-isolationist internationalism above the 
arena of political contestation. Prophet Wilson, whatever his resemblance to Woodrow Wilson, 
offered his flock a chance at redemption and lent world leadership an unimpeachably 
internationalist and American pedigree. His revelations grounded the origin myth of American 
global supremacy.  
 
The Woodrow Wilson Foundation was one hub in a large field of public officials and 
citizens’ groups that sought to convert ordinary Americans to anti-isolationist internationalism. 
As scholars have suggested, it would be a mistake to privilege the agency of either the 
government or private foundations in generating support for postwar American leadership. Not 
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only did officials and non-officials pursue the same objectives; often they were the same people. 
At various moments in 1942 and 1943, for example, historian James Shotwell planned the 
United Nations Organization in the State Department; formulated the Wilson Foundation’s 
public-relations campaign; set up — through the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
— “international mind” alcoves in public libraries and ten International Relations Centers for 
coordinating pro-U.N. groups in the West and Midwest; and arranged for the Carnegie 
Endowment and his Commission to Study the Organization of Peace to host an NBC radio 
series, “For This We Fight,” which secured one-quarter of listeners nationwide.20 Political 
scientist Inderjeet Parmar applies the term “parastate” to nominally private organizations in 
order to highlight their loyalty to the American state.21 If anything, the label may err in still 
suggesting the ultimate centrality of officialdom, at least at a moment prior to the expansion of 
the national security bureaucracy in the late 1940s. The unofficial Americans United for World 
Organization approached the State Department, not vice-versa, to ask how it should promote 
the Dumbarton Oaks proposals negotiated by the Big Four.22 
The Roosevelt administration, for its part, appreciated the potential for civil society 
groups to furnish “very helpful allies” in the fight for public opinion, provided that they were 
“discreetly guided” along the right path, as one of Pasvolsky’s men wrote early on.23 To that 
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end, the State Department launched perhaps the most determined effort in its history to engage 
the American public. After the Big Four committed themselves to creating a postwar 
international organization in the Moscow Declaration of October 1943, the department 
established the Division of Public Liaison, dedicated to outreach with civil society.24 Under 
Edward Stettinius, the U.S. Steel executive and savvy administrator who replaced Cordell Hull 
as secretary, State Department officials gave more than 500 speeches in every major U.S. city 
and distributed millions of promotional pamphlets between the release of the Dumbarton Oaks 
proposals in October 1944 and the start of the San Francisco conference that drafted the U.N. 
Charter in the following June.25 Most significantly, the department invited 42 domestic interest 
groups and non-governmental internationalist organizations to participate at San Francisco. It 
even listened to them, heeding their requests for the U.N. Charter to reference the protection 
of human rights and establish an Economic and Social Council that could consult with national 
and international NGOs.26 
From this, one historian concludes that the department largely made good on its stated 
aim of conducting a “democratic foreign policy.”27 But democracy is easy to support when the 
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demos does not disagree. The remarkable fact is less that the state reached out to civil society 
groups than that it could do so comfortably thanks to a broad anti-isolationist consensus. After 
Pearl Harbor, internationalists encountered a receptive public and no organized opposition. In 
July 1942, Welles’s planners in the State Department issued their first fortnightly summary of 
American public opinion on postwar problems and noted that the already small “isolationist 
minority” had shrunken further since the United States joined the war. As they pointed out, a 
staggering 73 percent of Americans now supported U.S. participation in postwar international 
organization, according to Gallup surveys, up from 50 percent a year before and 33 percent in 
1937.28 Public approval remained around the three-quarters mark through 1945, a level 
pollsters considered to be tantamount to unanimity in a diverse country.29 To say there was little 
debate over world organization is to understate. Participation in the postwar United Nations 
ranked as one of the least contentious issues in American politics. 
Certainly critics of the League of Nations before Pearl Harbor did not fail to notice that 
popular sentiment had deserted them. “The American people seem hell bent on some kind of 
league, alliance, or what have you,” historian Charles Beard lamented as delegates met in San 
Francisco.30 But few former anti-interventionists headed down Beard’s road to marginality. 
Most supported the United Nations, following the lead of Senators Arthur Vandenberg and 
Robert Taft. One reason was precisely that public sentiment seemed insurmountable. Despite 
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later claiming that Pearl Harbor “ended isolationism for any realist,” Vandenberg initially 
thought the attack vindicated anti-interventionists’ contention that Roosevelt would provoke his 
way into war.31 But ultimately he accepted interventionists’ logic too: any world war would draw 
in the United States, as had now happened twice.32 The perception that interventionists were 
right was so pervasive as to make them right. 
Furthermore, anti-interventionists found little to dislike in the modest design of the new 
world organization. When shown the State Department’s plan, Vandenberg marveled that “it 
is so conservative from a nationalist standpoint.”33 Why not sign on? U.S. planners had 
discarded the provisions of the League that imposed collective-security obligations on the 
United States. “The San Francisco Charter has no ‘Article X,’” Shotwell observed, and “there 
is a conscious avoidance of defining aggression.”34 With the most controversial elements of 
world organization abandoned before another controversy could begin, many anti-
interventionists could accept the United Nations without completely reversing their previous 
views.35 As a New York Herald Tribune editorial commented, the Charter represents “a kind of 
least common denominator of what is today practically acceptable to all.”36 
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For some supposed isolationists, the United Nations was too weak rather than too strong. 
Taft, the onetime anti-interventionist leader and future Cold War critic, declared early on, in 
1943, that the United States should join a universal commitment to use economic and military 
force to prevent aggression; an international body would decide whether to deploy sanctions by 
a majority vote.37 As Raymond Leslie Buell observed to his boss Henry Luce, Taft’s willingness 
to countenance global military policing made it absurd to call him an “isolationist,” a term 
defined by one’s stance on the use of force against aggression. And insofar as Taft envisioned 
American military force summoned by an international agency, his multilateralism went further 
than FDR’s ever did.38 “For some time,” the Washington Post observed in July 1945, “it has been 
evident that opposition to the United Nations Charter in the Senate has virtually collapsed.”39 
Small wonder that Citizens for Victory, set up in 1942 to succeed the Committee to Defend 
America by Aiding the Allies, fizzled out almost as soon as it began. The America First 
Committee having disbanded, with nothing to take its place, the group could not find enough 
“isolationists” to impugn.40 
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The dearth of opposition calls into question scholars’ search to explain why 
internationalism won the debate in World War II. The prior puzzle is why internationalists 
staged a debate at all. Why mobilize around U.N. participation when hardly anyone — two 
senators in the end — thought the contrary? Neo-Gramscian scholars beg the question in 
highlighting the “state spirit” shared by government agencies and private organizations that 
sought to engineer popular consent for globalism.41 Sometimes the American foreign-policy 
elite unites; other times it fractures. Sometimes it engages the public; often it prefers insulation. 
After dividing over neutrality and intervention in the years following Pearl Harbor, it came 
together around a campaign that becomes explicable only by taking seriously, and reading 
critically, what self-described internationalists told themselves they were doing. That mission 
was summarized by the wartime slogan of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation-backed League of 
Woman Voters: “Stop Isolationism Now.”42 Despite the lack of identifiable isolationists, then, 
the idea of isolationism proved spectacularly generative. It animated internationalists and 
transformed their agenda, more, in fact, than they knew. 
By no means, however, were they ignorant of the public support they commanded. They 
pored over scientific surveys in newspapers, magazines, and journals like Public Opinion Quarterly, 
founded in 1937. Not content to leave polling to the pollsters, the Roosevelt administration 
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developed sophisticated techniques for measuring and interpreting popular sentiment, first 
through the Office of War Information and then through the State Department’s Office of 
Public Opinion Studies. In the 22-year reign of political scientist H. Schuyler Foster, Jr., starting 
in 1943, the latter office produced tens of thousands of surveys scrutinizing the attitudes of 
interest groups and the aggregate public to every international question.43 Political leaders paid 
attention. FDR devoured weekly surveys of opinion polls and newspaper editorials.44 Sumner 
Welles, as we have seen, remarked to his postwar planners that “every poll of opinion” indicated 
the public’s desire to enforce the peace and join a world organization.45 Suffice it to say that 
wartime “internationalists” understood the paltry numbers of their antagonists. 
But they had the luxury of looking ahead, of finishing the postwar planning that 
interventionists had undertaken from the very start of the war in Europe. The Woodrow Wilson 
Foundation’s PR man put it well. The goal, he implied, was not to persuade John Doe. Mr. Doe 
was persuaded already. Now his persuasion had to be entrenched, his reservations expelled: 
“Mr. Doe must be made sure.”46 For nothing seemed so frightening as the prospect that after 
the war Americans might “retreat to isolationism” (FDR), “return to isolationism” (Walter 
Lippmann),” “swing back to isolationism” (Anne O’Hare McCormick), “try isolationism once 
again” (Senator Joseph Ball), and so forth.47 Given the actual state of popular sentiment, this 
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fear produced its share of hyperbolic scenarios. At the end of 1942, for example, a Midwestern 
Council on Foreign Relations official warned colleagues that isolationists had gone 
underground. They were merely biding their time, being “experienced in the art of guerilla 
warfare.”48 Isolationism’s absence only proved its strength.  
Such contortions notwithstanding, fear of isolationism was ubiquitous and expressed 
privately and publically alike. Not only a combat concept, deployed to discredit anti-
interventionists, “isolationism” structured the mental map of wartime internationalists. They 
believed and absorbed their own myth. Despite their recent coinage of the term, they took 
“isolationism” to be a self-conscious, organized force that had rivaled “internationalism” for 
decades and thwarted American participation in the League of Nations. Wartime 
internationalists defined their very identity in opposition to isolationism, pushing into the 
background internationalism’s previous antonyms of nationalism, imperialism, and power 
politics. This conception of internationalism as anti-isolationism structured the entire non-
debate, as it were. Wartime internationalists refused to air alternative schemes for world 
organization that might divide them and benefit isolationists, who, however dormant, seemed 
liable to erupt at any moment. 
This anti-isolationist self-concept was new. Although wartime internationalists 
constantly affiliated themselves with the Wilsonian generation, no one mobilized against 
“isolationism” in World War I. The category did not exist, not even as an epithet. Self-described 
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internationalists mounted little defense of internationalism as such, instead debating among 
various schemes for peace. By the time Wilson formulated his own view, civil society groups had 
already circulated several prominent models for world organization.49 How to have 
internationalism, not whether, was the question, with the answers so diverse that the Senate’s 
rejection of League membership hardly seemed to repudiate internationalism itself. 
In World War II, by contrast, advocates of the United Nations acted as though the 
important question was whether to have internationalism and international organization or not, 
even though answers in the negative were few and far between. They refused to engage in 
sustained public debates over how this internationalism should take shape, so anxious were they 
to fortify their advantage over a phantom enemy. Noting how rarely they attempted to 
conceptualize international organization, one recent historian blames the leadership of 
American Association for the United Nations, including James Shotwell, for collaborating with 
officials and suppressing differences of opinion within the movement.50 This argument implies 
that with different leaders internationalists might have offered more alternatives for world order 
and more criticism of government plans. But what if conceptual sterility was constitutive of anti-
isolationist internationalism? Obsessed with defeating “isolationism,” wartime internationalists 
fetishized world organization, attributing significance to its bare existence while remaining 
agnostic as to its form. 
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When the League to Enforce Peace formed in June 1915, two years prior to American 
entry into World War I, it began by formulating a four-article treaty to which its members 
wanted all nations to adhere. Soon it became America’s largest civil society group favoring 
world organization, although the specifics of its platform divided even the international lawyers 
who were its main constituency.51 The League to Enforce Peace had no counterpart in World 
War II. On the other hand, the internationalist movement, highly conscious of itself as such, 
maintained political unity precisely because of its “lack of any apparent long-term or coherent 
policy of action,” as one member complained.52 It preserved consensus by confining public 
discussion to the broad outlines of a world organization with universal membership, some sort 
of economic and policing powers, and perhaps competencies to oversee the administration of 
colonies.  
Consider the most popular “internationalist” tract, One World, a travelogue manifesto 
penned by Wendell Willkie after his globe-spanning trip in the autumn of 1942. Willkie, the 
1940 Republican presidential nominee turned ally-in-intervention of FDR, urged Americans to 
eschew all manner of imperialisms in the postwar world. Positioning himself against “narrow 
nationalism,” he opposed racial exploitation at home and preached partnership abroad, 
particularly with the peoples of Asia throwing off the colonial yoke.53 But despite calling on the 
United Nations to become a “common council in which all plan together,” Willkie ventured no 
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further details.54 More important than proposing an institutional structure for cooperation — 
where common council would become either the right of all nations or the charity of a few — 
was picturing the global masses, from Cairo to Chongqing, sharing the desires of ordinary 
Americans and looking to the United States for leadership.55  
If Willkie’s middlebrow appeal might have precluded detailed analysis, the experts of 
the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace (CSOP), chaired by Shotwell, also declined 
to offer public blueprints for world organization. One member, university president Philip Nash, 
reminded Shotwell that “it was in June 1915, three years before the Armistice, that the League 
to Enforce Peace was making a fairly definite picture of the Covenant of the League.”56 Was 
the present Commission tardy by comparison? Shotwell was unmoved. Although the 
Commission began to circulate drafts for a new world organization internally, these were not 
publicized until 1944 and closely resembled State Department plans.57 Two years into the U.S. 
war effort, public debate over postwar world order was less advanced than it had been two years 
before American entry into World War I. In August 1943, Henry Luce could tell his Postwar 
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Department that he wanted to support some scheme for world organization but found none in 
circulation.58 
Thus the Big Four governments had a free hand to release their own plan, as they did 
in October 1944 following the Dumbarton Oaks conference. The Dumbarton proposals were 
widely seen as a formula for great-power domination, drafted exclusively by the great powers 
themselves. Unlike the League Covenant, the proposals lodged responsibility for international 
peace and security exclusively in an executive council with five permanent members and not in 
a universal assembly. The power-political nature of the proposals troubled the U.S. postwar 
planners who had shaped them. At the end of October, officials from the State Department, the 
military, and the Council on Foreign Relations convened in Princeton for a special conference.59  
New York Times military analyst and CFR planner Hanson Baldwin opened the session 
on security by predicting “widespread criticism in public debate” given that the great powers 
“virtually arrogated to themselves the exclusive right to keep the peace.”60 Pasvolsky, perhaps 
the chief American architect of the U.N., reinforced Baldwin’s concern by highlighting 
Dumbarton’s realpolitik premises. The new organization, he said, possessed little capacity to 
discipline the great powers. Peace would depend “almost exclusively on the ability of these 
super-powers to exercise a considerable amount of self-restraint.”61 The United Nations would 
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work, if it did, by creating the conditions for a more organized “balance of power” — the bête 
noir of nineteenth-century internationalism and a phrase that other planners proposed to strike 
from their vocabulary.62 The more they talked about Dumbarton Oaks, the more the planners 
expected a popular backlash. Although they often attributed the potential backlash to 
“isolationism,” they simultaneously appreciated that something else was at issue: not whether 
but how the United States would join and structure world politics. 
The planners’ prediction did not prove entirely unfounded. Politicians and 
commentators universally acknowledged Dumbarton’s big-power bias. Republican Governor 
Thomas Dewey, in the thick of his presidential campaign against FDR, initially excoriated the 
Dumbarton plan as the “rankest form of imperialism” in which the strong would coerce the 
weak.63 No less a realist than Hans Morgenthau blasted the architects of the new world order 
for going to the opposite extreme of his customary Wilsonian whipping boy. He wrote that the 
Dumbarton framework attempted to build international society on a bedrock of “power alone,” 
bereft of the common moral standards appreciated even by the men of the Holy Alliance.64 
Columnist Walter Lippmann also contrasted the emerging United Nations Organization with 
the League of Nations but cheered the former because it repudiated the latter. In two recent 
books, widely read and reprinted, Lippmann appended Soviet Russia to his American-British 
condominium from 1941, and he judged the Dumbarton agreement to exemplify his un-
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Wilsonian “nuclear alliance.”65 Never mind the issue of “how to have the small powers 
‘represented,’” Lippmann told his readers; in practice the big powers would consult members 
of their sphere of influence anyway, so each American, British, or Soviet vote would in fact 
represent a broad consensus.66 If the British-led League had often honored the formal equality 
of states in the breach, Dumbarton so mocked the principle that Lippmann could only concoct 
an argument for virtual equality.  
The unmistakable hierarchies of Dumbarton might have inspired formidable 
opposition, especially from the self-styled Wilsonians whom Lippmann decried. Yet widespread 
reservations translated into scant rejections. After Dewey’s initial outburst, the two presidential 
campaigns concluded a pact between advisers Cordell Hull and John Foster Dulles to keep the 
Dumbarton plan out of the election.67 Internationalist groups ramped up their anti-isolationist 
activism nonetheless.68 They did propose amendments to Dumbarton that were mostly 
incorporated at San Francisco: notably, Shotwell’s CSOP and Dulles’s ecumenical Protestant 
group called for the creation of commissions on human rights and trusteeship.69 But these 
changes were understood to be ornamental.70 No one insisted on them as a condition for 
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supporting for the Charter. Internationalists intended to establish some world organization, and 
Dumbarton qualified. 
Why did the Dumbarton agreement command such thorough acclaim? For one, 
however distasteful Dumbarton looked, few internationalists disagreed with its fundaments. 
Having reconciled themselves to power politics in 1940 and 1941, internationalists wanted a 
security organization dominated by the United States and the great powers. They had learned 
that the League failed principally because it relied on peaceful, legalistic conciliation and could 
not impose its writ. So long as states refused to cede their sovereignty to a world government, 
this lesson inevitably privileged the great powers, who alone could furnish military force. 
Accordingly, it was with respect to an “international police force” that semiofficial and 
unofficial internationalists made their most significant innovation in the political design of world 
organization.71 Starting in 1943, CSOP members and CFR planners discussed methods for 
putting at the disposal of the Security Council-to-be a supranationally constituted, standing air 
force that could deploy rapidly from bases all over the world in order to beat back aggressors.72 
Before the Dumbarton Oaks proposals invested each of the great powers with a veto, therefore, 
internationalists did the same (except on disputes to which a great power would be a party). 
Their plan extended the exclusive American-British policing schemes of 1941, originally drawn 
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up in contrast to the universalist model of the League. Because it contemplated a supranational 
rather than bilateral air force, it suffered from being either too weak to be effective or strong 
enough to threaten U.S. prerogatives. Ultimately the Allies agreed on a quota system, never 
implemented, by which nations would designate some of their own forces to stay available for 
immediate dispatch upon orders of the Security Council.73 If the most influential non-
governmental internationalists had their way, the U.N. Charter might have constituted more 
great-power dictatorship, not less. 
Moreover, to the extent internationalists disagreed with aspects of the Charter, they 
were unwilling to call for its rejection. In a conscious strategy of self-suppression, they muted 
serious divergences of opinion until the Senate ratified the U.N. Despite objecting to an absolute 
great-power veto, Shotwell followed the principle he spelled out in 1942 that set the tone for the 
entire non-debate: “I think it is much more important to clarify the American mind with 
reference to the inescapable fundamentals than to confuse it with a multitude of plans.”74 
Conjuring a public mind incapable of nuance, Shotwell’s principle convinced a growing faction 
of world federalists to support the Dumbarton agreement despite their desire to strengthen the 
General Assembly and elevate it over the Security Council.75 Only after the U.N. Charter came 
into being, and especially following the detonation of the atom bomb, did dissenters organize 
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into the United World Federalists and campaign to revamp the Charter.76 By that time the 
window for reorganizing international relations had predictably shut. 
In an ideological boomerang, the specter of “isolationism” — powerfully invoked 
against anti-interventionists throughout the war — served to bludgeon fellow internationalists 
in their moment of supposed triumph. The perils of perfectionism, abettor of isolationism, 
became a motif of the non-debate. FDR issued a stark warning to this effect in his State of the 
Union address in January 1945, on the heels of his fourth election victory. The ailing president, 
unable to come before Congress, made his words clear enough from the White House. He 
blamed perfectionists from the last war, critical of the League Covenant, for abetting the “retreat 
to isolationism.” “Perfectionism, no less than isolationism or imperialism or power politics, may 
obstruct the paths to international peace,” Roosevelt avowed.77 Isolationism, imperialism, 
power politics — all were antitheses of “internationalism” too. In assaulting perfectionism, FDR 
assaulted the internationalism of the previous generation in the name of internationalism. Once 
meaningful differences of opinion were reduced to a perfectionist impulse, not worth 
comprehending on their own terms. 
Roosevelt was only echoing the lessons of a spate of new narratives of the League fight 
that historians and publicists published in the closing years of the war. These authors set the 
terms of historical memory for decades to come, and they distorted their subject matter to fit 
the assumptions and agenda of wartime anti-isolationist internationalism. When they turned to 
the League fight for guidance, they did not examine the intellectual alternatives promulgated 
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by contemporaries. Instead they effaced those alternatives. In their telling, the League fight 
pitted internationalists against isolationists, pure and simple. As the New York Times summed up 
the two hours and 34 minutes of Twentieth Century Fox’s Wilson: “the League is but a symbol 
of international accord, and the opposition to it — with Senator Lodge as the villain — is just 
an inchoate obstructive force.”78 The Times critic praised the film nonetheless for inspiring 
millions of Americans with its subject’s ideals. 
More complex narratives acknowledged divisions among the internationalists of World 
War I, only to condemn them. If the League fight did not simply pit internationalists against 
isolationists, it should have done so: writers switched from description to judgment and 
condemned advocates of particular plans for world organization for declining to line up behind 
any world organization. Ruhl Barlett’s The League to Enforce Peace, still the most detailed history 
of that organization, glossed over the LEP’s manifest legalism, presenting its activists as 
intellectual allies of Wilson who hurt their own cause by quibbling over details.79 Thomas A. 
Bailey, one of the most influential diplomatic historians of mid-century America, blamed Wilson 
instead, to the same effect. First in Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace, then in Woodrow Wilson and 
the Great Betrayal, Bailey reproached the president for spurning mild reservations to the Treaty 
of Versailles. Stubborn and tactless, Wilson failed to unite internationalists and assured victory 
for isolationists. The lesson was clear. This time America should cast off isolationism and 
“assume that world leadership which had been thrust upon her,” almost irrespective of the form 
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this should take.80 Although Bailey assumed world organization would accompany world 
leadership, his anti-isolationist internationalism inherently subordinated the former to the later. 
Thus the internationalists who staged the non-debate of World War II constructed the 
needless debate of World War I.81 Projecting the internationalist/isolationist dichotomy onto 
the past served them well, performing three functions at once. It delegitimized opposition to 
world leadership as selfish and provincial “isolationism.” It delegitimized debate among 
internationalists as “perfectionism,” the handmaiden of isolationism. Obversely, it legitimized 
advocates of world leadership by giving them credentials in the American past. The opportunity 
for postwar leadership could be represented as a “second chance,” not a first, offering 
redemption rather than deviation. Yet simply by virtue of imagining a second chance to defeat 
isolationism, Americans were creating something new.  
 
Cooperation for Domination 
 
Although internationalists staged a debate against a phantom enemy, their non-debate 
proved world-historically productive. It settled what Sumner Welles, a few weeks after the D-
Day landings, called “the real question before the American people today.” This was whether, 
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after winning the war, “they wish to make the fullest use of the strength which is theirs.”82 Their 
strength, Welles noted, dwarfed that of any other people in the world. As the United States 
helped to set up the institutions of postwar international society in the final years of the war, its 
political class perceived and constantly proclaimed that America had ascended to primacy 
among nations and must maintain its primacy over all others in the interests of national security 
and world order. The pursuit of cooperation and domination proceeded together.  
President Truman mapped the path to a “just and lasting peace” before Congress in 
October 1945: “We must relentlessly preserve our superiority on land and sea and in the air.”83 
Truman was blunt, but no one could deny the reality of American global military supremacy as 
victorious U.S. troops streamed across Central Europe and East Asia. In the closing months of 
the war, “magazine and newspaper editorials, radio commentators, government officials, and 
corporate advertisements constantly reminded Americans that their nation was the greatest 
power on earth,” historian John Fousek writes.84 Now military greatness seemed the ultimate 
and obvious proof of American greatness, as if it had done so all along.  
From the British embassy in Washington, the loss of world leadership to the Americans 
within six years was acutely felt. In a lengthy stock-taking of U.S. opinion, chargé John Balfour 
informed the incoming Labour government that Anglo-American relations were heading 
toward a “new order of things.” The Americans still regarded British strength as essential to the 
interests and values of the United States. They still wished Great Britain to occupy a “highly 
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important position as the bastion of Western European security and as the focal point of a far-
flung oceanic system.” But the Anglophilic prestige acquired in the lead-up to Pearl Harbor, 
Balfour reported, had been “largely eclipsed” by the burdens that warfare had imposed on 
Britain and, he might have added, the bounty that it had bestowed upon the United States. 
Americans clearly expected their British ally to “take her place as a junior partner in an orbit of 
power predominantly under American aegis.”85 Or as Winston Churchill told the House of 
Commons: “the United States stand at this moment at the summit of the world.”86 
Churchill was right, both in placing the United States at the summit and locating his 
own country and the Soviet Union down below. Although the term “super-powers” would be 
coined in 1944 to characterize the Big Three, the United States ranked first among unequals.87 
Narratives of the “bipolar” Cold War risk obscuring America’s vast advantage in global terms. 
In 1945 U.S. factories served up as much aggregated output as the whole rest of the world. 
While postwar reconstruction would narrow that gap in the future, no one knew whether and 
how far such reconstruction would succeed. The United States alone required no postwar 
reconstruction, only a peacetime conversion of its booming war economy; for it alone the war 
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enhanced “the magnitude of our material resources and the supreme quality of American 
industrial capacity,” as Welles put it.88 
Geopolitically, too, American superiority was as marked as editorialists suggested. Only 
the United States could be assured of preserving its sphere of influence, the Western 
Hemisphere, after the war. Only the United States, correspondingly, could project all 
dimensions of military power on a truly global scale. If the Red Army stood astride half of 
Europe (the much less industrialized half), it would be decades until the Red Fleet and the Red 
Air Force could deliver troops well beyond Soviet territory.89 On taking office, Truman 
estimated he should get 85 percent of what he wanted from Russian diplomats, who “needed 
us more than we needed them.”90 Meanwhile the United States had supplanted the British 
Empire as the main policeman of Asia, balancer of Europe, and creditor of the international 
economic system — not to mention of bankrupt Britain itself, dependent on Lend-Lease aid 
during the war and billions in intergovernmental loans immediately after.91  
Livingston Hartley, the Washington director of the American Association for the United 
Nations, aptly summarized the power position of the superpowers in testimony to Congress. 
The British Empire, he conceded, contained more people than the United States. The Soviet 
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Union possessed a larger army; one day it might develop the resources to ascend to primacy. 
“But the United States, in this year 1945, is supreme in naval strength, air strength, industrial 
power, and wealth.” It alone possessed the opportunity, here and now, to exert “leadership and 
unparalleled influence among the nations of the world.”92 But the capacity to lead the world 
would count for nothing without the will to do so.  
 
In this regard officials and intellectuals felt vulnerable. As we have seen, they feared a 
postwar reversion to so-called isolationism, and it would take less than that in order to thwart 
the redeployment of U.S. land forces to Europe, where the numerical dominance of the Red 
Army and the potential appeal of communism could threaten to divide the “one world” for 
which America fought. Particularly after Nazi defeats on the Eastern Front in the summer of 
1943, U.S. policymakers struggled to reconcile the goals of unifying the world order and 
cooperating with the Soviet Union — settling through 1945 on the hope that the Red Army 
would preside over an open sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, one that permitted such 
economic and political freedoms as did not compromise Soviet military security.93 Whatever 
Stalin might have in store for postwar Europe, however, the United States would require the 
willingness of its political system to exercise and maintain a preponderance of power abroad. 
It was in fashioning such political will that the non-debate proved significant. Unceasing 
professions of “internationalism” were not necessary for ensuring a sufficient quantity of public 
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support for postwar membership in international political organization, favored even before 
Pearl Harbor. They did little to enrich the quality of public discussion, since advocates declined 
to debate alternatives. But embracing internationalism and establishing the United Nations did 
imbue postwar American supremacy with a legitimacy it could not have otherwise obtained. 
That the United States was creating a world organization furnished proof positive that it was 
not simply the next empire out to aggrandize itself by exploiting others. Truman, for instance, 
told Congress why no one could doubt America’s good will in assuming “responsibility for world 
leadership”: “Our purpose is shown by our efforts to establish an effective United Nations 
Organization.”94 Precisely in order to make the United Nations effective, Truman continued, 
the United States needed a strong military, manned via universal training and coordinated by 
a new peacetime Department of Defense. 
Most expressions featured a subtler, seamless blending of advocacy of world 
organization and justification of world leadership. Colorado Senator Edwin Johnson displayed 
this dynamic in an interview during the would-be U.N. fight. Johnson insisted that the Senate 
ratify the Charter, for “there can be no United Nations Organization without the energetic 
leadership of the United States. It is our plain duty to assume such leadership with confidence 
and determination.” Johnson attempted to position world leadership as a means of realizing 
world organization, but the interviewer sensed the negative connotations that world leadership 
might still retain. He broke in: “Of course, Senator, we’re talking about world leadership in the 
best sense.” Johnson took the hint. “Yes,” he replied, “I am talking about a new kind of world 
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leadership. Not the kind that Caesar and Napoleon and Hitler had in mind, but a leadership of 
give and take — of cooperation and of good neighborliness.”95 Now the circle closed: world 
organization appeared as a method of world leadership, completing the mutual constitution of 
the two. 
In this instance, Johnson did not distinguish U.S. from Nazi world leadership by 
appealing to nationalist exceptionalism. No doubt he believed America’s political system and 
values to be inherently superior. Characteristic of policy elites in this founding moment of global 
supremacy, however, Johnson foregrounded internationalism. He highlighted mutuality and 
reciprocity, participation and rules. Even Walter Lippmann — having spent most of the war 
lambasting the naïveté of Wilsonian universalism and touting an American-British or 
American-British-Soviet concert — now exclaimed that the San Francisco Charter ushered in 
an “international society under the rule of law,” or almost did.96 Because the United States 
respected the equality of nations (internationalism), it gained the right to be superior 
(exceptionalism). Remarkably, this contradiction between internationalism and exceptionalism 
functioned instead as justification. 
Harnessing the legitimacy conferred by international institutions, many internationalists 
argued in 1944 and 1945 that the president should be able to use force solely on the authority 
of the Security Council, bypassing Congress. Running for his fourth term, FDR announced that 
“if the world organization is to have any reality at all,” the executive must be able to deploy 
military force as soon as the United Nations demanded, without waiting for Congress to debate 
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and declare war.97 Roosevelt’s position received support from six major international law 
experts like Shotwell and Wright, who explained in the New York Times that the president could 
use his existing constitutional authority to deploy force to defend international law. Such action 
would represent policing, not war, of which no declaration could be necessary.98 Roosevelt put 
the point vividly, likening the policing of international society to the policing of domestic society. 
A cop would be ineffective “if, when he saw a felon break into a house, he had to go to the 
Town Hall and call a town meeting to issue a warrant before the felon could be arrested.”99 
Roosevelt’s argument invested the U.N. Security Council with the same kind of legal and 
democratic legitimacy as a domestic legislature, whose elected representatives created codes of 
law for police to enforce. 
Yet the Security Council possessed unlimited discretion to define and punish a threat to 
“international peace and security”; its momentary judgment defined the law. Nor were its 
representatives directly elected, or, in any case, representative of every nation. Nevertheless, as 
the symbol of international society, the United Nations possessed an ersatz legal and democratic 
legitimacy, skillfully deployed by wartime internationalists looking beyond the present war. 
Eight years after Congress considered a constitutional amendment to require a popular 
referendum for each declaration of war, internationalists sought to insulate the use of force from 
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direct democracy. It was world organization that legitimated their project, investing global 
supremacy with the veneer of participatory democracy and legal order. 
 
Even though world leadership and world organization went hand in hand, then, the two 
were not equally foundational. Just as policy elites envisaged world leadership without world 
organization prior to the fall of 1941, so they continued to privilege the former as they rallied 
around the latter through 1945. Still, the more idealistic among them hoped that a thin 
commitment to internationalism might thicken after the war. FDR’s speechwriter, Robert 
Sherwood, said in reference to the Atlantic Charter that sometimes “when you state a moral 
principle, you are stuck with it, no matter how many fingers you have kept crossed at the 
moment.”100 Borgwardt quotes Sherwood in order to suggest that wartime internationalists, 
despite admittedly apologizing for national sovereignty and American power in the present, 
planted a seed that could not help but grow later.101 But what seed did internationalists plant; 
what “moral principle” did they announce? 
That moral principle was not that the dictates of international law and organization 
should trump the will of the United States, even if only in the future. Overwhelmingly, 
internationalists refused to confront the possibility of discord between the United Nations and 
the United States, partly because they had stripped from world organization any obligation for 
America to act against aggression unless its own representative concurred. Without confronting 
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the nevertheless real possibility of disagreement with world opinion, they could not state a 
principle making internationalism more than instrumental — useful when others go along, 
dispensable if they do not.  
A moment of semi-confrontation occurred in the post-Dumbarton meeting of postwar 
planners. One planner asked Pasvolsky what the United States would do if it wished to intervene 
against an aggressor like Argentina but a permanent member exercised a veto on the Security 
Council. Pasvolsky sidestepped the question. More likely, he countered, the rest of the Security 
Council would want the United States to use force when it would rather not. Although 
concluding that he personally thought the world organization should be able to judge and 
sanction the United States, Pasvolsky acknowledged that whether the United States would 
accept such subordination was “another matter.”102 In this exchange, Pasvolsky went as far as 
anyone to place international rules above American prerogatives. Even then he preferred to 
avoid envisioning a concrete scenario and evinced little confidence that the United States would 
constrain itself when the time came. 
Other officials and planners ranked the authority of international institutions less highly 
than Pasvolsky. John Foster Dulles, the chairman of liberal Protestant postwar groups and an 
important member the U.S. delegation at San Francisco, had an answer for the question that 
Pasvolsky evaded: “If a European country vetoed action to prevent aggression in the Western 
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Hemisphere, we would be entirely free to use force.”103 Dulles, a corporate lawyer, noted that 
under the Charter member states retained the right to go to war in self-defense. Should a 
permanent member stretch the meaning of self-defense in order to justify the use of force, 
“nothing can be done about it.”104 Senator Arthur Vandenberg, head of the Republican 
delegation, objected that Dulles implied nothing less than that “we have the right to do anything 
we please in self-defense.”105 Once they realized this point, “the people would be disillusioned 
beyond words.”106 Vandenberg did not, however, offer a different reading of the Charter. In 
fact, he obtained Pasvolsky’s permission to tell the Senate that “if the Security Council voted no 
and we thought action was vitally necessary we could take action on our own.”107 Before the 
ink dried on the U.N. Charter, American officials devised justifications for unilateral action that 
they or their successors would deploy later. 
As suggested by Pasvolsky’s willingness to inform the Senate, foreign policy elites struck 
similar notes in public as they did in private. Their confidential discussions at San Francisco 
differed chiefly in their specificity. In books, speeches, and testimony, internationalists stressed 
that the United Nations was a thoroughly American creation that would facilitate the projection 
of American power without impinging on American freedom of action. As Hartley told 
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Congress, the Dumbarton proposals were “basically the American plan.” Joining the United 
Nations would “place America in the lead in world affairs, fit to exert her unequaled influence, 
through a largely American system, to guide world evolution in accordance with American 
ideals.”108 Statements like this one denied any tradeoff between world organization and world 
leadership. Quite the contrary, they positioned the United Nations as essential to the full 
exercise of American power. 
Indeed internationalists frequently used the word “full” to characterize the extent to 
which the postwar United States ought to exert its own strength and follow its own judgment.109 
In The Great Decision, published in 1944, Shotwell wrote that the American people must retain 
the “full opportunity to decide when, where, and how much” to contribute in the enforcement 
of peace.110 What unified the “one world” that Willkie toured was that it “demands the full 
participation of a self-confident America.”111 Not least, soon after the release of the Dumbarton 
plan, FDR gave a wide-ranging speech on foreign policy that rebuked “inveterate isolationists” 
and ended on an uncompromising statement of American supremacy.  
Roosevelt noted that Americans could have come to terms with Hitler and “accepted a 
minor role in his totalitarian world.” But they emphatically chose otherwise: “We rejected that!” 
In FDR’s telling, Americans did not fight World War II merely to defend against the territorial 
attack at Pearl Harbor. Their purpose was rather to avoid a “minor role” in world affairs, to 
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cast off constraints, internal and external, on their world power. “We shall not again be thwarted 
in our will to live as a mature Nation, confronting limitless horizons,” Roosevelt declared. “We 
shall bear our full responsibility, exercise our full influence, and bring our full help and 
encouragement to all who aspire to peace and freedom.”112 As the United States entered the 
postwar world, this will to lead the world could not help but circumscribe international 
cooperation at every turn. Yet international cooperation could hardly go away. Symbolized in 
discourse and institutions, it already proved vital in forging the will to lead the world. 
 
The Triumph of Anti-Isolationism 
 
By June 1945, the New York Times had ample reason to call the United Nations a symbol 
that America was “in the world to stay.”113 One needed only to consult the gleaming emblem 
of the new world organization that hovered above the representatives of 50 nations who took 
the stage of San Francisco’s Herbst Theater to sign the Charter. Consisting of a circular map of 
the world framed by a pair of olive branches, the emblem depicted unity and peace among 
nations — but not equality. It gave visual primacy to North America, the only continent 
centered on the vertical axis and facing northward (whereas the bottoms of South America, 
Africa, and Australasia were cut off altogether). The world owed the design to Donal 
McLaughlin, head of the Graphics Presentation branch of the Office of Strategic Services; 
Secretary of State Stettinius had requested a number of OSS men, fresh off promoting 
                                                   
112 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Radio Address at a Dinner of the Foreign Policy Association,” New 
York, N Y, October 21, 1944, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16456. 




Dumbarton Oaks, to handle visuals for the San Francisco conference.114 A year later, 
McLaughlin modified the logo by rotating the continents 45 degrees clockwise. This version, 
which denied pride of place to any landmass, became the recognizable U.N. symbol of the 
postwar era. 
But there was no mistaking the vision of American policy elites who brought the 
organization into being. The original emblem represented well both the centrality expected of 
the United States in the new world order and the willingness of internationalists to say so. For 
even though policy elites manipulated existing concepts of internationalism, they manipulated 
openly. They were not so mendacious or shortsighted as to wage a campaign of deception, 
which could not have incorporated the broad swathe of opinion-shapers and might have 
crumbled the moment the truth came out. In this respect, the remaining anti-interventionists 
adopted an easy target by endlessly investigating the circumstances of the Pearl Harbor attack, 
as though nefarious officials had tricked the innocent public.115 Their adversaries built 
something studier than that. Exercising cultural hegemony, advocates of world leadership 
remapped how Americans comprehended the past, present, and future of their nation in the 
world. World leadership thereby captured the vocabulary and concepts of internationalism, so 
thoroughly that the two appeared to be mutually implied if not one and the same. 
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Most members of the foreign policy elite preferred to smooth over this intellectual 
transformation, if they were more than dimly aware that it had taken place. But a few marginal 
members, at once within and aslant the mainstream, reflected critically as once prominent ideas 
escaped from view. They were not convinced by the internationalists’ refrain that the League 
of Nations failed to prevent World War II because the United States stayed out (a decision 
blamed, in turn, on Congress and the American people).116 This argument held that somehow 
the League had been fundamentally faulty — based on “good intentions alone,” FDR jeered 
— and yet capable of stopping global warfare if only America had contributed.117 
In the Time/Life/Fortune Postwar Department, Raymond Leslie Buell found the 
reasoning superficial at best. He thought his fellow interventionists were fetishizing American 
power and world organization alike. As he wrote to Minnesota Senator Joseph Ball, everything 
depended on “what policies we would have followed as a League member. We could have been 
as obstructive inside as we were outside.” By casting the United States as the savior of world 
organization, interventionists assumed the world needed American power and American power 
necessarily benefitted the world. To Buell’s mind, by contrast, the two could easily clash. The 
question was how to have world organization and how to use American power, which should be 
judged by its actions rather than affirmed in advance. On balance, Buell thought the campaign 
for internationalism was preventing a meaningful discussion. He was willing to support the 
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Dumbarton Oaks proposals but equally feared that the agitation around them would “create 
the delusion that merely joining something solves everything.” In fact, “it is only the 
beginning.”118 
Buell remained hopeful that global supremacy and international cooperation would 
develop together. It took an anti-interventionist, John Basset Moore, to extend Buell’s point that 
American power might obstruct as well as construct. Eighty-one at the time of Pearl Harbor, 
Moore was past shifting his views with the political winds. He had been his generation’s most 
eminent academic expert on international law, advising decades of State Departments and 
serving as one of the first judges on the Permanent Court of International Justice.119 In his 
opinion, “nothing could be more preposterous…than the supposition that the League of 
Nations failed to preserve the peace of the world because the United States did not become a 
party to it.” This supposition positioned America as the indispensable nation to world peace, 
“apparently ignorant of the fact that the United States had not only been guilty of aggressive 
foreign war, as in the case of Mexico, but had also added to the number of great civil wars.”120  
Moore’s “apparently” suggested a willful ignorance, an affirmative act of forgetting. 
Public discourse no longer seemed able to register American power as potentially aggressive 
and deserving some measure of restraint. Moore sometimes made the realist argument that 
world organization was naïve, but mostly he argued that it could facilitate aggression and 
undermine law. That is, he criticized mid-century anti-isolationist internationalism from the 
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standpoint of turn-of-the-century legalist internationalism. He thought the United Nations gave 
the United States the power to define its enemies as aggressors — against whom all is permitted 
— and turn local wars into global wars. If so, American world leadership could become not 
only obstructive but destructive, all the more if it worked with international organization rather 






In the moment later deemed the “triumph of internationalism,” Quincy Wright did not 
speak triumphantly. He deserved to if anyone did. Since the First World War, no American 
academic had been more trenchant and prolific, inspired as many careers, and advised policy 
elites as widely on the subject of Wilsonian internationalism as a basis for world peace.1 And in 
the Second World War, no one attempted to stay as loyal to the ideals of prewar 
internationalism while espousing anti-isolationist internationalism at the same time. Yet when 
the U.N. Charter came into being, Wright was sober. In his judgment, the United Nations was 
better than “isolationism” but by no means realized Woodrow Wilson’s vision to create an 
“opinion, permeating the public of every important nation, prepared to subordinate immediate 
national interests to world law.” Instead “power politics is today the basis of the world’s political 
organization.”2 At best the new institution incorporated several different kinds of bodies, though 
the outstanding one constituted a “world empire” run by the most powerful nations.3  
Wright still refused to reduce internationalism to the projection of American power. But 
if he illustrated how prewar internationalists had sought something other than U.S. global 
supremacy, he leveled no criticisms of the new world role adopted by his colleagues. Rather 
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than confront American power, Wright emphasized world opinion. The way forward, he wrote, 
was to begin again to cultivate a global public disposed to put the welfare of mankind first. The 
United Nations could evolve into a world state only on the foundation of a “world state of 
mind,” however long that took.4 Until then, states could not trust their security to international 
law and organization, so they had to look out for themselves. Placing faith in a “still inchoate 
world opinion not yet aware of itself,” Wright divorced his residual prewar internationalism 
from his prescriptions for U.S. foreign policy. In the late 1940s, as he helped to draft a 
Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution, Wright supported the Truman Doctrine, a 
landmark in the advent of the Cold War.5 “It is regrettable,” he wrote, “that we must play the 
game of power politics until the United Nations is strong enough.”6 Little separated Wright’s 
outlook from that of Hans Morgenthau and other first-generation “realists” who championed 
power politics until the distant day when world federation might arrive.7 
In 1966, four years before his death, Wright saw American B-52s over Vietnam and no 
world constitution on the horizon. He was ready to reckon with U.S. global supremacy. He 
wrote to Walter Lippmann that “the trouble with the American people is that they do not 
recognize the difference between ‘imperialism’ and ‘internationalism.’” In the 1940s, the 
country “jumped from ‘isolationism’ to ‘imperialism,’” acquiring a taste for unilateral 
intervention everywhere in order to remake the world in the image of the United States. Wright 
                                                   
4 Wright, “Accomplishments and Expectations of World Organization,” 887. 
5 On the world constitution formulated by a Chicago group from 1945 to 1947, see Or Rosenboim, 
Emergence of Globalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming), ch. 6. 
6 Quincy Wright to Charles Bacon, April 1, 1947, Box 14, QW. 




recognized the same impulse in the nineteenth-century imperialism of Kipling’s Britain. This 
time he knew what American policymakers should do: “we should renounce unilateral 
intervention in both Europe and Asia”; accept Ho Chi Minh’s victory in a unified Vietnam; 
and bring both Germanys, both Koreas, and Communist China into the United Nations. “Such 
are the policies,” after all, “to which we committed ourselves in the San Francisco Charter.”8 
Were they? Although newly critical of American supremacy, Wright continued to 
reproduce the ideological structure that underpinned it. In World War II, Americans did not 
tell themselves they were adopting imperialism. Foreign policy elites generated a surfeit of terms 
to evoke the scale of imperial power without the moral undertones: the American Century, Pax 
Democratica, Grand Area, world leadership. But their favorite formula called on Americans to 
graduate from “isolationism” to “internationalism.” The dichotomy performed work that 
Wright advanced at the time and failed to recognize later. It turned global supremacy into the 
only legitimate posture for the United States, lest Americans abandon the world to disorder and 
their nation to isolation.  
Moreover, certain concepts of interwar internationalism — of outlawing war and 
enforcing law — fed the global interventions that the 75-year-old Wright decried. When the 
United States replaced collective bodies as the supreme judge and policeman, it acquired a 
rationale for war wherever it located an aggressor. The point was lost on Wright, but not on 
everyone. In 1943 anti-interventionist historian Harry Elmer Barnes favorably reviewed 
Wright’s monumental, 1552-page A Study of War but found the tome uncritical of 
                                                   




internationalism itself.9 “Crusades for internationalism are especially prone to spread warfare 
to global proportions,” Barnes warned. “War is not likely to be controlled by war.”10 No matter: 
Barnes, the alleged isolationist, was fast becoming a pariah. His own tome, Perpetual War for 




                                                   
9 Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942). 
10 Harry Elmer Barnes, Review of A Study of War by Quincy Wright, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 56, No. 
5 (March 1943), 847-9. 
11 Barnes, ed., Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace. Unfavorable reviews of the volume include Wayne S. 
Cole, American Historical Review, Vol. 59, No. 4 (July 1954), 961-2; Julius W. Pratt, Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 70, No. 1 (March 1955), 135-7. On Barnes, see Justus Doenecke, “Harry Elmer Barnes,” 
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